FIFTH DIVISION
PHIPPS, P. J.,
DILLARD and PETERSON, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
May 2, 2016
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A16A0228. WATSON v. THE STATE. PE-007C
PETERSON, Judge.
Rodrekus Watson, convicted of robbery as a lesser included offense of armed
robbery and theft by receiving stolen property, appeals from the denial of his motion
for new trial. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict made after the State’s case-in-chief, and urges us to overrule precedent from
the Supreme Court of Georgia providing that we may consider all the trial evidence,
not just the evidence introduced during the State’s case-in-chief, in evaluating this
claim. Watson also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to or
request a limiting instruction with regard to references to his status as a convicted
felon. Because we have no authority to overrule or modify a decision of the Supreme
Court of Georgia, and the evidence did not demand a verdict of acquittal, we reject
Watson’s first claim of error. We also conclude that Watson’s claim that counsel was
ineffective fails because, given the strong evidence connecting Watson to the robbery,
he has failed to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would
have been different but for his counsel’s error. Therefore, we affirm.
On appeal from the denial of a motion for directed verdict, this Court must
view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. Helton v.
State, 284 Ga. App. 777, 777-78 (1) (644 SE2d 896) (2007). So viewed, the trial
evidence shows that three men participated in a smash-and-grab robbery at a jewelry
kiosk in a mall. The assailants used hammers to shatter the glass display cases, took
jewelry from the cases, and fled the scene in a stolen car. After the assailants fled, the
kiosk employee noticed blood on top of the glass display case that was not there prior
to the robbery.
A police investigator took blood swabs from the display case and from broken
glass inside the display case, and sent the samples for DNA testing.1 A GBI DNA
analyst compared the DNA profile from the recovered blood samples against a list of
known individuals, which did not include Watson, and determined that the DNA was
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Blood swabs were also taken from the outside The Limited, a retail store in
the mall, and the DNA from these swabs was a match for co-defendant Curtis Turner.
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not a match for these individuals. The DNA analyst then submitted the DNA profile
to the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which collects DNA profiles
provided by local laboratories taken from arrestees, convicted offenders, and forensic
evidence found at crime scenes, including those from unidentified individuals. See
Bharadia v. State, 297 Ga. 567, 569 (1) n.3 (774 SE2d 90) (2015).
CODIS issued a “hit” indicating that Watson was a match for the DNA profile
obtained from the blood swabs. The CODIS report provided that it was to be used
only as an investigative lead. The GBI DNA analyst testified that GBI has a policy
requiring local authorities to obtain another DNA sample from the individual
identified in the CODIS report and submit it for further testing in order to confirm the
CODIS results. No additional DNA samples were taken from Watson until about a
week before his May 2012 trial.
The trial court initially held that the DNA test results of those additional
samples were inadmissible because Watson did not receive a copy of the results prior
to trial. But after Watson called Curtis Turner, a co-defendant, to testify that he did
not know Watson and that Watson was not involved in the robbery,2 the trial court
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Turner testified that he, co-defendant Kelsey Richardson, and his cousin,
Damean Edwards, were the three men involved in the smash-and-grab at the kiosk.
Although a fourth co-defendant, Edward Tate, was also charged with and pleaded
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granted the State’s request to present rebuttal evidence. On rebuttal, the State
introduced evidence that it had confirmed the CODIS report after testing the
additional DNA samples taken from Watson in May 2012, meaning that Watson’s
DNA profile matched that of the blood recovered from the display case. The jury
subsequently found Watson guilty of robbery and, based on the use of the stolen
vehicle, theft by receiving stolen property.
1. On appeal, Watson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict of acquittal, and argues that our review of his claim should be
limited to the evidence introduced during the State’s case-in-chief. Watson argues
that at the time he made his motion, the only evidence linking him to the crime was
the CODIS report that specifically provided that the information contained therein
was to be used only as an investigative lead and was required to be confirmed with
further investigation. We disagree.
A motion for a directed verdict of acquittal should be granted only when “there
is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence with all reasonable deductions and
inferences therefrom shall demand a verdict of acquittal or ‘not guilty.’” OCGA § 17-
9-1(a); Parham v. State, 320 Ga. App. 676, 677 (2) (739 SE2d 135) (2013). Under
guilty to the armed robbery, he was not present during the offense.
