In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI, )
Appellant, )
v. ) WD78971
)
FREDRICK WILLIAMS, ) FILED: April 12, 2016
Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. COLLINS, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION ONE: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, PRESIDING JUDGE,
VICTOR C. HOWARD AND GARY D. WITT, JUDGES
Fredrick Williams was charged with possession of a controlled substance
after police found methamphetamine in the trunk of a vehicle he was driving. The
circuit court granted Williams’ motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the
trunk based on an unlawful search and seizure. In this interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Section 547.200.1(3),1 the State contends the court erred in
suppressing the evidence because Williams does not have standing to challenge the
search of the vehicle that was owned by his girlfriend. For reasons explained
herein, we find no error and affirm the suppression order.
1
All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000, as updated by the 2013
Cumulative Supplement.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 2, 2014, at 3:53 a.m., Officer John Newman of the Holden Police
Department called dispatch to check the Missouri license plate number of a vehicle
driving near the intersection of 4th and Vine in Holden, Missouri. Dispatch
responded that the license number was not registered with the Missouri
Department of Revenue. Officer Newman stopped the vehicle.
Williams was driving the vehicle at the time of the stop. His girlfriend,
Amanda Edmonds, was in the front passenger seat. Officer Newman obtained the
car’s registration paperwork and determined that Edmonds had recently purchased
and registered the vehicle.2 Williams stated that he drove the car because his
girlfriend was too tired to drive. Williams informed Officer Newman that his
driver’s license was suspended and gave him a non-driver’s identification card.
Officer Newman also obtained Edmonds’ identification, and returned to his patrol
car.
Dispatch confirmed that Williams’ driver’s license was suspended and
informed Officer Newman that Williams had a warrant for his arrest in Randolph,
Missouri. Williams complied with Officer Newman’s request to exit the vehicle.
Officer Newman observed that Edmonds was asleep during most of the traffic
stop.
2
The documentation showed that Edmonds had registered the vehicle the day before the traffic
stop.
2
While waiting for dispatch to inform him whether Williams should be taken
into custody on the Randolph warrant, Officer Newman informed Williams that he
was going to be arrested for driving with a suspended license. Officer Newman
asked Williams to empty his pockets. Williams removed several bundles of cash
from his pockets. Officer Newman became suspicious because the money was
bundled in a manner commonly used by drug dealers.3 Based upon that suspicion,
Officer Newman asked Williams to consent to a search of the vehicle. Williams
denied consent, stating that Edmonds owned the vehicle and that he did not want
to disturb her sleeping.
Dispatch informed Officer Newman that Randolph would not take Williams
into custody on its outstanding warrant. Officer Newman then placed Williams
under arrest for driving with a suspended license. Based on his suspicion that
Williams had been engaged in drug transactions, Officer Newman called Sergeant
Matthew Bond and requested that a canine unit be brought to the scene.
Sergeant Bond arrived on the scene approximately 40 minutes later. Officer
Newman removed Edmonds from the vehicle and placed her in the back of the
patrol car.4 Sergeant Bond’s canine, Drako, began pulling toward the trunk of the
vehicle. Sergeant Bond conducted a canine sniff of the interior of the vehicle
during which Drako alerted to the seam of the back seat and the trunk.
3
Officer Newman testified that Williams had a large bundle of cash with several smaller bundles
wrapped separately inside of the large bundle. He stated that drug dealers preferred to bundle their
money “in different increments or different styles” in order to more easily remember the source of
the money.
4
Officer Newman testified that he placed Edmonds in the patrol car because it was a cold night
and she was wearing a dress. He described her as “lethargic” and stated that she fell asleep in the
patrol car.
3
The officers searched the trunk, where they found a large black bag which
contained a “six-ton bottle jack.” The jack was too large to be used for the vehicle
and appeared to be nonfunctioning. Upon closer inspection, Sergeant Bond
discovered that the jack was hollow and contained a clear plastic bag with
methamphetamine.
The State charged Williams with possession of a controlled substance.
Williams filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine found in the vehicle’s
trunk. Williams conceded that the initial traffic stop was lawful and that the stop
was lawfully extended because of his suspended license and outstanding warrant.
However, Williams argued that the purpose of the stop was accomplished as soon
as Officer Newman determined that: (1) the vehicle was lawfully registered to
Edmonds; (2) Edmonds’ driver’s license was valid; and (3) Williams would not be
taken into custody on the Randolph warrant. Williams argued that because Officer
Newman “had not acquired specific, articulable facts that would give rise to
objectively reasonable suspicion that the driver or passenger were involved in
criminal activity,” he should have “allowed [Edmonds] to take her vehicle and
proceed on her way.” Williams argued that because the search of the vehicle came
only after the investigatory detention lawfully should have ended, any evidence
obtained as a result of the search should be suppressed.
