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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
RACHEL ELIZABETH STIGER :
:
Appellant :
: No. 228 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 9, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005651-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., AND FITZGERALD,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MAY 05, 2016
Appellant, Rachel Elizabeth Stiger, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas following
her convictions for two counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”)1 and
one count of failure to stop at a red signal.2 Appellant argues the Port
Authority officer did not have authority to stop Appellant’s vehicle, she was
arrested without probable cause, and the Commonwealth unlawfully
obtained a blood sample in the absence of a warrant. We affirm.
On December 8, 2013, Officer Dominic Ravotti, of the Port Authority of
Allegheny County Police Department, arrested Appellant for DUI. On August
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (c).
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3112(a)(3)(i).
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19, 2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion alleging Officer Ravotti
exceeded his “limited jurisdiction” when he stopped her, he did not have the
requisite reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Appellant, and he
unlawfully coerced her consent to have her blood drawn. Omnibus Pre-Trial
Mot., 8/19/14, at 3-8. The trial court held a hearing on October 10, 2014,
at which the only evidence introduced was the testimony of Officer Ravotti.
We summarize the salient facts from the hearing as follows.
At the time of the hearing, Officer Ravotti had been a police officer for
ten years and employed by the Port Authority of Allegheny County Police
Department for one year. N.T. Suppress Hr’g, 10/10/14, at 4. He is dually
certified as a railway officer and through the Municipal Officer’s Education
and Training Commission. Id. at 4-5. He described his duties as a Port
Authority officer:
As an officer for Port Authority we are to patrol and
protect all Port Authority property, all Port Authority
bus routes, light rail transit routes and [] bus stops
and whatnot . . . [D]epending on the hours of the
day we do different duties. On a daylight shift, it’s
more the downtown area with the large amount of
traffic downtown. On midnight we are put more
towards checking on bus shelters due to a large
amount of vandalism and people sleeping in bus
shelters and keeping – setting up homes in basically
shelters so that people can use our shelters correctly
whenever morning comes.
Id. at 5.
On December 8, 2013, Officer Ravotti was “patrolling the Liberty
Avenue area” in Pittsburgh checking multiple bus stops and shelters along
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that road.3 Id. at 6. He testified there is a busway ramp at Liberty Avenue
and 16th Street. Id. He recounted what drew his attention to Appellant:
That night I was stopped at a traffic light on 16th
Street at Liberty Avenue, I was behind another
private auto. I noticed our light turn green; the
private auto kept on to travel and turned outbound
onto Liberty Avenue. At that time the vehicle got
about halfway into the intersection and had to come
to a complete stop. At that time I had to come to a
complete stop almost striking the vehicle in front of
me. I noticed a green colored Subaru traveling
outbound on Liberty Avenue go through a steady red
signal.
Id.
Officer Ravotti then activated his emergency lights and effected a
traffic stop. Id. at 6-8. When he approached the vehicle, Officer Ravotti
observed that Appellant, the driver of the vehicle, had bloodshot, glassy
eyes, detected an odor of alcohol, and noticed Appellant’s speech was
“slurred.” Id. at 9. Appellant admitted she had consumed alcohol. Id.
Officer Ravotti requested that Appellant perform field sobriety tests. Id.
Appellant was “unsteady” as she left her vehicle and “was having a hard
time standing still.” Id. at 10. Officer Ravotti asked Appellant to recite the
“ABCs” beginning with “C.” Id. Appellant began by reciting “A,” stopped on
a letter twice, and “slurred a couple letters.” Id. Officer Ravotti then asked
3
Officer Ravotti indicated there is a bus stop at approximately every block
and a bus shelter approximately every other block along Liberty Avenue.
N.T. at 6.
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Appellant to complete “the finger touch test.” Id. He demonstrated how to
perform the task for Appellant; however, when she attempted, she counted
incorrectly and used the wrong fingers. Id. at 10-11. Lastly, Officer Ravotti
asked Appellant to perform “the nose touch test;” Appellant missed her nose
and used the wrong hand on two of her attempts. Id. Officer Ravotti
determined Appellant failed all three tests and arrested her for DUI. Id. at
9, 11.
Officer Ravotti transported Appellant to Allegheny General Hospital for
a blood test. Id. at 11. He testified Appellant consented to the blood draw.
