This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1195
Julius Antwon Coleman, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed May 2, 2016
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-10-10784
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Carol Comp, Special Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his postconviction-relief petition, which sought
withdrawal of his guilty plea to fifth-degree controlled-substance crime based on
deficiencies at the St. Paul Police Department Crime Laboratory. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 29, 2010, police officers observed appellant Julius Antwon Coleman
make at least three “hand-to-hand exchange[s]” outside a St. Paul residence. When officers
approached Coleman, he attempted to flee on foot, and officers quickly apprehended him.
Officers performed a search incident to arrest and found a small baggie containing “white
crystal particles” and a glass pipe with residue in Coleman’s pants pockets.
In a Mirandized statement, Coleman admitted that he is an addict who smokes
methamphetamine frequently, that he had been at the residence “for a good portion of that
day getting high,” and that he had had “less than a gram of methamphetamine” on his
person. The St. Paul Police Department Crime Laboratory (crime lab) tested particles in
the baggie and residue in the pipe, which “tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine, with a total net weight of .13 grams.”
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Coleman with fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime (possession of methamphetamine). Coleman pleaded guilty as charged as
part of a negotiated resolution of the controlled-substance offense and an unrelated
weapons offense. On July 8, 2011, the district court sentenced Coleman to 24 months’
imprisonment for fifth-degree controlled-substance crime as a subsequent controlled-
2
substance offense, to be served concurrently with a 60-month prison sentence for the
weapons offense. Coleman did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence.
At a subsequent consolidated hearing on the admissibility of evidence in three
unrelated cases, defendants Matthew David Jensen, Daniel Ralph Sawyer, and Cecelia
Rose Jackson presented evidence of serious training and process deficiencies at the crime
lab (crime-lab deficiencies).1 On July 17, 2014, Coleman petitioned the district court for
postconviction relief. He alleged crime-lab deficiencies, sought withdrawal of his guilty
plea to fifth-degree controlled-substance crime, claimed applicability of the newly-
discovered-evidence and interests-of-justice exceptions to the two-year time limit for filing
a petition, and requested an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court concluded that
Coleman had failed to show that either exception applied and summarily denied Coleman’s
petition. This appeal follows.
DECISION
“[A] person convicted of a crime, who claims that . . . the conviction obtained or the
sentence or other disposition made violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or
laws of the United States or of the state . . . may commence a proceeding to secure
relief . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2012). A postconviction petitioner is not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing if “the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1
(2012). “[Appellate courts] review a postconviction court’s decision to deny a petition,
1
The hearing began on July 16, 2012, and ended on May 3, 2013.
3
including its decision to deny the petition without granting an evidentiary hearing, for an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d 297, 303 (Minn. 2016). “In determining
whether the postconviction court abused its discretion, [appellate courts] review the
[postconviction] court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”
Id.
“No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after . . . the
entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed[.]” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2012). But a postconviction petition that was filed outside of the two-
year period is not time-barred if
the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered
evidence, including scientific evidence, that could not have
been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the
petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the two-year time
period for filing a postconviction petition, and the evidence is
not cumulative to evidence presented at trial, is not for
impeachment purposes, and establishes by a clear and
convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent of the
offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted.
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2) (2012). Neither is such a petition time-barred if “the
petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is
in the interests of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2012). “Any petition
invoking [such] an exception must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2012).
In his postconviction petition, Coleman argued that the evidence of crime-lab
deficiencies provides five distinct grounds for plea-withdrawal relief: newly discovered
evidence, Brady violations, due process violation, manifest injustice, and ineffective
4
assistance of counsel. On appeal, Coleman argues that the postconviction court abused its
discretion in summarily denying his untimely petition, claiming that he has established the
applicability of the newly-discovered-evidence and interests-of-justice exceptions to the
two-year time limit and that, at a minimum, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Newly-discovered-evidence exception
The newly-discovered-evidence exception
requires that the petitioner show that the evidence (1) is newly
discovered; (2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence by the petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney
within the 2-year time-bar for filing a petition; (3) is not
cumulative to evidence presented at trial; (4) is not for
impeachment purposes; and (5) establishes by the clear and
convincing standard that petitioner is innocent of the offenses
for which he was convicted.
Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2012). “All five criteria must be satisfied to
obtain relief.” Id. Neither the second nor the fifth criterion is satisfied in this case.
To begin, Coleman has not demonstrated that the evidence of crime-lab deficiencies
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by him or his counsel
within two years of his conviction and sentence. The state alleged in its complaint that
“[t]he suspected controlled substance was submitted to the Saint Paul Police Department
Crime Laboratory and tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine, with a total
net weight of .13 grams.” The complaint thereby placed Coleman on notice that the state
based the controlled-substance charge on the results of the crime-lab test. Coleman could
have investigated and challenged the foundational reliability and/or validity of the test
results. See Roberts v. State, 856 N.W.2d 287, 291 (Minn. App. 2014) (reaching same
5
conclusion on similar facts in reliance on, among other things, Minn. Stat. § 611.21(a)
(2004), Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4), 11.02, .04), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28,
2015). He chose to plead guilty rather than do so.
Moreover, the evidence of crime-lab deficiencies does not establish by a clear and
convincing standard that Coleman is innocent of fifth-degree controlled-substance crime.
“The innocence prong . . . requires more than mere ‘uncertainty’ about a petitioner’s guilt.