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Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 374-75 (1) (219 SE2d 743) (1975), a court reviewing
the denial of a motion for a directed verdict is not limited to considering only the
evidence presented in the case-in-chief, but may consider all the evidence in the case.
Here, the State introduced evidence during its case-in-chief showing that a
CODIS report revealed that the DNA found at the crime scene was a match for
Watson. On rebuttal, the State presented evidence that the CODIS report was
confirmed with subsequent testing. In a protracted argument spanning almost half of
his brief, Watson argues that we should overrule or abandon Bethay’s express
provision that we may consider all of the trial evidence in evaluating the denial of a
motion for directed verdict. But we have “no authority to overrule or modify a
decision made by the Supreme Court of Georgia, as the decisions of the Supreme
Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.” Hudson v. State, 325 Ga. App. 657,
660 (3) (754 SE2d 626) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, Watson
makes no argument that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present rebuttal
evidence confirming the DNA match. Thus, Watson has failed to provide a legal basis
precluding our consideration of the DNA evidence.
Reviewing all of the trial evidence, the State established that no blood was on
the display case prior to the robbery, blood was left on and inside the display case as
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a result of the crime, and the blood was a match for Watson’s DNA. There was no
evidence to explain how Watson’s blood could have been left at the crime scene at
a time other than when the crime was committed. Thus, the jury would have been
authorized to convict Watson of robbery based on his DNA evidence at the crime
scene. See Barstad v. State, 329 Ga. App. 214, 216-17 (1) (764 SE2d 453) (2014) (the
jury was authorized to infer defendant’s guilt based on, among other things, the lack
of evidence showing how his DNA was left at the crime scene other than the
commission of the offenses); Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. App. 681, 683 (1) (710 SE2d
878) (2011) (concluding that the unexplained presence of defendant’s blood at crime
scene authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of crime). Because there was
evidence showing that Watson was connected to the crimes of robbery and theft by
receiving, the trial court did not err in denying Watson’s motion for directed verdict.
2. Watson next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
or request a limiting instruction regarding testimony that CODIS was made up of
genetic profiles of convicted felons or to object to testimony that Watson was
previously convicted of a felony. We disagree.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Watson “must
show that trial counsel’s performance fell below a reasonable standard of conduct and
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that there existed a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have
been different had it not been for counsel’s deficient performance.” Scott v. State, 290
Ga. 883, 889 (7) (725 SE2d 305) (2012) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.
668 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 LEd2d 674) (1984)). In reviewing a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings, which
are upheld unless clearly erroneous, and review a trial court’s legal conclusions de
novo. Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014).
Here, trial counsel did not object when the GBI DNA analyst testified that
CODIS contained DNA profiles of convicted offenders, “missing persons,” and
forensic evidence collected at crime scenes. In response to trial counsel’s questioning,
the witness repeated her testimony that CODIS contained DNA profiles of convicted
felons. Trial counsel also did not object when the State elicited testimony from the
police investigator that the DNA profile of another suspect was in CODIS as a result
of that suspect’s felony conviction, nor did counsel object when the detective
confirmed that Watson was convicted of a felony prior to 2008. This Court has stated
that “evidence that a defendant’s DNA profile is included in a database compiled by
a state or a federal government agency would reflect badly on the defendant’s
character if the DNA profile or references to the database linked the defendant to
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criminal activity.” Scales v. State, 310 Ga. App. 48, 51-52 (2) (a) (ii) (712 SE2d 555)
(2011).
Assuming without deciding that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object
to or request limiting instructions regarding references to Watson’s prior felony
conviction, Watson has failed to establish prejudice. In this smash-and-grab robbery,
Watson’s DNA was found not only on the glass display case of the kiosk, but also on
broken glass inside the case. The uncontradicted evidence shows that there was no
blood on the display case prior the robbery. Given that the undisputed evidence
establishes that Watson’s blood was left inside the broken glass case at the time the
crime was committed, there is no reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s
errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Therefore, the trial court
correctly rejected Watson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Judgment affirmed. Phipps, P. J., and Dillard, J., concur.
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