15-195-cr
United States v. Jackson
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 3rd day of May, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
GUIDO CALABRESI,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
United States of America,
Appellee,
v. 15-195-cr
Corey Jackson,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Randall D. Unger, Esq.
Bayside, New York.
FOR APPELLEE: Sandra S. Glover, Assistant United States
Attorney, Brian P. Leaming, Assistant
United States Attorney (on the brief), for
Deirdre M. Daly, United States Attorney for
the District of Connecticut, Hartford,
Connecticut.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
(Chatigny, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-appellant Corey Jackson appeals from the district court’s judgment finding him
in violation of a condition of supervised release and sentencing him to 60 months’ imprisonment
consecutive to the two concurrent life terms he is set to serve in the State of Florida. Jackson
argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering sua sponte a
competency hearing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
“It is well established that the Due Process Clause . . . prohibits the criminal prosecution of
a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992).
This due process right “spans the duration of a criminal proceeding,” including sentencing.
United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also Saddler v.
United States, 531 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1976). Where, as here, neither counsel filed a motion for a
hearing to determine incompetency, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) requires the court to order sua sponte
such a hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable
to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in
his defense.”
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s determination that such “reasonable
cause” warranting a competency hearing is absent. Arenburg, 605 F.3d at 169.
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While there are “no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further
inquiry to determine fitness to proceed,” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975), a district
court “must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused
unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial,” id. at 181, because the determination
whether “reasonable cause” exists to believe that a defendant is incompetent involves “a highly
particularized assessment that varies in each case,” United States v. Kerr, 752 F.3d 206, 216 (2d
Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). In making this particularized determination, a district court
should consider “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior
medical opinion on competence to stand trial.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. We recognize that
“some degree of mental illness cannot be equated with incompetence,” United States v. Vamos,
797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986), but note equally that a district court’s “observations alone
cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on [the issue of competence] if there is substantial
other evidence that the defendant is incompetent,” United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1233
(2d Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
Although the district court here did not make any explicit findings on the record regarding
Jackson’s competency, for the reasons that follow we affirm its decision not to order a competency
hearing. Judge Chatigny presided over both Jackson’s 2008 plea hearing and the 2015 hearing for
his violation of a condition of supervised release that we review in this appeal. Before the 2008
hearing, the court granted Jackson’s request for a competency hearing and Jackson was found
competent to stand trial. At the 2015 hearing, the court listened to defense counsel explain how
the issue of Jackson’s competency was addressed in the Florida state proceedings, and that despite
the inconsistent conclusions proffered by various psychiatric doctors as to Jackson’s competency,
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he was ultimately declared fit to stand trial. Thus, the court was familiar with Jackson’s history of
mental illness and aware that his competency had been repeatedly tested, with inconsistent results.
In addition, the court heard defense counsel explain that although he was displeased with how the
competency evaluations were performed and analyzed with respect to the proceedings in Florida,
he “[did not] have any issues with how [Jackson] is now,” and his competency “was definitely
more important at the time [he stood trial in Florida].” App. at 113; cf. United States v. Kirsh, 54
F.3d 1062, 1071 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A failure by trial counsel to indicate that the defendant had any
difficulty in assisting in preparation or in comprehending the nature of the proceedings provides
substantial evidence of the defendant’s competence.”).
The district court did not, however, rely exclusively on the representations of Jackson’s
counsel. It canvassed Jackson directly, asking him repeatedly whether he was following along
and understood what was going on. Jackson responded affirmatively each time. Moreover,
Jackson himself spoke cogently at this hearing about what he perceived as a lack of proof
underlying his murder conviction.
Because “[t]he question of competency focuses on a defendant’s abilities at the time of [the
hearing],” Kirsh, 54 F.3d at 1070 (emphasis added), we have held that “the failure to conduct a full
competency hearing is not a ground for reversal when the defendant appeared to be competent
during [the hearing],” id; see also Vamos, 797 F.2d at 1150. Of course, a district court should also
consider prior psychiatric evaluations and other evidence of mental illness when considering
whether to hold a competency hearing. See Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1233. We are satisfied that the
district court fulfilled this duty. Given Jackson’s cogent demeanor and his counsel’s
representation that he was competent, the district court judge’s familiarity with Jackson’s history
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of mental illness, and the fact that Jackson ultimately was determined to be competent to stand trial
in Florida, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not ordering a
competency hearing.
We have considered Jackson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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