IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1670
Filed June 15, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JARROD DALE MAJORS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Taylor County, David L.
Christensen, Judge.
Jarrod Majors appeals from the sentence imposed on resentencing.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Jarrod Majors appeals from the sentence imposed following an
individualized resentencing hearing. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In July 2002, as a result of a home invasion, Majors was charged with
eleven counts: two counts of attempted murder, one count of first-degree
burglary while in possession of a firearm, three counts of assault while
participating in first-degree burglary while in possession of a firearm in a
weapons-free zone, three counts of going armed with intent, and two counts of
criminal trespass. He was seventeen years old at the time of the offenses. In
November 2002, he entered a plea of guilty to one count of attempted murder
and agreed not to appeal. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the
remaining ten counts. However, Majors appealed, and the State proceeded with
the remaining ten counts.
On May 13, 2003, Majors agreed to plead guilty to a lesser-included
offense of second-degree burglary, to dismiss the appeal of his sentence for his
conviction of attempted murder, and to agree the sentence for burglary would be
served consecutive to his sentence for attempted murder. The State agreed to
dismiss the remaining nine counts. Majors waived time for sentencing and
requested immediate sentencing. The district court sentenced Majors to an
indeterminate term in prison not to exceed ten years on the second-degree
burglary conviction, which was to run consecutively to the twenty-five-year,
attempted-murder sentence.
3
On May 9, 2014, after having filed several additional motions and two
applications for postconviction relief,1 Majors filed a motion to correct an illegal
sentence. He asserted that because he was a juvenile at the time of the
commission of the offenses, the imposition of an automatic mandatory minimum
sentence was illegal. A resentencing hearing was held. The parties stipulated
that based on the recent rulings of the Iowa Supreme Court, Majors’ motion
should be granted to the extent that the prior automatic imposition of the
sentencing provision under Iowa Code section 902.12 (2001) constitutes an
illegal sentence. As a result, the parties agreed that Majors was entitled to an
individualized resentencing hearing.
The district court than heard and received evidence from the parties, a
victim-impact statement from one of the victims, and the parties’
recommendations as to what sentences should be imposed. The court took
Majors’ resentencing under advisement and considered whether the mandatory-
minimum sentence pursuant to section 902.12 is subject to his resentencing or if
such a mandatory sentence is unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution, article 1, section 17.
On September 26, 2014, the district court issued a lengthy and
comprehensive ruling. We quote some of the court’s conclusions. The district
court noted the Iowa Supreme Court’s recent decisions, the factors to consider in
juvenile sentencing, and that a lengthy term of incarceration without the
1
See Majors v. State, No. 12-1090, 2013 WL 2637599, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 12,
2013).
4
possibility of parole is to be the exception. The court then considered the factors
in Majors’ case:
At the time of the commission of these offenses, the
defendant was only fifteen days from his eighteenth birthday. In the
appellate opinions finding mandatory minimum sentences
unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders, the Iowa
Supreme Court emphasizes that juveniles’ immaturity reduces their
culpability because they are subject to impulsive behavior and peer
pressure, and they have not adequately developed the ability to
comprehend the full nature and consequences of their actions.
Given this stance, logic would dictate that as juveniles get older the
juveniles become more mature, become less subject to impulsive
behavior and peer pressure, and they are better able to
comprehend the full nature and consequences of their actions.
Therefore, juveniles who have almost reached the age of [eighteen]
would be substantially mature, minimally subject to impulsive
behavior and peer pressure, and largely able to comprehend the
full nature and consequences of their actions. If this logic is applied
to the facts of this case, the defendant was only fifteen days from
reaching the age of eighteen, the age at which a person becomes
fully accountable for the person’s criminal acts.
In assessing whether the defendant’s actions were the result
of youth or a criminal nature, because this is a resentencing
hearing instead of an original sentencing hearing, the court has the
benefit of knowing the defendant’s behavior during his eleven years
of incarceration. The report provided by his counselor lists fifty-five
prison rule violations spread out relatively evenly over the length of
his period of incarceration. Instead of depicting a person who has
decreased his impulsivity and gained maturity and understanding of
consequences, the defendant’s behavioral record in prison paints a
picture of a person who does not recognize societal rules, now or
eleven years ago. This record is indicative of a person who had
developed his adult behaviors and attitudes by the time he
committed his crimes. While juveniles are more capable of change
than adults, the defendant’s actions over the past eleven years
have shown that he is the exceptional juvenile who formed his long-
term attitudes and behaviors before reaching the age of majority,
and those negative attitudes and behaviors persist to this date.
