UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4418
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN FRANKLIN WOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:13-cr-00053-RLV-DCK-4)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: May 20, 2016
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Reggie E. McKnight, MCKNIGHT LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stephen Franklin Wood appeals the downward variant sentence
of 170 months imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
distribute, possess with intent to distribute, and manufacture
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846
(2012). On appeal, Wood’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the
reasonableness of Wood’s sentence. Counsel questions the
district court’s denial of Wood’s motion for a downward variance
to the statutory minimum and application of a three-level
enhancement for a substantial risk of harm pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(13)(C)(ii) (2014). Wood
has filed a pro se supplemental brief, asserting additional
claims that the district court erred in ordering him ineligible
for federal benefits for a period of 10 years, placing undue
reliance on his criminal history, and selecting a sentence that
was substantially higher than those of his codefendants. We
affirm.
We conclude that Wood’s sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. The record establishes that Wood
withdrew his objection to the three-level enhancement for
creating a substantial risk of harm; therefore, Wood has waived
appellate review of the issue. United States v. Robinson, 744
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F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 225 (2014).
The district court otherwise properly calculated the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range, and the court appropriately
explained the sentence in the context of the relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors. See United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d
519, 528 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus, our review of the record
reveals no procedural error in Wood’s sentence.
Additionally, Wood’s below-Guidelines sentence is
presumptively substantively reasonable, and Wood fails to rebut
that presumption on appeal. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d
295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). The
mere fact that many of Wood’s coconspirators received a lower
downward variant sentence to or near the statutory minimum is
insufficient to require vacating Wood’s sentence, United States
v. Pierce, 409 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2005), and Wood has not
demonstrated that he and his coconspirators were similarly
situated. Moreover, the district court offered ample reasons
rooted in the § 3553(a) factors for rejecting a downward
variance to the statutory minimum. See Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“[Appellate courts] must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”).
Lastly, Wood contends that the district court erred in
denying him federal benefits for 10 years. We conclude this
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issue is meritless. Nowhere in the sentencing transcript or
criminal judgment does the district court deny Wood federal
benefits.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and find no meritorious ground for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Wood, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Wood requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Wood. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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