At the suppression hearing, the State argued that Williams was claiming
“that he was aggrieved [by an unlawful search and seizure] because [Edmonds] and
her vehicle were detained, not because he was lawfully detained.” Thus, the State
4
asserted that Williams did not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle
because Williams “is not aggrieved by another person’s detention.”
The circuit court granted Williams’ motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from the search of the vehicle. The court reasoned that Officer Newman lacked
reasonable suspicion that illegal activity was occurring. In its order, the court ruled
that “all evidence obtained subsequent to the arrest of [Williams] for driving while
suspended, including physical evidence and statements of witnesses, is hereby
suppressed.” The State appeals the suppression order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of the circuit court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress is for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Selvy, 462 S.W.3d 756, 764 (Mo. App. 2015). We
will reverse the ruling only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d
181, 183 (Mo. banc 1990). “Our review is limited to determining whether the trial
court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Selvy, 462 S.W.3d at 764.
In making that determination, we view the facts and reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the circuit court’s ruling. Id.
ANALYSIS
The State contends the circuit court erred in granting Williams’ motion to
suppress because Williams does not have standing to challenge the search of his
girlfriend’s vehicle. The State claims that because Edmonds owned the vehicle that
the officers searched, Williams cannot be aggrieved by an unlawful search of that
property.
5
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
individuals will not be subject to unreasonable searches or seizures. However,
“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously
asserted.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387
(1978) (citations omitted).
Although the State has the ultimate burden of showing that a motion to
suppress should be overruled, the movant has the initial burden of proving that he
is a person who is “aggrieved” by an unlawful search and seizure pursuant to
Section 542.296. State v. Ramires, 152 S.W.3d 385, 395 (Mo. App. 2004).
“The language of section 542.296.1, conferring standing to file a motion to
suppress upon an ‘aggrieved’ person, is nothing more than a codification of the
standing requirements under the Fourth Amendment as set forth by the United
States Supreme Court.” State v. Brown, 382 S.W.3d 147, 157 (Mo. App. 2012).
Thus, the movant must establish that he has standing to challenge the search by
showing that “he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or thing
searched.” Id. at 158 (citation omitted). A two-part test exists for determining
whether the movant has a legitimate expectation of privacy. First, the movant
must have had an “actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the place or thing
searched.” State v. McCrary, 621 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Mo. banc 1981). Second,
that expectation of privacy must be objectively “reasonable” or “legitimate.” Id.
The State asserts that Williams could not have had an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy in the vehicle because, when Officer Newman asked him for
6
consent to search the vehicle, Williams indicated that he did not own the car. The
State claims that Williams thereby “disowned any possible privacy interest in the
car.”
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the ruling, the circuit court
could have reasonably concluded that Williams had a subjective expectation of
privacy in the vehicle. Although there was testimony that Williams stated that
Edmonds owned the vehicle, Officer Newman also testified that Williams denied
consent because he did not want to disturb Edmonds’ sleep. Thus, the circuit
court could have concluded that Williams had control over the vehicle and denied
consent because he did not want the officers waking his girlfriend—and not
because he believed that he did not have an expectation of privacy in the car as a
non-owner driver.
The State further claims that any expectation of privacy that Williams may
have had in the vehicle was not objectively reasonable or legitimate. The State
points out that a defendant who asserts “neither a property nor a possessory
interest in the automobile” does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct. 421. Thus, the State argues that
Williams is akin to a “mere passenger” in the vehicle and, under Rakas, lacks
standing to challenge the legality of the search of that vehicle. Id. at 148-49, 99
S.Ct. 421.
“Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside
of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
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property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”
Id. at 143 n.12, 99 S.Ct. 421. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that because
one of the main rights associated with property is the right to exclude others, “one
who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.” Id., 99 S.Ct.
421 (emphasis added).
Missouri courts have noted that a defendant does not obtain standing to
challenge the search of a vehicle by showing only that he possessed the vehicle or
that he was merely driving the vehicle. State v. Toolen, 945 S.W.2d 629, 632
(Mo. App. 1997). Rather, to have standing to challenge the search, the defendant
would need to show that he had permission from the owner to possess or control
the vehicle. See Id. In other words, “[w]here the defendant offers sufficient
evidence indicating that he has permission of the owner to use the vehicle, the
defendant plainly has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and
standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.” State v. Childress, 828 S.W.2d
935, 941 (Mo. App. 1992) (citation omitted).
