NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3301
___________
ELIZABETH LIGGON-REDDING;
STEWART LIGGON; *MINORS S, D & K,
Appellants
v.
**BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Elizabeth Liggon-Redding; Stewart Liggon,
Appellants
*(Dismissed pursuant to the Court’s Order dated 3/31/2015)
**(Amended pursuant to Clerk’s Order dated 6/01/2015)
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-00827)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 20, 2016
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 21, 2016)
___________
OPINION *
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
___________
PER CURIAM
Elizabeth Liggon-Redding and her son Stewart Liggon appeal from the final order
of the District Court directing the closure of this case. We will affirm as to Liggon-
Redding. As to Liggon, this appeal is dismissed. 1
I.
Liggon-Redding is a frequent pro se litigant. In this case, she filed suit against the
entity now known as Bank of America, National Association (“BOFA”). She did so on
her own behalf and purportedly on behalf of Liggon and his three minor children as well.
The District Court dismissed her cursory complaint without prejudice, and she filed an
amended complaint. Liggon-Redding alleged that BOFA discriminated against Liggon
on the basis of his race and disability in setting a high interest rate on a mortgage
obtained by Liggon and his wife. Liggon-Redding further alleged that BOFA unlawfully
instituted eviction proceedings, trespassed on Liggon’s property, and stole certain of his
belongings. Only Liggon-Redding signed the initial and amended complaints.
BOFA moved to dismiss the amended complaint on standing and other grounds,
and the District Court granted that motion and dismissed the amended complaint on
October 21, 2013. Among other things, the District Court concluded that Liggon-
1 Liggon-Redding has purported to file various documents with this Court on Liggon’s
behalf. Our Clerk advised appellants that documents filed on Liggon’s behalf would be
deemed filed by him only if he personally signed them. Liggon-Redding has filed a brief,
but Liggon neither signed it nor filed a brief of his own. Thus, this appeal is dismissed as
to Liggon pursuant to Fed. R. App. 3(a)(2) and 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 107.2(b), for failure
2
Redding pleaded no facts suggesting that she has standing to assert any claims on her
own behalf and that she is not permitted to represent her family members pro se. The
District Court’s dismissal was once again without prejudice, however, and it gave
Liggon-Redding time to file a second amended complaint and to hire a lawyer if she
wished the interests of the other named plaintiffs to be represented.
Liggon-Redding responded by filing motions for appointment of counsel and an
extension of time to amend her complaint. The District Court denied her motion for
counsel but granted her an extension of time to amend. Liggon-Redding appealed from
that order at C.A. No. 13-4612, and we dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Thereafter, the District Court granted Liggon-Redding another extension of time to
amend. Liggon-Redding instead filed a motion to reconsider appointing counsel, and the
District Court denied that motion but granted her one final extension of time to amend.
The District Court also warned her that it would close the case if she failed to do so.
Liggon-Redding instead filed a document captioned as “plaintiff attempt to try to
submit an amended complaint and be allowed to turn this complaint into a class action
law suit and appointment of counsel.” Liggon-Redding sought to initiate a class action
against BOFA on the basis of its alleged noncompliance with a consent decree in a
different case and again requested appointment of counsel. The District Court denied her
requests and finally closed the case on July 7, 2014. Liggon-Redding appeals.
to file a brief.
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II.
We deem the District Court’s July 7 order a final decision closing the case with
prejudice. We thus have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Liggon-Redding,
however, has not properly placed any issue before us for review. A litigant in Liggon-
Redding’s position might challenge the District Court’s legal analysis in dismissing the
amended complaint, its denial of counsel, or its decision to close the case. Liggon-
Redding’s notice of appeal mentions the denial of counsel and class-action status, but her
brief on appeal does not mention those issues or any of the District Court’s rulings at all.
Thus, as BOFA argues, Liggon-Redding has waived all potential issues on appeal. 2
Nevertheless, we have reviewed the District Court’s rulings and perceive no abuse
of discretion in its case management decisions or its denial of Liggon-Redding’s requests
for counsel. Appointment of counsel generally requires some potentially meritorious
claim, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993), and Liggon-Redding has
never raised anything in the District Court or in this one suggesting that she has standing
2 We previously denied Liggon-Redding’s motions for appointment of counsel in this
Court and to stay this appeal, and we directed her to file a brief if she wished to proceed.
Liggon-Redding has titled her brief “plaintiffs [sic] attempt at the ordered brief.” The
brief is approximately one page long, and it mentions only an apparent refinance of the
mortgage, an attorney’s performance in an unidentified proceeding, and the recent
occupation of federal land in Oregon. None of these issues is relevant to any of the
District Court’s rulings. We treat pro se litigants with indulgence in certain respects but,
“[a]t the end of the day, . . . they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other
litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). And
Liggon-Redding is an experienced pro se litigant who is well-aware of the briefing
requirements and has filed briefs in other cases.
4
to assert any potentially meritorious claim against BOFA. Nor may she represent her
family members pro se. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d
Cir. 1991). Thus, the District Court also did not err in dismissing Liggon-Redding’s
amended complaint or abuse its discretion in declining to grant her a seventh opportunity
to amend.
III.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court as to Liggon-
Redding. As to Liggon, this appeal is dismissed.
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