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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13773
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A205-516-065
RONALD ABEL SORTO-LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(May 11, 2016)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Ronald Abel Sorto-Lopez, a national and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the
Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum and withholding of
removal under sections 208(a) and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1231(b)(3). The BIA concluded that Sorto-
Lopez is not eligible for asylum or to have his removal withheld, because he did
not demonstrate that he suffered persecution in El Salvador or, alternatively, that
he has a well-founded fear of future persecution there. On appeal, Sorto-Lopez
argues that these findings were erroneous. Because we find that the BIA’s
decision is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence, we affirm
the decision and deny Sorto-Lopez’s petition.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review only the [BIA]’s decision, except to the extent that it expressly
adopts the IJ’s opinion.” Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
Here, the BIA issued its own opinion and did not adopt the opinion or reasoning of
the IJ expressly, so we only consider the BIA’s decision. See id.
“A factual determination by the BIA that an alien is statutorily ineligible for
asylum or withholding is reviewed under the substantial evidence test.” Perlera-
Escobar v. Exec. Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam). As such, we “must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by
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reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole.” Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
standard is “highly deferential.” Id. We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the BIA’s decision, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that
decision. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2005). And,
“we may reverse only when the record compels it.” Li Shan Chen v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 672 F.3d 961, 964 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
II. ASYLUM
The INA provides that “[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United
States . . . irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a)(1). The Attorney General may grant an alien’s asylum application if it
“determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of” 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A). See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself
of the protection of, that country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). The applicant bears the burden of
proving that he is a refugee, which requires him to present “specific and credible
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evidence” demonstrating either “past persecution on account of a statutorily listed
factor” or “a well-founded fear that the statutorily listed factor will cause future
persecution.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept,
requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.”
Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Past Persecution
Sorto-Lopez asserts that he established past persecution based on his religion
and his membership in a particular social group. In support of this claim, he points
to his testimony that (1) two to three times per week, gang members in El Salvador
told him that God did not exist when he was on his way to church; (2) he had to
transfer schools because other students harassed him by saying that God did not
exist and that he should change his religion; (3) a few days before he left El
Salvador for the United States, a car swerved towards him while he was on the
sidewalk and someone in the car yelled that God would not protect him; (4) when
he worked at a prosecutor’s office—his “particular social group”—gang members
and corrupt police officers threatened him; and (5) on one occasion, he was
extorted for $1,000. However, Sorto-Lopez also testified that he was never
physically harmed by any of his alleged persecutors.
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Considered as a whole, this evidence supports a finding of “mere
harassment,” coupled with a “few isolated incidents of . . . intimidation.” See id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the record does not require a
determination that Sorto-Lopez suffered past persecution. See id. (holding that
“menacing telephone calls and threats . . . do not arise to the level of past
persecution that would compel reversal of [a BIA] decision”); Gonzalez v. Reno,
212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[P]ersecution requires more than a few
isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any
physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
B. Future Persecution
Sorto-Lopez also claims that he has a well-founded fear of future
persecution in El Salvador due to his religion and association with the prosecutor’s
office. To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, an applicant must
demonstrate that his fear is “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.”
Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. While Sorto-Lopez may genuinely fear persecution in El
Salvador, the record does not compel a finding that such fear is objectively
reasonable. His previous experience did not amount to persecution, and he has
failed to “demonstrate specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he
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will be singled out for persecution” See id. at 1289–90 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
* * *
In sum, the record does not require a determination that Sorto-Lopez
suffered past persecution or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Thus, we must uphold the BIA’s finding that he is not eligible for asylum. See Li
Shan Chen, 672 F.3d at 964.
III. WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL
To be eligible for withholding of removal under the INA, an applicant must
show that, if he was removed, his life or freedom would be threatened because of
his “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
standard is “more stringent” than the above-discussed standard for asylum. See id.
Hence, “where an applicant fails to meet the burden for asylum, he necessarily
cannot meet the . . . burden for withholding of removal.” Amaya-Artunduaga v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1249 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Because
Sorto-Lopez has not met his burden for asylum, his challenge to the BIA’s
“withholding of removal” decision likewise fails. See id.
PETITION DENIED.
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