This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1231
Shauna Marie Krupicka,
Respondent,
vs.
Paul John Hassinger,
Appellant.
Filed April 4, 2016
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-14-3150
Quin C. Seiler, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Joanna M. Salmen, Foley & Mansfield, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Erick G. Kaardal, James V.F. Dickey, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAUBER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to modify or
vacate a harassment restraining order (HRO) issued against him. We affirm.
FACTS
In February 2014, the district court issued an ex parte order for protection (OFP)
on behalf of respondent Shauna Marie Krupicka against appellant Paul John Hassinger.
After a hearing on March 5, 2014, the district court issued an order entitled “Order to
Dismiss Order for Protection and to Grant Harassment Restraining Order.” The district
court found that “[i]n lieu of an evidentiary hearing and/or an Order for Protection, the
parties have agreed to the issuance of a Harassment Restraining Order,” effective from
March 2014 until March 2016. By the terms of the order, Hassinger was directed to
refrain from harassing Krupicka and her children, but the order did not similarly apply to
Krupicka. At the time of the hearing, Hassinger was represented by counsel but Krupicka
appeared pro se.
Shortly after the HRO was issued, Hassinger filed a petition for an ex parte OFP
against Krupicka. After an evidentiary hearing requested by Krupicka, the district court
dismissed the ex parte OFP, stating that Hassinger had “not met his burden” of proving
that he was entitled to one.
On April 21, 2015, Hassinger moved for dismissal or modification of the HRO.
As a basis for this motion, Hassinger alleged that he had scrupulously obeyed the HRO,
was fearful of Krupicka and believed that she was stalking him and accessing his private
records, feared for his son, sold his house and moved, and believed that he was
experiencing “collateral damage” because background checks “could hurt [his] potential
career opportunities.” He also alleged that he wished to work again as a licensed
emergency medical technician (EMT), but he thought the HRO would interfere with an
application for licensing. Hassinger requested a hearing on his motion, but the referee
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heard arguments without receiving testimony. The referee noted that Hassinger was not
alleging actual harm to employment opportunities, but rather was speculating about what
could happen. Krupicka’s attorney explained that Krupicka had not accessed Hassinger’s
driver’s-license records, but her employer did for security reasons after she informed
them about the HRO.
The referee issued a recommendation to deny Hassinger’s motion, finding that
Hassinger had “a broad ‘concern’ that an active HRO could make it difficult for him to
obtain employment – but there is nothing in the record before the Court to establish that
this ‘concern’ is accurate.” The district court filed a written order adopting the referee’s
recommendations on May 15, 20151. Hassinger appeals this order denying his Minn. R.
Civ. P. 60.02(e) motion to vacate or modify the HRO.
DECISION
We review the district court’s decision on whether to vacate a judgment or order
under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 for an abuse of discretion. Northland Temps., Inc. v.
Turpin, 744 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 2008).
Rule 60.02(e) provides that relief may be granted when “it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application.” This provision represents the court’s
equitable power to modify a decree in light of changed circumstances and applies to any
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Hassinger filed a notice requesting review of the referee’s recommendation on May 22,
2015. On June 1, 2015, the district court denied Hassinger’s request to review the
referee’s recommended order, concluding that the request was untimely because it was
made more than 10 days after the referee’s recommended order was issued on April 29,
2015. Hassinger is nevertheless permitted to appeal to this court, despite failing to timely
seek district court review. James v. James, 397 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Minn. App. 1986).
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judgment that has prospective effect. City of Barnum v. Sabri, 657 N.W.2d 201, 205
(Minn. App. 2003). The burden of proof is on the party seeking relief. Id.
When parties have agreed to a judgment, the court may set it aside if a party
demonstrates fraud, mistake, or absence of consent. Hollenkamp v. Peters, 410 N.W.2d
427, 429 (Minn. App. 1987). Hassinger has not alleged fraud, mistake, or absence of
consent, and he was represented by counsel when he stipulated to issuance of an HRO.
Although Krupicka was not represented by counsel, Hassinger has not demonstrated any
reason for setting aside the stipulated HRO.
Hassinger argues that the original order is an injunction and not an HRO because
the district court did not make findings of harassment. But this argument is not supported
by the record. The findings are limited, but they state that “[i]n lieu of an evidentiary
hearing and/or an Order for Protection, the parties have agreed to the issuance of a
Harassment Restraining Order.” On appeal, Hassinger does not dispute that he entered
into this agreement after consulting with his attorney; this is sufficient to support the
district court’s issuance of an HRO. See Anderson v. Anderson, 303 Minn. 26, 31, 225
N.W.2d 837, 840 (1975) (stating that “the effect of [a] stipulation is to take the place of
evidence”).
Hassinger argues that Krupicka’s failure to abide by the spirit of the HRO makes
the judgment ordering issuance of an HRO no longer equitable, but Krupicka was not
bound by the HRO; the HRO restrained only Hassinger. Hassinger’s allegations of
Krupicka’s misconduct are, like his other allegations, vague and speculative.
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Hassinger also argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion
to vacate or modify the HRO. We review the district court’s decision on whether to hold
an evidentiary hearing on a motion for an abuse of discretion. See Thompson v.
Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. App. 2007) (discussing motion to reopen
dissolution judgment under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2). Hassinger submitted an
affidavit providing his reasons for seeking relief, which fully informed the court of the
circumstances; both parties were represented by counsel, who argued in favor of their
respective positions. Although Hassinger urges this court to consider his affidavit as
“unrebutted evidence,” an examination of his affidavit demonstrates that it is largely
unsupported statements of belief, fear of future consequences, a restatement of
allegations made in the earlier hearing, or additional proof that the parties should have no
contact. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to hold an evidentiary
hearing when the supporting affidavit was speculative and vague. See id. at 430-31
(stating that in order to reopen a judgment because prospective application is no longer
equitable, “[t]he moving party must present more than merely a new set of circumstances
or an unforeseen change of a known circumstance” and that “the development of
circumstances [were] beyond the parties’ control”).
Affirmed.
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