In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.J. and J.J. (Minor Children), R.J. (Mother) and Jo.J. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
May 24 2016, 8:37 am

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), CLERK
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bruce N. Elliott Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General

James D. Boyer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the Parent- May 24, 2016
Child Relationship of K.J. and Court of Appeals Case No.
J.J. (Minor Children), 27A02-1510-JT-1811
Appeal from the Grant Superior
R.J. (Mother) and Jo.J. (Father), Court
Appellants-Respondents, The Honorable Dana J.
Kenworthy, Judge
v. Trial Court Cause Nos.
27D02-1408-JT-17 and
Indiana Department of Child 27D02-1501-JT-2
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

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 Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case
[1] Jo.J. (“Father”) and R.J. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”) appeal the trial

court’s termination of their parental rights over their minor children K.J. and

J.J. (“Children”). Parents raise a single issue for our review, namely, whether

the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) presented sufficient

evidence to support the termination of their parental rights over Children. We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and Mother were married and living together in Marion when Mother

gave birth to K.J. on May 20, 2013. K.J. was hospitalized for approximately

two months after her birth due to multiple health issues, including hypoxic

ischemic encephalopathy. On July 11, DCS filed a petition alleging that K.J.

was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). And on July 18, Parents admitted

that the following allegations in the CHINS petition were true:

a. That their home was in need of repairs due to a water line
break, which caused mold in the back bedroom.

b. That their home was infested with fleas.

c. That their home was not suitable for [K.J.] upon her
release from the hospital.

d. That they were living in temporary housing until their
home became appropriate.

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 e. That [K.J.] had continuing medical needs and they would
benefit from services to assist them in meeting her needs.

f. That Mother had an older child removed from her care
and not reunified with her.

Appellants’ App. at 50-51. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that K.J. was a

CHINS, and the court ordered Parents to comply with a parental participation

plan. On September 20, “due to further allegations of neglect,” DCS removed

K.J. from Parents’ care and placed her in foster care. Id. at 51. Parents began

supervised visitation with K.J. at that time.

[3] On April 7, 2014, Mother gave birth to J.J. On April 10, DCS filed a petition

alleging that J.J. was a CHINS, and, with a court order, DCS took J.J. into

custody. Following an initial hearing, the trial court ordered that J.J. was a

CHINS, and she was placed into foster care.

[4] On August 12, 2014, and January 22, 2015, DCS filed petitions to terminate

Parents’ parental rights as to K.J. and J.J., respectively. Following a final

evidentiary hearing on those petitions over the course of four days and

concluding on June 4, 2015, the trial court issued its order terminating Parents’

parental rights to Children. In that order, the trial court entered remarkably

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detailed findings and conclusions. DCS has summarized the critical findings

supporting termination as follows:1

21. Mother’s Prior CHINS Involvement. Mother had a ten-year[-
]old child, H.D., who[m] Montana state authorities removed
from Mother’s care. The case was open for 18 months and
Mother was required to participate in services. Child H.D. never
returned to Mother and Maternal Grandmother, who lives in
Arizona, adopted child.

22. The Children’s Special Medical Needs. Children both have
special medical needs. Child J.J. was born premature and suffers
from seizures, ischemic encephalopathy, and has one functioning
kidney. Child K.J. also suffers from seizures. Children both take
seizure medications. Children are regularly seen by doctors and
at Riley Children’s Hospital.

Parents do not understand fully Children’s medical issues nor
have they been involved fully in their medical care. Despite the
court ordering Parents to attend Children’s medical
appointments, they have attended very few of them. They do not
know the names of Children’s doctors and they do not know the
medications or dosages given to Children. Because of Parents’
pattern of passivity and non-involvement, the court finds Parents’
assertion that they will meet Children’s medical needs when they
are returned to them to be dubious. There is a reasonable
probability that Parents would not appropriately attend to
Children’s medical needs.

23. The Children’s Developmental Delays. Children both have
developmental delays. Child K.J. has delays in her cognitive,

1
Parents do not challenge the accuracy of DCS’s summary of the findings, and our close review of the
summaries of each finding reveals that they are accurate. We adopt DCS’s summary of the findings here for
the sake of efficiency.

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 social, expressive, and fine and gross motor skills. Child J.J. has
delays in her expressive, social-emotional, and fine and gross
motor skills. Services have been provided to the family three
times a week since April 2014 to assist Parents in working with
Children to achieve developmental milestones.

Although Parents have good attendance and have shown
improvement, they have not been able to consistently implement
the skills taught to them without redirection or the provider’s
continued direct involvement. Parents lack appropriate
motivation and urgency. Also, they lack understanding of
Children’s developmental delays and Father outright denies
Children have such a problem. The provider has concerns about
Parent’s lack of parenting skills and their inability to remedy the
poor living conditions. The court finds that there is a reasonable
probability that Parents would not be able to help Children
improve their developmental delays.

