FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 11 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LINSEY ADAMS, No. 14-55711
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-09057-DSF-SH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SANTA BARBARA COTTAGE
HOSPITAL; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: MURPHY,*** PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Linsey Adams appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Federal Rule of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
1. Reviewing de novo the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, Kahle v.
Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 2007), we hold that the district court did not
err in dismissing Adams’s Section 1983 claims against defendants Santa Barbara
Cottage Hospital (“Cottage Hospital”), Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC (“Aurora”),
and physicians John Anis, Atman Reyes, and Ronald Sager (collectively, “the
private defendants”). To plead a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that
the defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of rights
secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Soranno’s
Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1313–14 (9th Cir. 1989). As the district
court correctly noted, Adams failed to demonstrate that the private defendants took
action “under color of state law” within the meaning of Section 1983. Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
A plaintiff may attribute a private actor’s conduct to the State under one of
three theories: the “state compulsion” test, also known as the“government nexus”
test; the “joint action” test; or the “public functions” test.1 Caviness v. Horizon
Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812, 816 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Blum v.
1
As Adams conceded, she does not assert a joint action theory of liability.
2
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (state compulsion); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (public functions). For the reasons set forth in the
district court’s order dismissing Adams’s complaint, we agree that Adams has
failed to establish Section 1983 liability against the private defendants under any of
those theories. The district court did not err in dismissing Adams’s Section 1983
claims against Cottage Hospital, Aurora, Anis, Reyes and Sager.
2. Adams also alleged that Bradley Crable, a County employee, violated her
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The parties do not
contest that Crable acted in his capacity as a county employee and took action
under color of state law during Adams’s detention.
Nevertheless, Adams failed to allege that Crable was personally involved in
the deprivation of her civil rights, a prerequisite to applying Section 1983 liability.
Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Lacey v.
Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Even if Adams
had demonstrated Crable’s involvement, she failed to plead any cognizable causes
of action with respect to those claims. Consequently, her First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities claims against
Crable fail, and the district court did not err in dismissing those claims with
prejudice.
3
Although mislabeled, Adams also alleged that Crable violated her
procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.2
See Sessions v. Chrysler Corp., 517 F.2d 759, 760–61 (9th Cir. 1975) (a claim
should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) simply because it is mislabeled).
Adams’s complaint alleged the basic elements of a due process violation, but she
did not state a plausible claim with respect to Crable’s involvement in her
detention. The district court dismissed without prejudice Adams’ due process
claim and granted Adams leave to amend her cause of action to “allege additional
facts showing that Crable caused Adams’ improper detention.” Adams declined to
avail herself of that opportunity.
When Adams declined to amend her complaint, she waived the opportunity
to cure any defects in her complaint, including her due process claim against
Crable. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). The
district court did not err in dismissing her claim without prejudice, and it did not
err in dismissing Adams’s complaint after she elected not to amend her complaint
2
We have held that a state cannot involuntarily commit a “nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom . . . without good cause”
and without “minimum requirements of due process.” Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d
1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted); People v. Allen, 42 Cal.4th 91, 98
(2007). We also have characterized claims alleging the unlawful deprivation of
liberty by involuntary commitment as violative of Fourteenth Amendment due
process. Gallinot, 657 F.2d at 1021.
4
as provided by the district court in its March 11, 2014 order. See Edwards, 356
F.3d at 1065; Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992).
3. Adams also contends that the district court erred when it applied the one-
year statute of limitations for claims related to a health care provider’s professional
negligence, Cal. Code. Civ. P. § 340.5, to her Lanterman–Petris–Short (“LPS”) Act
claims. The California Court of Appeal has held that the one-year statute of
limitations for false imprisonment, Cal. Civ. Code P. § 340(c), provides the
limitations period for LPS Act claims. Jackson v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 220
Cal. App. 3d 1315, 1320–22 (1990). The statute of limitations for false
imprisonment and for professional health care negligence accrue one-year from the
date upon which an individual became aware of her injury—in this case, from the
first day Adams was involuntarily committed. Compare Cal. Civ. Code P. § 340.5
with id. § 340(c). Although the district court applied the wrong statute of
limitations to Adams’s LPS Act claims, under either limitations period, Adams’s
claims were time-barred. Consequently, the district court’s error was harmless and
does not warrant reversal.
AFFIRMED.
5