The State relies on State v. Sullivan, 935 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. App. 1996), to
support its assertion that Williams has no standing to challenge the search based
merely on the fact that he was driving the vehicle. In Sullivan, the Southern
District found that a non-owner operator of a boat, which was owned by one of
the passengers, did not have standing to challenge the search of the boat. Id. at
8
755.5 The court reasoned that although the defendant was operating the boat, “he
was not the owner of the boat and as such he had no expectation of privacy in the
boat.” Id.
Since Sullivan, however, our Supreme Court has suggested that a person
driving a rental car—with the authorized driver under the rental contract riding as a
passenger—may have standing to challenge the search of the car notwithstanding
the fact that the rental company had not authorized that person to drive. See
State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719 (Mo. banc 2007). In Sund, the State argued that
a permissive driver of a rental car lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
car. Id. at 722 n.4. The Court stated that “even were there merit to the State’s
questionable contention,” the permissive driver in that case had standing because
the search resulted from the unlawful detention of her person. Id. (emphasis
added). Thus, although finding that the driver had standing on other grounds, the
Court suggested that an unauthorized driver may have standing to challenge the
search of a rental car when the authorized driver of the vehicle is present as an
occupant. As we stated in Brown, “[w]hile the language in Sund may have been
dictum . . . Sund provides us with guidance as to how our Supreme Court might
view the issue of a permissive driver’s reasonable expectation of privacy when
[that driver] receives permission to use the vehicle from the authorized driver.”
382 S.W.3d at 159.
5
The defendant in State v. Sullivan claimed that he had “automatic” standing to challenge the
search “where the same possession needed to establish standing is an essential element of the
crime charged.” 935 S.W.2d 747, 755 (Mo. App. 1996). The court noted that the “automatic
standing rule is no longer the law in Missouri.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
9
In this case, there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s
ruling that Williams had permissive control of the vehicle. The officers’ testimony
at the suppression hearing revealed that Edmonds was Williams’ girlfriend and that
Williams was driving her car late at night while she slept in the passenger seat.
Officer Newman stated that Williams explained that he was driving despite having
a suspended license because Edmonds was too tired to drive. Officer Newman
testified that Edmonds was “lethargic” and slept throughout most of the traffic
stop, including falling asleep in the patrol car during the search. The circuit court
could have reasonably concluded that Williams had control over the vehicle
pursuant to Edmonds’ permission while she slept.
The circuit court’s ruling is consistent with recent cases where we have
recognized that a non-owner driver has sufficient control over a vehicle to provide
valid consent to a search of the vehicle. Selvy, 462 S.W.3d at 768 n.6;6 State v.
Hindman, 446 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Mo. App. 2014).7 Although Officer Newman
was aware that Edmonds owned the vehicle, and that it was registered in her
name, he asked Williams to consent to a search of the vehicle because he believed
6
In State v. Selvy, 462 S.W.3d 756 (Mo. App. 2015), the Eastern District affirmed the circuit
court’s suppression of evidence found in a vehicle the defendant was driving. The vehicle belonged
to the defendant’s sister. Id. at 761. Because the detention of the defendant’s person lasted
beyond the time necessary to effect the initial purpose of the stop, the search of his sister’s vehicle
was the result of an unlawful detention, and the evidence was therefore suppressed. Id. at 768.
The court also concluded that the defendant’s consent was involuntary. Id. at 769.
7
In State v. Hindman, 446 S.W.3d 683, 685 (Mo. App. 2014), police stopped a vehicle owned by
the defendant, but driven by her friend. The defendant was present in the vehicle as a passenger.
Id. Upon the officer’s request, the defendant’s friend consented to a search of the vehicle, in which
officers found drugs. Id. at 685–86. In upholding the search of the vehicle as lawful, we stated
that “a non-owner driver of a vehicle has sufficient authority to grant valid consent to search the
vehicle.” Id. at 687.
10
that Williams, as the driver, “had the ultimate decision” as to whether to provide
consent. In other words, Officer Newman did not seek to obtain consent from
Edmonds because he believed Williams to be asserting control over the vehicle with
his sleeping girlfriend’s permission.
Because the evidence showed that Williams was driving the vehicle with the
owner’s permission, Williams had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle
at the time of the traffic stop. Therefore, Williams has standing to challenge the
resulting search of the vehicle. The circuit court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous.
The State’s point on appeal is denied.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the circuit court’s suppression order.
____________________________________
LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
ALL CONCUR.
11