24. Unsafe Home Conditions. The court ordered parents to clean
their home and maintain it in a safe condition. DCS provided
parents with case management services through several providers
to help them improve the condition of the home. Despite two
years with several providers, Parents had not improved the
condition of the home in that there remained “hazardous clutter
and dangerous items left within reach of small children, i.e.,
antifreeze, motor oil, lighters, potting soil, overflowing litter
boxes full of cat feces, chemicals, and trash.” One service
provided ended services after Father got into an argument with
them. Mother acknowledged that progress had been slow.
Parents were not able to demonstrate skills taught to them. The
court finds that there is a reasonable probability that Parents will
not be able to keep their home in a condition that is safe and
suitable for Children.

25. Parents’ Contact with DCS. Parents maintained contact with
DCS and signed all required releases.

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 26. Inadequate Parenting Skills. Parents regularly attended
supervised visitation with Children. During the CHINS case,
visitation never moved past supervised. Although Parents appear
to love Children and have a bond with them, they have not
improved in their ability to care appropriately and safely for
them. Parents do not closely supervise Children. Providers
supervising visits question whether Parents have benefitted from
services because they are not able to apply the skills they have
learned. Parents make excuses, are defensive, and are resistant to
suggestions. DCS and providers have experienced conflict with
Parents regarding parenting issues and DCS observed, at a time
when DCS removed child K.J. from the home, Father “acting
erratically, cursing, yelling and acting threatening, such that law
enforcement had to be called.” Mother usually remains in one
position sitting on the couch during visits and does not interact
fully with Children. Parents both have fallen asleep on numerous
occasions during visits.

27. Common Sense Parenting Program. Parents completed
parenting classes. Mother admitted that the classes were of little
benefit and Father fell asleep during some of the class time.
Despite their completion, concerns remained about their ability
to appropriately care for Children.

28. FCM Visits to the Home. Parents denied DCS’ access to the
home on at least two occasions and denied DCS the ability to
take pictures of the home.

29. Parents’ Finances. Father is the beneficiary of a family trust,
he receives $502 per month in government disability, and earns
additional income from several part-time jobs. Mother is not
employed and says she receives $708 per month in Social
Security. Parents have adequate income to pay their bills but
make questionable financial decisions that sometimes leave them
without income to buy such things as gasoline for their vehicle.
Parents are renting to own a trailer and obtain most of their
household furnishings from rent-to-own stores. Parents have
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 made questionable purchases on such items as a big screen
television and the latest iPhones. Parents have received help
with budgeting and have been advised that if they continue their
current spending habits, the funds in their trust will be depleted
by 2025. Parents have shown resistance to suggestions regarding
their finances by becoming angry and defensive.

30. Parenting/Psychological/IQ Assessments. Parents both
completed parenting assessments and IQ tests including the Child
Abuse Potential Inventory (“CAPI”), the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory 2 (“MMPI-2”), and the Wechsler tool to
measure intellectual functioning.

Mother’s testing results for CAPI were invalid because she
presented herself in an overly positive way. The MMPI-2
showed that she “may tend to deviate from a normal way of
doing things when she is frustrated, she has a high resistance to
self-disclosure, has a tendency to minimize problems and not see
them as significant when they may very well be.” As for
intelligence, she tested in the “slow normal range” with a full
scale IQ of 77, which is in the borderline range. She has a severe
learning disability particularly in verbal learning. The
psychologist administering the testing has predominant concerns
about Mother’s ability to parent Children because of her
tendency to deny and minimize problems.

Father’s CAPI results indicated an elevated rigidity scale score,
which shows Father to be inflexible and potentially overly critical
and demanding. This can contribute to abuse and neglect and
indicate relationship problems with Children. The overall results
were concerning.

Father’s MMPI-2 results indicated that Father has “problems
with ongoing anxiety, has a negative view of his environment
and society, has very negative attitudes towards treatment and
social service organizations, tends to become aggressive when
frustrated, tends to minimize problems, is socially insecure, has a
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 high resistance to self-disclosure, has more stressors related to his
marital relationship than he admits, has a low motivation to
change, has a high level of denial of problems, has significant
problems with social relationships, and has trust issues.” In
addition, the results indicate Schizoid features such as difficulty
relating to others and expressing feelings appropriately. Based on
the MMPI-2 results, the psychologist diagnosed Father with
Personality Disorder with Schizoid and Paranoid Features.

Father’s full scale IQ was 60, which placed him in the mildly
impaired range. The psychologist had concerns about Father’s
ability to parent Children because of his low motivation, negative
outlook, and low intellectual functioning.

31. Family Counseling. Parents have been involved in counseling
since June 25, 2014. Goals included reunification and Parent’s
role and responsibility in Children’s removal. Parent’s counselor
indicated that although Parents made some progress, they did not
meet the goals. The counselor characterized parents as
“overwhelmed by the system” and they were limited in their
ability to understand issues. The counselor also noted that
Parents frequented a local strip club and sought emotional
support from the club employees. The counselor expressed
concerns about Parents ability to provide full-time care for
Children. Their success would depend on an ability to
understand Children and Children’s needs, but Parents lack the
intellectual ability and character to do so. They have been
unable to apply the skills taught to them.