Id. at 12. He specifically noted he reviewed with Appellant the PennDOT
DL-26 form,4 which he and Appellant signed, and she signed a separate
hospital consent form.5 Id. at 12-13. Appellant had a blood alcohol content
(“BAC”) of .184%. Id. at 14.
The trial court permitted the parties to file memoranda and heard oral
arguments on November 21, 2014. The court denied the motion to
suppress, and Appellant proceeded to a stipulated nonjury trial at which she
was found guilty of the aforementioned offenses.6 On January 9, 2015, the
4
See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547.
5
We note the DL-26 form and the hospital consent form were admitted
without objection into evidence. However, they do not appear in either the
certified or the reproduced record.
6
The trial court acquitted Appellant of careless driving, 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3714(a).
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court sentenced Appellant to ninety days of intermediate punishment and a
concurrent term of eighteen months’ probation for DUI—highest rate of
alcohol. Sentencing Order, 1/9/15. The court granted Appellant’s request
for bail pending appeal.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 6, 2015, and a
court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on March 10, 2015. The trial
court authored a responsive opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:
A. Whether or not Port Authority Officer Ravotti had
the jurisdictional authority under the Railroad and
Street Railway Police Act, 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3303(a), to
perform a traffic stop of [] Appellant’s vehicle while
she was driving on a public highway, not a roadway
that was used exclusively for Port Authority vehicles?
B. Whether or not there was probable cause to arrest
[Appellant] for the offense of DUI when Port
Authority Officer Ravotti did not administer
standardized field sobriety tests but instead, relied
on arbitrary testing that has not been standardized
or associated with alcohol impairment on any
scientific level?
C. Whether or not [Appellant] was subjected to an
unlawful search and seizure of her blood when the
Port Authority officer failed to obtain a search
warrant before conducting a blood draw?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant first argues that “Officer Ravotti was not acting within his
primary jurisdiction for the Port Authority when he stopped Appellant’s
vehicle.” Id. at 11. She contends the intersection where the stop occurred
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was a public highway, and the evidence did not establish that the
intersection is “in the immediate and adjacent vicinity of Port Authority
Property.” Id. at 12. She argues further that Officer Ravotti did not have
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at 15. Appellant reasons that because no
bus service was running at the time, “then the bus stops and shelters were
empty and no passengers were present.” Id. Moreover, she contends there
was insufficient evidence to establish her conduct placed Port Authority
personnel, property, or passengers in jeopardy. Id. at 16. Appellant posits
that affirming the trial court “will permit Port Authority police to patrol
throughout the county under the ruse that they are checking bus shelters.”
Id. at 18. We disagree.
Our standard of review is well settled.
An appellate court may consider only the
Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole.
Where the record supports the factual findings of the
trial court, the appellate court is bound by those
facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions
drawn therefrom are in error. However, it is also
well settled that an appellate court is not bound by
the suppression court’s conclusions of law.
* * *
In appeals from suppression orders, our scope of
review is limited to the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing.
Commonwealth v. Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517-18 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations and footnote omitted).
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Further, it is within the sole province of the suppression court to
determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to afford testimony.
Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 117 (Pa. Super. 2008).
The power of Port Authority officers is codified at 22 Pa.C.S. § 3303
and provides, in relevant part:
(a) General powers.—Railroad and street railway
policeman shall severally possess and exercise all the
powers of a police officer in the City of Philadelphia,
in and upon and in the immediate and adjacent
vicinity of, the property of the corporate authority or
elsewhere within this Commonwealth while engaged
in the discharge of their duties in pursuit of railroad,
street railway or transportation system business.
22 Pa.C.S. § 3303(a).
Our Supreme Court noted, “the Act plainly includes aspects of both
primary or derivative jurisdiction . . . and a distinct, direct grant of
extraterritorial authority . . . .” Commonwealth v. Firman, 813 A.2d 643,
647 (Pa. 2002). The Court acknowledged:
by conditioning the grant of extraterritorial
jurisdiction on engagement in the discharge of duties
in pursuit of transportation system business, the
General Assembly intended to require a closer
connection between the interests of the
transportation system and encounters in which police
powers are to be exercised than mere “on-duty”
status of transportation system police on the
observation of offenses.
Id.
