OPINION ON REHEARING
APPELLANTS PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Chuck W. Adams Attorneys for ArvinMeritor, Inc., et al.
Pendleton, Indiana Brian L. McDermott
Christopher C. Murray
Charles E. Howard Ebony A. Reid
Morgantown, Indiana Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for State of Indiana FILED
Attorneys for Amici Curiae, Michael Gregory F. Zoeller Apr 18 2016, 8:52 am
Kincade, Antonio Collier, and David Attorney General of Indiana CLERK
Marzini Frances Barrow Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
Robert S. Rifkin Deputy Attorney General and Tax Court
Clinton E. Blanck Indianapolis, Indiana
Maurer Rifkin & Hill, P.C.
Attorneys for Corizon, Inc., et al.
Carmel, Indiana
Rachel A. East
Bleeke Dillon Crandall
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Chuck W. Adams, Charles E. April 18, 2016
Howard, et al., Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Plaintiffs, 49A02-1406-PL-465
Appeal from the Marion Superior
v. Court
The Honorable James B. Osborn,
ArvinMeritor, Inc., et al., Judge
Appellees-Defendants. Trial Court Cause No.
49D14-1206-PL-25688
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 49A02-1406-PL-465 | April 18, 2016 Page 1 of 6
[1] In Adams v. ArvinMeritor et al, 2015 WL 8319119 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015),
we held, in part, that inmates at the Indiana Department of Correction
Correctional Industrial Facility participating in an offender work program
operated by a private enterprise had a private right of action to enforce the
statutory prevailing wage requirement. Accordingly, we reversed the trial
court’s order dismissing the wage claim against Meritor and the State
defendants and remanded for further proceedings. Meritor has filed a petition
for rehearing,1 contending we unreasonably interpreted Indiana Code section
11-10-7-4 and the decision should be revisited because it will result in
“presumably unintended consequences.” Meritor Appellees’ Petition for
Rehearing at 4. We grant rehearing to address Meritor’s argument.
[2] Essentially, Meritor contends our interpretation of section 11-10-7-4 “opens the
door to claims under every other generally applicable employment law that
does not expressly exclude prisoners.” Id. at 3.2 Our decision was premised on
the specific statutes implicated by Adams’s claim: Indiana Code chapters 11-
10-6 and -7, and the Wage Payment and Wage Claims statutes (Indiana Code
1
Meritor filed its petition for rehearing on January 8, 2016, the thirtieth day after our opinion was issued.
Adams did not file a response to the petition for rehearing. The State defendants submitted a Brief in Support
of Co-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing on January 26, 2016, well after the time for filing their own petition
for rehearing of the opinion had passed (as well as after the time for a response to a petition for rehearing to
be filed had passed). Our rules do not provide for a “brief in support” of a petition for rehearing, and the
State did not seek leave of court to file the brief. We have therefore not considered it.
2
Meritor does not make a separate argument with respect to this court’s determination that its employment
program at the Department of Correction is covered by Chapter 7, but does note that it denies Chapter 7
applies to it. Id. at 2 n.4. If the Meritor enterprise at the DOC is not a Chapter 7 enterprise, then it is difficult
to imagine any enterprise that would be. See Adams, 2015 WL 8319119 at *1, 4 (discussing the nature and
operation of Meritor’s business at CIF).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 49A02-1406-PL-465 | April 18, 2016 Page 2 of 6
chapters 22-2-5 and -9). It was further premised on the specific circumstances
of this claim: namely, that after this claim was initiated, those statutes were
amended to foreclose any similar claims in the future. The amendment of those
specific statutes was a prime consideration in reaching our decision. See Adams,
2015 WL 8319119 at *5 (considering the amendment of the statutes to exclude
an action such as Adams’s in determining legislative intent). Thus, we reject
Meritor’s argument that the decision could be expanded far beyond the narrow
interpretation at issue when in fact, a claim such as Adams’s is no longer
available but for those who, like Adams, had claims already in progress when
the statutes were amended in May 2013.
[3] Further, we note that this case was decided by the trial court on a Trial Rule
12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. As stated in the original opinion,
[w]e will affirm a dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) only if it is
apparent that the facts alleged in the complaint are incapable of
supporting relief under any set of circumstances. We view
motions to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) with disfavor
because such motions undermine the policy of deciding cases on
their merits.
Id. at *3 (citations omitted). Our opinion determined only that on its face,
Adams’s complaint had stated a claim for which relief could be granted under
Title 11, but cautioned that “[t]here may be other impediments to Adams’s
recovery of the wages to which will be discerned at a later stage . . . .” Id. at *5.
We leave consideration of those “other impediments” to the trial court on a
more fully developed record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 49A02-1406-PL-465 | April 18, 2016 Page 3 of 6
[4] For these reasons, we reaffirm our earlier opinion in all respects.
Mathias, J., concurs.
May, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 49A02-1406-PL-465 | April 18, 2016 Page 4 of 6
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Chuck W. Adams, Charles E. Court of Appeals Case No.
Howard, et al., 49A02-1406-PL-465
Appellants-Plaintiffs,
v.
ArvinMeritor, Inc., et al.,
Appellees-Defendants.
May, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[1] I agree that rehearing is appropriate in this case to address ArvinMeritor’s
concerns about possible implications of the reasoning in the majority decision.
But I cannot agree with the majority analysis on rehearing, because as
explained in my dissent in our original opinion, Ind. Code § 11-10-7-4 should
not be interpreted to provide a private right of action.
[2] This court stated explicitly in Kimrey v. Donahue, 861 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007), trans. denied, that trial courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
complaints like Adams’ “unless an explicit private right of action is afforded by statute
or an allegation is made that constitutional rights are being violated.”
(Emphasis added.) In the case before us the majority identified no such explicit
private right of action; to the contrary, it resolved that issue based on its
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 49A02-1406-PL-465 | April 18, 2016 Page 5 of 6
determination “section 11-10-7-4 provides at least an implied right to sue.”
Adams v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., No. 49A02-1406-PL-465, 2015 WL 8319119, at *5
(Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015) (emphasis added).
[3] Recognizing, however, that the majority opinion found a private right of action,
I agree rehearing is appropriate to address ArvinMeritor’s concerns.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 49A02-1406-PL-465 | April 18, 2016 Page 6 of 6