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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ERIC DEBOOTH
Appellant No. 798 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003129-2011
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 07, 2016
Appellant, Eric DeBooth, appeals from the order entered April 21,
2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, which denied his
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”). We affirm.
On October 21, 2013, Appellant entered a guilty plea to third degree
murder. That same day the trial court sentenced Appellant to 9½ to 20 years
in prison. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. On April 16, 2014, Appellant
filed a pro se “Motion to Cease and Desist” which sought to enjoin the
Department of Corrections from deducting 20% of his earnings from his
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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inmate account to pay for fines and costs (so called “ACT 84” deductions). 2
The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on May 6, 2014.
On February 21, 2015, Appellant filed pro se an “Initiation of
Petitioner’s First P.C.R.A. Pursuant to Pa.R.Cri.Pro. 901,” which again
requested that the Department of Corrections be enjoined from deducting
money from his inmate account. On April 17, 2015, the PCRA court denied
Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal. On July 17, 2015,
this Court issued a per curiam order directing the PCRA court to either
appoint counsel for Appellant or permit him to proceed pro se. Following a
hearing, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant.
Appointed counsel, Lara Glenn Hoffert, Esquire, did not file an amended
PCRA petition and relied upon Appellant’s pro se Concise Statement of Errors
on Appeal in the appellate brief prepared in this matter.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
A. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in dismissing Appellant’s pro
se PCRA [p]etition where [Appellant’s] sentence is illegal as
fines, costs, and restitution were imposed out of court?
B. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in dismissing Appellant’s pro
se PCRA [p]etition where the PCRA [c]ourt did not provide
Appellant with appointed counsel for his first PCRA [p]etition?
C. Whether Appellant’s plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
advise Appellant that he would be subjected to the imposition
of fines, costs, and restitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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2
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728.
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“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of
review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013). “[Our] scope of review
is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court
level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 2012) (citation
omitted). “[T]his Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA
court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (Pa.
2011) (citation omitted).
Before we address the merits of a PCRA petition, however, we must
first consider the petition’s timeliness. “The PCRA timeliness requirements
are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a court cannot hear untimely
PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 509 (Pa.
2004) (citation omitted). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one
year of the date that his judgment becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on November
20, 2013, thirty days following the imposition of sentence when the time for
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filing a direct appeal expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Thus, Appellant’s petition
filed February 21, 2015, is patently untimely. Appellant has not asserted
that his petition falls within any of the timeliness exceptions provided in the
PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). He argues, however, that the
lower court should have treated his “Motion to Cease and Desist” filed April
16, 2014, as a timely first PCRA petition and appointed counsel. We
disagree, as the claims raised in that Motion are not cognizable under the
PCRA.
In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).
“Pennsylvania Courts have repeatedly held that the PCRA contemplates only
challenges to the propriety of a conviction or a sentence.” See
Commonwealth v. Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 843 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc)
(string citation omitted; emphasis added).
As discussed previously, Appellant’s “Motion to Cease and Desist”
sought to enjoin the Department of Corrections from making Act 84
deductions from his prison account. In Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833
A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 2003), a state inmate filed a motion with the court of
common pleas apparently under the caption of his original criminal case to
stop Act 84 deductions from his inmate account, and the motion was denied
on its merits. On appeal, we held that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because Danysh’s claim was, in reality, a civil action against an
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agency of the Commonwealth, the DOC. Therefore, the Commonwealth court
enjoyed exclusive original jurisdiction for such a claim, pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a).
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627 (Pa. Super.
2004) (en banc), the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in
a state correctional facility, plus costs and restitution. The DOC began
deducting 20% of his earnings from an inmate account. The defendant filed
a pro se petition to stop the DOC from taking deductions. The trial court
denied the petition, finding it did not have jurisdiction to consider the
defendant’s petition. On appeal, an en banc panel of this court applied the
rationale in Danysh and affirmed the trial court’s determination.
Applying the principles of Danysh to the instant case, the trial court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Act 84 claims raised in
Appellant’s “Motion to Cease and Desist.”3 Those claims did not challenge
Appellant’s underlying sentence and, therefore, are not cognizable under the
PCRA. See, Masker, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s claim that the trial court
should have treated his “Motion to Cease and Desist” as a timely first PCRA
petition is without merit.
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3
Appellant should have sought relief to stop the DOC from withdrawing
funds from his inmate account before the Commonwealth Court via a
petition for review of governmental action. See Danysh, supra, at 153-
154.
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Based on the foregoing, Appellant has failed to establish an applicable
exception to the PCRA time bar. Accordingly, neither the lower court nor this
Court has jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s request for relief.4 See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/7/2016
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4
We note that even had we addressed Appellant’s claims, they would not
have warranted relief. As discussed, Appellant’s challenge to the Act 84
deductions is not cognizable under the PCRA. Appellant’s remaining two
issues were not included in his PCRA petition. It is well settled that the
“[f]ailure to state … a ground [for relief] in the [PCRA] petition shall preclude
the defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction
collateral relief.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B); see also Commonwealth v. Elliott,
80 A.3d 415, 430 (Pa. 2013).
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