This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1465
Scott Andren,
Appellant,
vs.
James Woodhull, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed April 25, 2016
Reversed
Kirk, Judge
St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-14-2535
Sean M. Quinn, Falsani, Balmer, Peterson, Quinn & Beyer, Duluth, Minnesota (for
appellant)
William D. Paul, William Paul Law Office, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondents,
asserting that it is not necessary to prove obstruction of his workers’ compensation benefits
to pursue retaliatory-discharge and refusal-to-offer-suitable-employment claims under
Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subds. 1, 2 (2014). Because the district court misapplied the law in
dismissing appellant’s claims, we reverse.
FACTS
Appellant Scott Andren was employed as a full-time mechanic by respondent
Northwoods Trucking, Inc., which is owned and operated by respondent James Woodhull.
On May 31, 2013, while at work, Andren cut a finger on his left hand while changing a
brake chamber on a truck’s axle. After receiving medical treatment, Andren informed
Woodhull that he needed surgery to repair the injury to his finger and that he was restricted
in the use of his left hand. A few days later, Andren completed a first-report-of-injury form
for workers’ compensation benefits and underwent surgery.
During a deposition, Woodhull recounted his conversation with Andren upon
learning about Andren’s need for surgery. Woodhull described telling Andren, “Being all
the accidents and stuff you’ve had, maybe it’s time you look for different employment.”
Andren asked Woodhull, “Are you firing me?” Woodhull replied, “No, I didn’t say that.
I said, ‘You hurt your foot. You got stuff in your eyes. You cut your finger now. You
may be kind of accident-prone, but maybe you ought to look for different employment.’”
After undergoing surgery, Andren did not return to work or have any further
communication with Woodhull.
In March 2014, Andren sued respondents, alleging retaliatory discharge,
obstruction-of-compensation benefits, and refusal to offer suitable employment, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subds. 1, 2.
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On the eve of trial, respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Andren
was no longer asserting obstruction of his compensation benefits. At a hearing on the
morning of trial, Andren stipulated to the fact that he had received all of his compensation
benefits. Upon learning this fact, the district court dismissed Andren’s case, concluding
that all of his claims were barred because he could not prove any obstruction-of-
compensation benefits. In its written memorandum, the district court stated:
The plain language of Minnesota Statute[s] Section 176.82 and
subsequent [caselaw] interpreting it clearly require there to
have been some actual obstruction of benefits in order to
maintain any claim under the statute, whether brought under
subdivision 1 or subdivision 2.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents.
Andren appeals.
DECISION
On appeal from summary judgment, this court reviews whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and if the district court erred in its application of the law.
STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Minn. 2002). “We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted” and “review de novo whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. at 76-
77. We also review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Christianson v. Henke, 831
N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. 2013).
Andren argues that the district court erred in concluding that he must prove that he
was obstructed from receiving his workers’ compensation benefits in order to pursue his
claims under Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subds. 1, 2.
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A. Retaliatory discharge under Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1.
Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, prohibits three forms of conduct: discharging an
employee for seeking workers’ compensation benefits; threatening to discharge an
employee for seeking benefits; and intentionally obstructing an employee seeking benefits.
Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp., 831 N.W.2d 656, 665 (Minn. App. 2013), aff’d, 852 N.W.2d
669 (Minn. 2014). Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, states:
Any person discharging or threatening to discharge an
employee for seeking workers’ compensation benefits or in
any manner intentionally obstructing an employee seeking
workers’ compensation benefits is liable in a civil action for
damages incurred by the employee including any diminution
in workers’ compensation benefits caused by a violation of this
section including costs and reasonable attorney fees, and for
punitive damages not to exceed three times the amount of any
compensation benefit to which the employee is entitled.
Damages awarded under this section shall not be offset by any
workers’ compensation benefits to which the employee is
entitled.
The plain language of the statute does not require that an employee demonstrate
obstruction-of-compensation benefits to pursue a retaliatory-discharge claim.
A review of caselaw involving retaliatory-discharge claims arising under Minn.
Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, affirms this conclusion. In McDaniel v. United Hardware Distrib.
Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court held that there was a six-year limitations period for
recovering damages under Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, and that the employee could
recover punitive damages if he proved actual damages. 469 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.
1991). Notably, the plaintiff-employee alleging retaliatory discharge in McDaniel applied
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for and received workers’ compensation benefits, but never alleged that his employer
delayed or obstructed his benefits claim. Id. at 84-85.
