IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1870
Filed April 27, 2016
SHAWN DESHAY HOOSMAN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.
Lekar, Judge.
A defendant appeals the district court’s dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas M. McIntee, Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ.
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VOGEL, Judge.
Shawn Deshay Hoosman appeals the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR). Hoosman claims the district court erred in
concluding he failed to preserve his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for
PCR proceedings. He also asserts his PCR counsel rendered ineffective
assistance if an adequate record was not made. We agree the district court
erred by dismissing the claims on error-preservation grounds, and therefore, we
reverse and remand this matter for a ruling on the merits of Hoosman’s PCR
application.
In July 2008, Hoosman was convicted of several drug-related offenses
and for driving while barred. His conviction and sentences were affirmed on
appeal. State v. Hoosman, No. 09-0067, 2010 WL 1579428, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Apr. 21, 2010). Hoosman filed a pro se PCR application in 2010 that ultimately
raised thirteen claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and a PCR hearing
was held on May 27, 2014. After receiving testimony and exhibits, the district
court issued its ruling dismissing all of Hoosman’s claims. The court found
Hoosman failed to preserve error on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
because he had not asserted them in his direct appeal, raising them for the first
time in his PCR application.
On appeal, Hoosman claims the court’s dismissal was in error. On our
review, we agree. See Castro v State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011)
(holding our review of the district court’s dismissal of a PCR application is for
errors at law).
Iowa Code section 814.7(1) and (2) (2009), provides:
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1. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal
case shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction
relief pursuant to chapter 822, except as otherwise provided in this
section. The claim need not be raised on direct appeal from the
criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for
postconviction relief purposes.
2. A party may, but is not required to, raise an ineffective
assistance claim on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings if
the party has reasonable grounds to believe that the record is
adequate to address the claim on direct appeal.
(Emphasis added.) The State agrees the district court erred in its dismissal of
the action on error-preservation grounds but asserts, “[T]he district court followed
the wrong path to reach the correct result.” It urges us to affirm the dismissal by
finding Hoosman failed to overcome the presumption counsel was effective and
by finding Hoosman failed to prove prejudice because of the overwhelming
evidence of his guilt presented at the criminal trial. The State also claims the
PCR record is incomplete so as not to allow for a fair review of Hoosman’s claim
against PCR counsel’s representation.
We conclude the district court erred when it dismissed Hoosman’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims based on his failure to raise the claims
on direct appeal. Since Iowa Code section 814.7 was enacted in 2004, it has
been the law of this state that an ineffective-assistance claim need not be raised
on direct appeal for it to be raised in a PCR proceeding. See State v. Johnson,
784 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Iowa 2010). In addition, this statute has been held to be
retroactive and applicable to all criminal cases. Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45,
50–51 (Iowa 2007).
We decline the State’s invitation to address the merits of Hoosman’s
claims for the first time on appeal. The district court is in a better position to
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make the necessary credibility assessments, having heard the evidence first
hand. We will not usurp the PCR court’s role by ruling on the substance of the
ineffective-assistance claims before the PCR court has addressed them. We
therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Hoosman’s PCR application and
remand for a ruling on the merits from the record already created.1 We do not
retain jurisdiction.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1
Because we are reversing and remanding for the court to rule on Hoosman’s claims
that his criminal trial counsel was ineffective, we need not address Hoosman’s claim that
his PCR trial counsel was ineffective.