UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4402
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARY ANTONIO JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
Judge. (8:14-cr-00176-DKC-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: May 19, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICES OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Joseph R. Baldwin, Mara Zusman Greenberg, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Antonio Jones was convicted by a jury of being a felon
in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012), and was sentenced to 96 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Jones argues that the district court
erred by denying his three motions to suppress evidence,
considering certain information at his sentencing hearing, and
applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of
justice. We affirm.
When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, we
review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. United States v. McGee, 736
F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013). Because the district court
denied Jones’ suppression motion, we construe the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Government, id., and defer to
the district court’s credibility findings, United States v.
Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 2015).
First, Jones asserts that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle,
arguing that the ATF agents’ actions exceeded the scope of the
traffic stop. Crediting the testimony of the ATF agents, which
included testimony that an agent asked Jones to exit the car in
order to investigate the odor of alcohol, the district court
determined that the stop was reasonable. We find that Jones’
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conclusory, unsupported assertions to the contrary fail to
establish that the district court’s decision was clearly
erroneous.
Jones also contends that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress recordings of statements he made
while seated in the back of a police vehicle. In order to
succeed on this motion, Jones was required to show that he had a
subjective expectation of privacy in the police vehicle and that
this expectation was objectively reasonable. United States v.
Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court
determined that, although Jones had a subjective expectation of
privacy when he made the statements, this expectation was not
objectively reasonable, given that Jones knew he was in a police
vehicle and could see radio and electronic equipment in the
vehicle. We discern no error in the district court’s analysis.
Jones asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the statements he made during his interview
at the police station. Jones claims that he made the
incriminating statements after involuntarily waiving his Miranda *
rights. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court did not clearly err in finding that the officers
provided a full and complete recitation of Jones’ Miranda rights
* Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and exhibited no coercive conduct. Accordingly, we reject
Jones’ contention that his Miranda waiver was involuntary.
Next, Jones contends that the district court erred in
considering, and the Government erred in making, certain
arguments at sentencing. Because Jones was the party who first
raised the challenged subject, we conclude that any error from
the court’s consideration of this material was invited. United
States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 617 (4th Cir. 1997). Jones has
not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances and this
argument is therefore waived. United States v. Hickman, 626
F.3d 756, 772 (4th Cir. 2010).
Finally Jones asserts that the district court erred in
applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice
based on Jones’ perjured testimony at trial. Because Jones did
not object to the enhancement, this court’s review is for plain
error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir.
2010). We conclude that Jones fails to demonstrate such error.
Contrary to Jones’ assertion, the district court made a
sufficient explanation of its perjury finding, as required by
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1993).
Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ conviction and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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