The court also took an in-depth examination of the facts of the crimes committed:
[T]he defendant thoroughly planned these crimes, demonstrated
the patience to wait for the right opportunity and took measures to
avoid detection, identification, and apprehension. Jamie Peckham
told how his family attended an activity every Wednesday evening,
5
and afterward he would drop his wife off at their house and then
drive their two children around for a while so they would fall asleep.
The defendant lived across the street from his victims, and it was
not a coincidence that the defendant entered their home and
concealed himself in the upstairs bedroom on the same night of the
week that he had observed this routine taking place. The
defendant had the foresight to bring duct tape to bind Holly
Peckham. He wore a mask to conceal his face and gloves to
ensure that he left no fingerprints. The defendant devised a home-
made silencer by taping a plastic bottle over the end of the barrel of
a rifle. He took measures to avoid apprehension, arming himself
with a loaded rifle, which had a chambered round, and a machete.
These facts indicate that the defendant did not act impulsively or as
the result of any peer pressure, but instead acted carefully and
deliberately, planning the timing and method of his crimes very
carefully. These facts also indicate that the defendant fully
understood the nature and potential consequences of his acts. He
sought to avoid those consequences by concealing his identity and
trying to ensure he would escape apprehension by arming himself
with two separate weapons.
Ultimately, the court concluded:
All of these facts demonstrate that the defendant did not act
under an impulse or peer pressure, and that he had fully
considered the nature, risks, and potential consequences of his
actions. The defendant cannot use his juvenile status at the time
he committed these crimes to shield him from full responsibility for
those crimes. “At the same time, it bears emphasis that while youth
is a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an excuse.” [State v.]
Null, 836 N.W.2d [41,] 75 [(Iowa 2013)].
After comprehensive consideration of all of the relevant
factors, for the reasons set forth above, it is the conclusion of the
court that the defendant is the exceptional case in which sentences
providing for the maximum period of incarceration, including a
mandatory minimum sentencing provision, are appropriate.
The court then entered judgment. On his conviction for burglary in the
second degree, the court ordered Majors to be sentenced to an indeterminate
term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years and pay a fine of $1000, as well as
the statutory surcharges and court costs. The court suspended the imposition of
the fine and surcharge. On his conviction of attempted murder, the court ordered
6
Majors to be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed
twenty-five years, ruling Majors must serve at least seventy percent of the
maximum term of the sentence before he is eligible for parole. The court also
ordered that the sentences were to be served consecutively, for a total term of
incarceration not to exceed thirty-five years.
Majors appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion in
resentencing him.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Where the claim raised by an appellant is that the district court failed to
consider any of the required factors or considered any of the required mitigating
factors to be aggravating, then the sentence imposed has been the product of a
defective sentencing proceeding, which is unconstitutional. See State v. Lyle,
854 N.W.2d 378, 402-04 (Iowa 2014); see also State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545,
553 (Iowa 2015) (stating “we have begun to decide cases involving constitutional
attacks on the validity of a sentence” and “[w]hen a defendant attacks the
constitutionality of a sentence, our review is de novo”).
However, where the appellant attacks the legality of the sentence on
nonconstitutional grounds, our review is for errors at law. Seats, 865 N.W.2d at
553. If the claim is that the district court has granted an individualized hearing,
imposed a sentence within the statutory limits, and considered all the required
factors but the appellant disagrees with the sentence imposed nonetheless, then
our review is for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 552-53 (noting “a district court
did not abuse its discretion if the evidence supports the sentence”).
7
III. Discussion.
A flurry of sentencing cases have been handed down in the last few years
by the United States Supreme Court and our supreme court. A summary of
these cases alleging cruel and unusual sentences has been well documented in
our case of State v. Tuecke, No. 15-0617, 2016 WL 1681524, at *3-8 (Iowa Ct.
App. Apr. 27, 2016). We need not repeat it here.
The posture of this case requires us to review a resentencing decision to
determine if, after an individualized sentencing hearing, the court properly
applied the Miller factors.2 Majors was a juvenile when he committed his crimes
and was granted such a hearing. Ultimately, the district court concluded this was
a rare case that necessitated the imposition of the mandatory-minimum seventy
percent for the offense of attempted murder.