The Court held the following situation creates a sufficient connection
enabling an officer to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction:
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In circumstances in which a motorist’s conduct
on a public highway jeopardizes Port Authority
personnel, property, or passengers (here the
transportation system officer and the authority
vehicle that he was operating), we conclude
that a sufficient connection to transportation
system business arises such that extrajudicial
jurisdiction of Port Authority policeman is
implicated. Once police power is so enabled,
absent a sufficient break in the encounter, its
exercise may continue through an investigatory stop
and/or arrest, where otherwise warranted.
Id. at 648 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
Instantly, the uncontradicted testimony of Officer Ravotti established
that while he was on duty and driving toward an intersection on a public
roadway, with a green traffic light, Appellant drove through a steady red
light on the intersecting road. N.T. at 6. His unrebutted testimony further
demonstrated he was patrolling bus stations and shelters to protect them
from vandalism and unauthorized occupants and ensure they were in good
order for morning commuters. Id. at 5; accord 22 Pa.C.S. § 3303(a).
While discharging his duties, Appellant’s traffic violation caused the vehicle
directly in front of Officer Ravotti to come to an abrupt stop in the middle of
the intersection and forced him to bring his vehicle to a complete stop to
avoid an accident with said vehicle. N.T at 5. Accordingly, we conclude the
suppression record amply supports the trial court’s determination, and we
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discern no legal error.7 See Caple, 121 A.3d at 517-18; Firman, 813 A.2d
648.
Moreover, in light of the facts of this case, i.e., Appellant’s actions
causing a disturbance in traffic and a near-accident between Officer Ravotti
and another motorist, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s policy argument
that our ruling will permit Port Authority officials from patrolling beyond their
jurisdiction under the ruse of checking bus shelters. See Appellant’s Brief at
18. The Firman Court clarified that a Port Authority officer’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction is properly invoked when a motorist’s conduct jeopardizes Port
Authority personnel, property, or passengers, as Appellant’s actions in this
case did. See Firman, 813 A.2d at 648.
Next, Appellant contends there was no probable cause to arrest her for
DUI because the field sobriety exercises Officer Ravotti asked Appellant to
perform “are not standardized or associated with alcohol impairment on any
scientific level.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. She argues, “the information
gathered from these tests is untrustworthy and does not provide an
objective basis to establish probable cause” and that without consideration
7
We note the trial court relied primarily on Officer Ravotti’s testimony that
there were bus stops every block and bus shelters every other block in
determining he exercised primary jurisdiction. Trial Ct. Op., 7/8/15, at 3
(unpaginated). Although our reasoning differs than the trial court’s, we
agree Officer Ravotti was acting within his jurisdiction. Furthermore, we
may affirm on any basis. Commonwealth v. Clouser, 998 A.2d 656, 661
n. 3 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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of Officer Ravotti’s testimony, the trial court could not find there was
probable cause to arrest. Id. at 21, 23. Appellant is due no relief.
This Court has explained:
[p]robable cause exists where the officer has
knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to
warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver
has been driving under the influence of alcohol or a
controlled substance. Additionally, [p]robable cause
justifying a warrantless arrest is determined by the
totality of the circumstances. Furthermore, probable
cause does not involve certainties, but rather the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent [persons] act.
Angel, 946 A.2d at 118 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Viewing the uncontradicted evidence presented by the Commonwealth,
under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Ravotti had knowledge of
sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant the belief that Appellant had
been driving under the influence of alcohol. See Freeman, 128 A.3d at
1240; Angel 946 A.2d at 118. After stopping Appellant, Officer Ravotti
detected classic signs of intoxication, i.e., odor of alcohol, Appellant’s glassy
eyes and slurred speech. N.T. at 9; see Angel, 946 A.2d at 118. Appellant
admitted to Officer Ravotti she had consumed alcohol, she was unsteady on
her feet, and she was unable to follow his instructions. N.T. at 9-11.
Specifically, she was unable to recite the alphabet as instructed, unable to
touch her fingers to her thumb according to Officer Ravotti’s direction and
after he modeled how to perform the task, and she was unable to touch her
nose as instructed. Id. Appellant asks this Court to reassess the officer’s
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credibility and reweigh his testimony. See Appellant’s Brief at 23 (“[t]he
trial court’s finding . . . is based on the weight given to the unvalidated
exercises”). Pursuant to our standard of appellate review over suppression
challenges, we decline to do so. See Angel, 946 A.2d at 117. Accordingly,
the record supports the trial court’s ruling, and we discern no error of law.