Under the clear and convincing standard, the proffered evidence must be unequivocal,
intrinsically probable, and free from frailties.” Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 798
(Minn. 2016) (citation omitted).
In Roberts, we considered the innocence prong as follows:
Roberts’s new evidence regards the “sufficiency of the
training, knowledge, and practices of laboratory employees” at
the crime lab. But Roberts does not offer evidence regarding
the chemical composition of the particular substance in his
case. In fact, Roberts has never claimed—in district court,
during postconviction proceedings, or on appeal—that the
substance was not cocaine.
....
[T]here was nonscientific evidence of guilt. The complaint
suggested that the arresting officer suspected that the substance
was crack cocaine based on its appearance. The complaint also
indicated that Roberts ran from the officer after the substance
fell out of his pant leg, and flight is evidence of “consciousness
of guilt.” These circumstances are fatal to Roberts’s attempt to
establish actual innocence based on speculation regarding the
validity of the test results in his case.
6
856 N.W.2d at 291–92 (citation omitted). Like Roberts, Coleman attempted to flee from
police officers, exhibiting consciousness of guilt. And like Roberts, Coleman did not offer
evidence regarding the chemical composition of the substance that was in the baggie and
pipe recovered from his pockets. Coleman never has claimed that the substance was not
methamphetamine; in fact, he admitted in a police statement that the substance was
methamphetamine. Finally, at his plea hearing, Coleman responded affirmatively when
asked whether officers had found “some methamphetamine” in his pocket.
We conclude that the evidence of crime-lab deficiencies, tempered by the wealth of
nonscientific evidence that Coleman possessed methamphetamine, cannot establish by the
clear and convincing standard that Coleman is innocent of fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime. See id. at 292 (stating that “[t]he identity and weight of a suspected
controlled substance may be proved . . . , in certain situations, circumstantially with . . .
nonscientific evidence,” and concluding that evidence of crime-lab deficiencies did not
establish Roberts’s innocence in light of nonscientific evidence of his guilt). We therefore
conclude that the postconviction court did not err by refusing to consider Coleman’s
untimely petition under the newly-discovered-evidence exception.
Interests-of-justice exception
“To satisfy the interests-of-justice exception, . . . a petitioner must satisfy two
requirements: (1) that the petition is not frivolous, and (2) that the petition is in the interests
of justice.” Wallace v. State, 820 N.W.2d 843, 849 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted).
Application of the exception “is reserved for exceptional cases.” Taylor v. State, 874
N.W.2d 429, 431 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
7
[I]n deciding whether to grant relief in the interests of justice,
courts should weigh the degree to which the party alleging
error is at fault for that error, the degree of fault assigned to the
party defending the alleged error, and whether some
fundamental unfairness to the defendant needs to be addressed.
[Courts] have also acted in the interests of justice when
necessary to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.
Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 587 (Minn. 2010). “[T]he factors identified in Gassler
do not form a rigid test,” and “[d]ifferent factors may be dispositive in the unique
circumstances of each case.” Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 608 (Minn. 2012).
In this case, Coleman appears to argue that the interests-of-justice exception is
satisfied in part because he has meritorious claims, specifically referring to three of the five
substantive claims that he made in his postconviction petition and continues to pursue on
appeal. But the interests-of-justice exception “relate[s] to the reason the petition was filed
after the 2-year time limit in subdivision 4(a), not the substantive claims in the petition.”
Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. 2012). “In other words, the interests-of-
justice exception is triggered by an injustice that caused the petitioner to miss the primary
deadline in subdivision 4(a), not the substance of the petition.” Id. Accordingly, we need
not review the merits of Coleman’s claims in order to consider the applicability of the
interests-of-justice exception.
Coleman also argues that “it was the fault of the State that the information [regarding
crime-lab deficiencies] was not disclosed earlier,” that “[t]here is a fundamental unfairness
that needs to be addressed” here, and that “th[is] court must apply th[e interests-of-justice]
exception in order to protect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” However, in Roberts, we reasoned that “Roberts had the opportunity to
8
investigate the validity of the test results in his case, and he declined to do so,” which meant
that he was “at fault for his failure to discover the problems at the crime lab before he
pleaded guilty.” 856 N.W.2d at 293. We further reasoned that there is “no fundamental
unfairness that needs to be addressed” because “it is not fundamentally unfair to hold
Roberts accountable for his choice to accept the state’s scientific evidence at face value
and resolve his case with a guilty plea in exchange for a reduced sentence.” Id. We also
reasoned that we did not need “to act in the interests of justice to protect the integrity of
the judicial proceedings” because Roberts’s post-plea discovery of the crime-lab
deficiencies did “not stem from a flaw in the judicial process” but stemmed instead “from
Roberts’s decision to waive his right to challenge the state’s evidence against him.” Id. Our
reasoning in Roberts applies with full force to this case, whose facts are remarkably similar
to those before us in Roberts. We conclude that the postconviction court did not err by
refusing to consider Coleman’s untimely petition under the newly-discovered-evidence
exception.
Evidentiary hearing
“A postconviction court may summarily deny a petition for postconviction relief
when the petition is time barred.” Wayne v. State, 866 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted). Thus, a postconviction petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on an untimely petition unless he demonstrates the applicability of an exception to
the two-year time limit. Townsend v. State, 867 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn. 2015). Coleman’s
petition was untimely, and he has failed to demonstrate the applicability of any exception;
9
consequently, we conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying Coleman’s
request for an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
10