NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAM SABER, No. 14-56000
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:13-cv-00812-DOC-
JCG
v.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 6, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges and GORDON,** District Judge.
Sam Saber appeals the district court’s dismissal of two causes of action in
his second amended complaint against J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Saber’s claim
under California Civil Code § 2923.6 with prejudice. The court had previously
dismissed this same claim with leave to amend and specifically explained that
Saber must adequately allege a material change in his financial circumstances in
connection with his January 15, 2013 loan modification application. As Saber
concedes, both below and on appeal, he failed to do so. Denying further
amendment is not abuse of discretion where a party has “essentially re-pled the
same facts and legal theories.” Loos v. Immersion Corp., 762 F.3d 880, 890-91
(9th Cir. 2014) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp.,
Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The trial court’s discretion . . . is
particularly broad where, as here, a plaintiff previously has been granted leave to
amend.”).
2. Reviewing de novo, see Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512
F.3d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 2008), the district court also did not err in dismissing
Saber’s claim under California Civil Code § 2923.7. Saber has not plausibly
alleged that he was not given a single point of contact because he alleges in
relation to his § 2923.6 claim that he was in contact with J.P. Morgan regarding a
loan modification and that J.P. Morgan responded to that inquiry. Further, in light
2
of these allegations, the district court did not err in requiring Saber to provide more
detailed factual allegations to support other statutory violations. Nor did it err in
then dismissing when Saber failed to do so.
AFFIRMED.
3