See Caple, 121 A.3d at 517-18.
For Appellant’s last issue, she argues the blood sample the
Commonwealth tested to determine her BAC was taken without a warrant in
“contravention” of her constitutional rights. Appellant’s Brief at 24. She
relies on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Myers, 118 A.3d 1122
(Pa. Super. 2015), appeal granted, 131 A.3d 480 (Pa. 2016), “for the
proposition that the implied consent statute does not provide the actual
consent that is necessary to obtain a chemical result and it is not an
exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 27. She posits that there was
“no exception to the warrant requirement” present in this case. Id. at 28.
We find Appellant’s reliance on Myers misplaced.
The administration of a blood test is a search under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 312,
315 (Pa. 1992).
A search conducted without a warrant is
constitutionally impermissible unless an established
exception applies. A consensual search is one such
exception, and the central inquiries in consensual
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search cases entail assessment of the constitutional
validity of the citizen/police encounter giving rise to
the consent, and the voluntariness of the consent. . .
. Where the underlying encounter is lawful, the
voluntariness of the consent becomes the exclusive
focus.
Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 127 (Pa. Super. 2012).
In Myers, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of DUI and
transported to the hospital. Myers, 118 A. 3d at 1124. The police officer
who responded to the hospital observed the defendant unconscious and
unresponsive. Id. After attempts to have Appellant respond to the officer
were unsuccessful, the officer read the “standard informed consent
warnings” to the unconscious defendant. Id. The defendant never signed
consent warnings, and no warrant for the defendant’s blood was secured;
however, the police officer obtained a warrantless blood sample from the
defendant. Id.
The defendant sought suppression in the Municipal Court based on,
inter alia, the warrantless draw of his blood. Id. The Municipal Court
granted the suppression motion with respect to the blood because it
concluded the defendant was unconscious and could not consent, and “it was
not unreasonable” for the Commonwealth to obtain a warrant under the
circumstances. Id. at 1124-25. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
affirmed the ruling, and the Commonwealth appealed to this Court. Id. at
1125. This Court acknowledged that defendant’s case was unique because
the defendant did not have an opportunity to refuse the blood draw:
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Pennsylvania’s implied consent statute provides a
driver under arrest with the statutory right of refusal
to blood testing, see 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (“If
any person placed under arrest for a violation of
Section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical
testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be
conducted. . . .”). As discussed, Section 1547
provides for chemical testing when consent is not
withdrawn pursuant to subsection (b)(1), and
precludes a blood draw when consent is withdrawn
and imposes penalties. Here, [the defendant] was
arrested for DUI and transported to the hospital, but
was not given the applicable warnings until a later
time, at which point he could not claim the statutory
protection of Section 1547(b)(1).
Id. at 1129 (footnote omitted). We affirmed the suppression court’s
determination concluding the defendant could not refuse testing or consent
to the blood test and exigent circumstances did not excuse the warrantless
blood draw.8
As discussed supra, there was probable cause supporting Appellant’s
arrest. Therefore, our task is limited to evaluating the voluntariness of her
consent. See Caban, 60 A.3d at 127. Officer Ravotti testified Appellant
consented to the blood draw, he went over the implied consent form with
Appellant, both the officer and Appellant signed the form, and Appellant
signed a separate hospital consent form. N.T. at 12-13. There is no
8
We found the case was controlled by the United States Supreme Court
decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), which held “in
drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol does not
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a
blood test without a warrant.” Myers, 118 A. 3d at 1130 (discussing
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568).
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evidence of record to suggest Appellant was unable to consent like the
defendant in Myers or that Officer Ravotti coerced Appellant’s consent.
Rather, the uncontradicted evidence presented at the suppression hearing
was that Appellant consented, following her arrest, to having her blood
drawn. Id.; see Freeman, 128 A.3d at 1240 Appellant’s suggestion that
the trial court relied solely on the signed consent forms as evidence of her
consent is not supported by the record. Thus, we conclude the record
supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant consented, and therefore, her
suppression motion was properly denied. See Caple, 121 A.3d at 517-18.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
Judgement of sentence affirmed.
Gantman, P.J. joins the Memorandum. Olson, J. Concurs in the
Result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2016
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