32. FCM Hullinger’s Recommendation. The FCM never
recommended the return of Children to Parents’ care because of
the condition of the home and Parents’ inability to parent them
safely. Termination is in Children’s best interests because of
Parents inability to follow instructions and utilize the thing
taught to them.

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 33. CASA’s Recommendations. CASA agreed that Parents have
not resolved the conditions of Children’s removal and that
reunification would pose a threat to Children’s wellbeing.
Children have been in their current foster home for most of their
lives and are bonded, they feel safe, and are doing well. CASA
agreed with the DCS’ plan of adoption.

34. Best Interests. Termination of parental rights is in Children’s
best interests.

35. Permanency Plan. Adoption is a satisfactory plan.

Appellee’s Br. at 21-24 (summarizing findings found at Appellants’ App. at 53-

71). And the trial court entered the following relevant conclusions:

2. There is a reasonable probability that:

a. The conditions which resulted in [Children’s]
removal and continued placement outside the home
will not be remedied;

b. Continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to [Children’s] wellbeing.

3. Termination of parental rights is in [Children’s] best
interests.

4. There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
[Children], that being adoption.

Appellants’ App. at 72. This appeal ensued.

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 Discussion and Decision
[5] We begin our review of this appeal by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional

right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe

Div. of Family & Children (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996),

trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the

parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a

termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re K.S.), 750

N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child

relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is

threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be

terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental

rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or

her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[6] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS

is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied.

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 (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.

***

(C) [and] that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). That statute provides that DCS need establish only

one of the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) before the trial court may

terminate parental rights. DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental

rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-

14-2).

[7] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of

Family & Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.

denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.

Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). trans. denied.

[8] Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered specific

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment

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 contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of

review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind.

2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and,

second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id.

“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98,

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[9] Parents contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s

findings underlying its conclusions that they will not remedy the conditions that

resulted in Children’s removal or that the continuation of the parent-child

relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Children. Because Indiana Code

Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we only address the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that

continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to Children’s well-

being.2

[10] Parents devote much of the Argument section of their brief on appeal to the trial

court’s conclusion that the reasons for Children’s removal will not be remedied.

2
Parents do not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that termination is in the Children’s best interests or
that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, namely, adoption.

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 With respect to the trial court’s conclusion that continuation of the parent-child

relationships poses a threat to Children’s well-being, Parents state as follows:

Without actual evidence that the parents are unwilling or unable
to care for the girls’ medical issues, the court improperly
concluded that the girls’ well-being was somehow threatened by
living with their parents in the home that the parents had
improved to make it safe.

It is noteworthy that mother told the court that the girls were
place[d] in Early Head Start as infants. . . .

With the continued help of such programs, there is nothing in the
record to substantiate the contention that these parents are a
danger to the well[-]being of these children.

There was insufficient evidence presented as to what the girls’
specific medical needs are that these parents are either unwilling
or unable to meet, or couldn’t meet satisfactorily with help from
family service programs. . . .

Appellants’ Br. at 25-26.

[11] Parents’ contentions on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh the

evidence, which we will not do. A trial court need not wait until a child is

irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that his physical, mental, and

social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child

relationship. Shupperd v. Miami Cnty. Div. of Family & Children (In re E.S.), 762

N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). When the evidence shows that the

emotional and physical development of a child in need of services is threatened,

termination of the parent-child relationship is appropriate. Id.

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[12] DCS presented evidence that K.J. was removed from Parents’ care only a few

months after her birth, and J.J. was removed from their care only a few days

after her birth. Throughout the CHINS proceedings, Parents struggled to

comply with the parental participation plans. The evidence shows that Parents

struggled to maintain a clean and safe home environment for Children, and

they did not engage in Children’s extensive medical care. Parents’ supervised

visits with Children were marred by Mother’s lack of interaction with Children,

both parents’ failure to practice good parenting skills, and both parents sleeping

during visits. As Ed Pereira, Parents’ family counselor, testified, Parents have

poor judgment and would be unable to care for Children, who are both special

needs. Pereira testified that the thought of Parents attempting to care for

Children on their own “scare[d]” him. Tr. at 105.

[13] Still, Parents assert that “[m]ental disability, standing alone, is not a proper

ground for terminating parental rights.” Appellants’ Br. at 24 (citing R.G. v.

Marion Cnty. Ofc., Dep’t of Family & Children, 647 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ind. Ct. App.

1995), trans. denied). But Parents acknowledge that “their mental disabilities

were [not] the sole issue cited by the trial court” in support of termination of

their parental rights. Id. at 24-25. Indeed, while the trial court acknowledges

Parents’ IQs in its findings, the court’s many other findings more than support

termination of Parents’ parental rights.

[14] The trial court’s findings support the trial court’s conclusion that there is a

reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationships

pose a threat to Children’s well-being. Again, Parents do not challenge the

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 remainder of the trial court’s conclusions. We hold that the trial court did not

err when it terminated Parents’ parental rights to Children.

[15] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.

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