J-A03019-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DANIEL PERKINS
Appellant No. 210 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 7, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011906-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 08, 2016
Appellant, Daniel Perkins, appeals from the January 7, 2015 judgment
of sentence of five years’ probation, after being found guilty of attempted
criminal trespass.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court has set forth the following facts and procedural history.
On September 5, 2013, at approximately 7:30
a.m., Detective Kenneth Rossiter was at his home on
Verree Road in the City and County of Philadelphia.
Detective Rossiter entered his garage, contained
within the home, and noticed Appellant at his garage
door. Detective Rossiter observed that the garage
door was moving. Detective Rossiter went back into
his house and exited the front door to confront
Appellant. Appellant said that he was looking for
someone named Sullivan. Detective Rossiter advised
Appellant that no such individual lived at that
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a) (to commit 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii)).
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address. Appellant insisted that Sullivan did live
there and began to use profanity. Detective Rossiter
told Appellant that he should leave. Appellant then
advised Detective Rossiter that he was not going
anywhere.
Detective Rossiter then advised Appellant that
he was a police detective and that Appellant was
under arrest. Appellant challenged Detective
Rossiter to show his badge, which Detective Rossiter
then retrieved inside his home. As Detective
Rossiter came out of his home, Appellant advised
him that he was going to key every car in the
driveway if Detective Rossiter didn’t let him in the
home. Detective Rossiter advised Appellant that he
had the badge Appellant mentioned earlier.
Appellant began walking north on Ver[r]ee Road.
Detective Rossiter pursued him and attempted to
take him into custody. Appellant struggled with
Detective Rossiter, flailing his arms to avoid being
handcuffed. Appellant was eventually subdued.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/1/15, at 2 (citations omitted).
On September 25, 2013, the Commonwealth filed an information,
charging Appellant with the above-mentioned offense, plus one count each
of attempted burglary, resisting arrest, and harassment.2 A bench trial was
held on October 22, 2014, at the conclusion of which Appellant was found
guilty of attempted criminal trespass. The trial court acquitted Appellant of
resisting arrest and harassment, and the attempted burglary charge was
quashed pre-trial. A pre-sentence investigation report was ordered. On
January 7, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to five years’ probation. No post-
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2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) (to commit 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)), 5104, and
2709(a)(1), respectively.
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sentence motions were filed. On January 12, 2015, Appellant filed his timely
notice of appeal.3
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.
Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter
of law to convict [A]ppellant of attempted criminal
trespass beyond a reasonable doubt because
“intimidation” as used in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(3)
requires a threat of physical force of violence, or an
intent to instill fear, an element not proven by the
Commonwealth?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Our review is guided by the following. “In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we consider whether the evidence presented at trial, and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, support the [fact finder’s] verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55,
66 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v. Pennsylvania,
135 S. Ct. 1400 (2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its burden by wholly
circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113
(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
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3
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate court, we must
review “the entire record … and all evidence actually received[.]” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Because evidentiary
sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our
scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119,
126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. Pennsylvania,
135 S. Ct. 145 (2014).
In this case, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of his conviction for
attempted criminal trespass which is defined by the following statutes.
§ 901. Criminal attempt
(a) Definition of attempt.--A person commits an
attempt when, with intent to commit a specific
crime, he does any act which constitutes a
substantial step toward the commission of that
crime.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901.
§ 3503. Criminal trespass
(a) Buildings and occupied structures.--
(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing
that he is not licensed or privileged to do so,
he:
(i) enters, gains entry by subterfuge or
surreptitiously remains in any building or
occupied structure or separately secured
or occupied portion thereof; or
(ii) breaks into any building or occupied
structure or separately secured or
occupied portion thereof.
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(2) An offense under paragraph (1)(i) is a
felony of the third degree, and an offense
under paragraph (1)(ii) is a felony of the
second degree.
(3) As used in this subsection:
“Breaks into.” To gain entry by force, breaking,
intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks, or
through an opening not designed for human
access.
Id. § 3503(a).
Appellant solely challenges the element of “intimidation” in Section
3503(a)(3). Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant concedes he threatened to key
Detective Rossiter’s cars if he was not allowed to enter the home. Id.
However, Appellant argues “[n]o reasonable person would ever allow a
stranger into their home because they made an idle threat to scratch some
paint.” Id. Appellant asserts that the statute does not define “intimidation”,
but that “the statute cannot realistically include such minor unlawful
behavior.” Id. at 12. We note that the General Assembly did not define the
term “intimidation.”
Therefore, our initial focus is on the legislative intent discernible from
the meaning of the statute. Our standard for such an inquiry is as follows.
“An issue of statutory construction presents a
pure question of law and our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Spahn v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 602 Pa. 83, 977 A.2d
1132, 1142 (2009). “The object of all interpretation
and construction of statutes is to ascertain and
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effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1
Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
In re T.B., 113 A.3d 1273, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2015). When a statute is not
explicit, we consider a variety of factors to ascertain the legislative intent,
including the object of the provision and the consequences of different
interpretations. Id., citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “Absent a definition,
statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular and plain everyday
sense, and popular meanings of such words must prevail.” Zimmerman v.
Harrisburg Fudd I, L.P., 984 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 992 A.2d 890 (Pa.
2010).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “intimidation” as “unlawful coercion;
extortion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 841 (8th ed. 2004). Further, “coercion”
is defined as “compulsion of a free agent by physical, moral, or economic
force or threat of physical force.” Id. at 275-276. Appellant attempts to
argue that a threat of physical force “must be one which endangers safety[]”
and that can only be accomplished by “threaten[ing] violence or physical
harm.” Appellant’s Brief at 25.
Upon careful review, we disagree. Despite Appellant’s attempt to
require intimidation to include a threat of violence to a person, intimidation
merely requires a threat of physical force, in this case, destruction of
property. Appellant intentionally threatened Detective Rossiter’s property,
his vehicles, in an effort to gain entry into Detective Rossiter’s home. To
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hold that a threat of physical force must be directed at a person would add a
limitation to the statutory definition that would lead to unintended results.
Essentially, Appellant’s limitation would exclude physical force against all
property from the statute’s reach, including homes, vehicles, furniture, and
even pets. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1) (stating “[t]hat the General Assembly
does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or
unreasonable”). As a result, Appellant’s threat was a “substantial step”
towards the commission of criminal trespass. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we conclude the Commonwealth met its burden of proving
attempted criminal trespass beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the Commonwealth’s evidence
was sufficient to convict Appellant of attempted criminal trespass.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s January 7, 2015 judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/8/2016
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