IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
)
STATE OF DELAWARE )
) I.D. No. 0304012678
v. )
)
DARIUS D. BROADNAX, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: February 24, 2016
Decided: May 9, 2016
On Defendant’s Third Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
On Defendant’s Second Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
DENIED AS MOOT.
ORDER
Joseph S. Grubb, New Castle County Prosecutor, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Darius D. Broadnax, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna
Delaware, pro se.
COOCH, R.J.
This 9th day of May, 2016, upon consideration of Defendant’s Third
Motion for Postconviction Relief and Second Motion for Appointment of
Counsel, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Darius D. Broadnax was found guilty following a
jury trial of Murder Second Degree (as a lesser included offense
to Murder First Degree) and Possession of a Deadly Weapon
During the Commission of a Felony.1 This Court sentenced
Defendant to 20 years at Level V, followed by 4 years of
decreasing levels of supervision.2 Defendant’s conviction and
sentence were upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court on
March 22, 2005.3 On Defendant’s direct appeal, counsel filed a
motion to withdraw because “there were no arguable issues.”4
2. Six days after the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
Defendant’s conviction and sentence, Defendant filed his First
Motion for Postconviction Relief and First Motion for
Appointment of Counsel. In his First Motion for
Postconviction Relief, Defendant claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel because his trial counsel allegedly failed to: (1)
suppress a pretrial statement; (2) object to alleged hearsay
statements; (3) object to the State’s leading questions and his
“right not to testify; and (4) investigate issues that could be
raised on appeal.”5 Defendant’s First Motion for
Postconviction Relief was summarily dismissed by this Court
on June 14, 2006. On his appeal of this Court’s summary
dismissal, the Supreme Court stated, “Although Defendant sets
forth the legal standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, he failed to offer any facts to support his contentions.”6
3. On August 28, 2012, Defendant filed a Second Motion for
Postconviction Relief, in which he: (1) again raised a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel’s alleged
failure to inform him of a favorable plea offer; and (2) claimed
this Court erred by denying his First Motion for Appointment
of Counsel.7 Defendant’s Second Motion for Postconviction
Relief was denied on Nov. 13, 2012. The Supreme Court
affirmed this Court’s denial of Defendant’s Second Motion for
1
Broadnax v. State, 870 A.2d 1191, 2005 WL 678006, at* 1 (Del. Supr. Mar. 22, 2005)
(TABLE).
2
State v. Broadnax, 69 A.3d 370, 2013 WL 3270891, at* 1 (Del. Supr. June 24, 2013)
(TABLE).
3
Broadnax, 2005 WL 678006, at* 1 (Del. Supr. Mar. 22, 2005) (TABLE).
4
Broadnax, 2013 WL 3270891, at* n. 1 (Del. Supr. June 24, 2013) (TABLE).
5
State v. Broadnax, 2006 WL 1679583, at* 1–2 (Del. Supr. June 14, 2014).
6
Id. at 2.
7
Broadnax v. State, 69 A.3d 370, 2013 WL 3270891, at* 1 (Del. Supr. June 24, 2013)
(TABLE).
2
Postconviction Relief and stated, “[T]here is simply no factual
basis for [Defendant’s] assertion that his counsel failed to
inform him of the State’s plea offer. Similarly, because this
claim is contradicted by the record, there can be no merit to
[Defendant’s] second claim that the Superior Court should have
appointed counsel.”8
4. On February 24, 2016, Defendant filed his Third Motion for
Postconviction Relief and Second Motion for Appointment of
Counsel. In his Third Motion for Postconviction Relief,
Defendant claims “newly-discovered facts” entitle him to relief.
Defendant’s claims are: (1) this Court abused its discretion and
he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel because a
videotaped out-of-court statement was allowed in the jury
room; and (2) this Court abused its discretion and he suffered
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing “to present
arguments and a[] lesser-included[-]offense [i]nstruction.”9
5. Defendant’s Third Motion for Postconviction Relief is
controlled by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.10 Before
addressing the merits of this Motion, the Court must address
any procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i).11
6. Under Rule 61(i), a motion for postconviction relief can be
procedurally barred for time limitations, successive motions,
procedural defaults, and former adjudications.12 If a procedural
bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the
postconviction claim unless the Defendant can show that,
pursuant to Rule 61(i)(5), the procedural bars are inapplicable.
7. Rule 61(i)(5), provides that consideration of otherwise
procedurally barred claims is limited to claims that the Court
lacked jurisdiction, or to a “colorable claim that there was a
miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that
8
Id.
9
Def’s. Opening Mem. at 1. The Court notes that Defendant was in fact found guilty of a
lesser-included offense and not the offense with which he was originally charged.
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61.
11
See Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
12
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
3
undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or
fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of
conviction.”13
8. This Court finds that all of Defendant’s claims are procedurally
barred pursuant to Rule 61(i). Motions filed more than 1 year
after Defendant’s conviction is finalized are time-barred.14
Defendant’s judgment of conviction was finalized on March 22,
2005, by the Delaware Supreme Court. Defendant did not file
his Third Motion until February 24, 2016, almost 11 years later.
Defendant’s Third Motion is also a successive motion, since this
is his third motion.
9. Furthermore, Defendant’s attempt to avoid the procedural bars
by claiming that he is entitled to relief based on “newly-
discovered facts” is meritless and a bad-faith attempt to usurp the
Rule. Therefore, the Court will not discuss the merits of his
claims and Defendant’s Third Motion for Postconviction Relief
is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
10. Finally, since Defendant’s Third Motion for Postconviction
Relief is summarily dismissed, Defendant’s Second Motion for
Appointment of Counsel is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________
Richard R. Cooch, R.J.
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Investigative Services
13
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
14
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring postconviction motions filed more than 1 year
after judgment of conviction is final); Felton v. State, 945 A.2d 594, 2008 WL 308231
at* 2 (Del. Feb. 1, 2008) (TABLE) (measuring the start of the filing period for a Rule 61
motion from the date the direct Supreme Court mandate was issued and direct appeal
process concluded).
4