14-3412
Singh v. Lynch
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A200 940 543
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
26th day of April, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
PETER W. HALL,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SARBJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 14-3412
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,
New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Justin
Markel, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Nancy E. Friedman, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Government’s unopposed motion
to file a late brief is GRANTED, and the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Sarbjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of an August 14, 2014, decision of the BIA, affirming
an August 28, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
Sarbjit Singh, No. A200 940 543 (B.I.A. Aug. 14, 2014), aff’g
No. A200 940 543 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 28, 2013). We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
2006). The applicable standards of review are well established.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,
165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). The agency may, “[c]onsidering the
totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on
an asylum applicant’s demeanor and inconsistencies in his
statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether”
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they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
Singh was not credible.
The agency reasonably relied on Singh’s demeanor, noting
that his testimony was vague, unresponsive, and evasive. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430
F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005); Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329
F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) , overruled in part on other grounds
by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305
(2d Cir. 2007). That finding is supported by the record.
The agency’s demeanor finding and the overall credibility
determination are bolstered by record inconsistencies. See Li
Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006);
see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67. Singh testified that
he did not ask his political party for a supporting letter until
2012, but the letter he submitted was dated 2011. See Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 164, 166-67. Further, Singh testified
inconsistently regarding whether he knew the name of the author
of that letter, how he discovered the author’s address, and who
had obtained the letter. Singh’s attempts to explain these
inconsistencies only led to further inconsistencies. See
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.
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Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency
reasonably relied further on his failure to submit corroborating
evidence sufficient to rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao
Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The IJ
reasonably declined to credit the political party’s letter given
Singh’s inconsistent testimony as to how he obtained it. The
IJ did not err in giving diminished weight to Singh’s remaining
individualized evidence, which consisted only of photocopies
of affidavits from interested parties and his birth certificate.
See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013); Xiao Ji
Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006).
Given the demeanor, inconsistency, and lack of
corroboration findings, the agency’s adverse credibility
determination is supported by substantial evidence. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That finding is dispositive of
Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.
2006).
Accordingly, the Government’s motion to file a late brief
is GRANTED, and the petition for review is DENIED. As we have
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completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal
in this petition is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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