In Jensen v. Hercules, Inc., employees successfully sued their employers for
retaliatory discharge under Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, while receiving workers’
compensation benefits. 524 N.W.2d 748, 749, 751 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 28, 1995). In Jensen, we affirmed the district court’s holding that the
employees had been terminated because they had filed workers’ compensation claims. Id.
at 751. Again, there is nothing in the decision indicating that the employees demonstrated
any obstruction of their compensation benefits in order to pursue their retaliatory-discharge
claim. Id. at 748-52.
In denying Andren’s claims in the instant case, the district court relied on several
cases, including Bergeson v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., Flaherty v. Lindsay, and
Summers v. R & D Agency, Inc., which involved instances where an employee alleged
obstruction-of-compensation benefits. Bergeson, 414 N.W.2d 724, 725-28 (Minn. 1987);
Flaherty, 467 N.W.2d 30, 30-33 (Minn. 1991); Summers, 593 N.W.2d 241, 243-44 (Minn.
App. 1999). But none of these cases involved a retaliatory-discharge claim. Bergeson
involved an employee who sued his employer’s insurer for intentionally obstructing his
receipt of workers’ compensation benefits after he was seriously injured on the job. 414
N.W.2d at 725-28. Likewise, Summers involved an employee alleging that a firm hired by
his employer’s insurer to investigate his compensation claim obstructed his receipt of
benefits. 593 N.W.2d at 243-44.
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The district court primarily relied on Flaherty in support of its decision to dismiss
Andren’s claims. Flaherty, which was decided in 1991, involved a police officer suing for
compensation benefits after he received a work-related injury. 467 N.W.2d at 30. The
Flaherty court recognized that “some actual denial or disruption in the receipt of benefits
must occur to warrant recovery” under Minn. Stat. § 176.82. Id. at 32. But the police
officer in Flaherty never brought a retaliatory-discharge claim, and it is clear from the
opinion that the Flaherty court was clarifying the elements for proving an obstruction-of-
benefits claim. Id. This becomes even more apparent in light of the fact that neither
McDaniel nor Jensen, which involved retaliatory-discharge claims, mention Flaherty on
this issue. Hence, the district court misconstrued the holding of Flaherty to apply to
retaliatory-discharge claims brought under section 176.82, subdivision 1.
The correct law to apply in a retaliatory-discharge claim is the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework, which does not require proof of obstruction-of-compensation
benefits. Schmitz, 831 N.W.2d at 671; see also Dietrich v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 536 N.W.2d
319, 323-24 (Minn. 1995) (outlining elements of retaliatory-discharge claim under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework).
Respondents argue that, even if Andren’s retaliatory-discharge claim does not
require proof of obstruction-of-compensation benefits, he cannot prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that his employment termination was impermissibly motivated under the
McDonnell Douglas test. But, on appeal, this court examines only the basis for the district
court’s dismissal of Andren’s case, which rested solely on statutory interpretation of Minn.
Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, and caselaw. The district court did not review the factual record.
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Generally, “[i]t is not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact
on appeal.” Kucera v. Kucera, 275 Minn. 252, 254, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (1966). Further,
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Andren must only point to admissible evidence
that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of his claim. See Minn. R.
Civ. P. 56.03. Therefore, we will not independently examine the factual record to
determine whether Andren’s retaliatory-discharge claim would survive summary
judgment.
Contrary to the district court’s analysis, allowing a retaliatory-discharge claim
without a showing of obstruction of benefits does not expand the scope of the Workers’
Compensation Act on public policy grounds. Retaliatory discharge is a civil action
“separate and independent from any penalties that might be awarded under the Workers’
Compensation Act.” Bergeson, 414 N.W.2d at 726 (citing Kaluza v. Home Ins. Co., 403
N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1987)).
B. Refusal to offer continued employment under Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 2.
Under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 2, Andren’s refusal-to-offer-
continued-employment claim does not require a showing of obstruction-of-compensation
benefits. Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 2, states that “[a]n employer who, without reasonable
cause, refuses to offer continued employment to its employee when employment is
available within the employee’s physical limitations shall be liable in a civil action for one
year’s wages.” Id.
The Minnesota legislature added subdivision 2 in 1995. See 1995 Minn. Laws ch.
231, art. 1, § 30, at 1996-97. Hence, the district court erred in relying on cases prior to
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1995, such as Flaherty and Bergeson, in dismissing Andren’s refusal-to-offer-continued-
employment claim because Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 2, did not exist at the time. There
is no caselaw supporting the district court’s assertion that Andren must demonstrate
obstruction-of-compensation benefits to pursue this claim.
Reversed.
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