Majors asserts the district court abused its discretion in resentencing him,
giving too much weight to some factors and too little weight to others. Appellate
review for abuse of discretion “‘is not to second guess the decision made by the
district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable
grounds.’” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 412 (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720,
724-25 (Iowa 2002)).
Recent precedent requires that a juvenile offender be given individualized
sentencing consideration. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 52-56 (providing an overview
of juveniles, legal responsibility, and diminished culpability). An individualized
sentencing hearing requires the court to consider several factors:
2
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
8
(1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth,
including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that
surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the . . . offense,
including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected [the youth]”;
(4) the “incompetencies associated with youth—for example, [the
youth’s] inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors
(including on a plea agreement) or [the youth’s] incapacity to assist
[the youth’s] own attorneys”; and (5) “the possibility of
rehabilitation.”
State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 n.6 (Iowa 2013).
Additionally, our supreme court has stated that the purpose of an
individualized sentencing hearing is for the court to “undertake an analysis of
‘everything the United States Supreme Court said in Roper and Graham’ about
youth.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 (citation omitted). The trial court “must recognize
that because children are constitutionally different from adults, they ordinarily
cannot be held to the same standard of culpability as adults in criminal
sentencing.” Id. The court must also recognize that “juveniles are more capable
of change than are adults and that as a result, their actions are less likely to be
evidence of irretrievably depraved character.” Id. at 75. “At the same time, it
bears emphasis that while youth is a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an
excuse.” Id.
More recently, in Seats, the court explained further:
In sentencing the juvenile offender, the court must take into
account any information in the record regarding “the family and
home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot
usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.”
In examining the “family and home environment,” the judge shall
consider any information regarding childhood abuse, parental
neglect, personal and family drug or alcohol abuse, prior exposure
to violence, lack of parental supervision, lack of an adequate
education, and the juvenile’s susceptibility to psychological or
9
emotional damage. The sentencing judge should consider these
family and home environment vulnerabilities together with the
juvenile’s lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility,
and vulnerability to peer pressure as mitigating, not aggravating,
factors.
....
Finally, the sentencing judge must take into consideration
that “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than are adults” and
that as a result, “their actions are less likely to be evidence of
‘irretrievably depraved character.’” . . . It is very difficult for a judge
to distinguish between “‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’”
865 N.W.2d at 556 (citations omitted). The court “must take into account any
information in the record regarding these factors. Id. (emphasis added).
In addition, we are guided by the 2014 decision of Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at
402. There, our supreme court noted that judges are not prohibited from
sentencing juveniles to prison for the length of time identified by the legislature
for the crime committed, and the legislature is not prohibited from imposing a
minimum time that youthful offenders must serve in prison before being eligible
for parole. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402. But, the sentencing court is to “consider all
the circumstances of each case to craft an appropriate sentence and give each
juvenile the individual sentencing attention they deserve and our constitution
demands.” Id. The court identified the relevant sentencing factors to be
considered by the district court:
Under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution, the
portion of the statutory sentencing schema requiring a juvenile to
serve seventy percent of the period of incarceration before parole
eligibility may not be imposed without a prior determination by the
district court that the minimum period of incarceration without
parole is warranted under the factors identified in Miller and further
explained in Null.
Id. at 404 n.10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
10
But then in the case of State v. Sweet, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ , 2016 WL
3023726, at *29 (Iowa 2016), the supreme court adopted a categorical rule that
juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
under article 1, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. In reaching this conclusion,
the supreme court decimated the use of the Miller factors, describing one factor
as “not . . . very helpful,” Sweet, 2016 WL 3023726 at *27, and another factor
“fraught with risks.” Id., 2016 WL 3023726 at *28. Ultimately, the court stated
the Miller factors cannot be applied in any principled way—at least as it pertains
to whether parole eligibility should be granted for a juvenile defendant facing a
life sentence.
Unfortunately, the principles in Lyle, requiring the application of the Miller
factors to determine if a mandatory-minimum sentence should be imposed upon
a juvenile offender serving or required to serve a term of years, were not
overruled in Sweet. Therein lies our dilemma. Do we follow the principles of
Lyle, or conclude the principles of Lyle have been completely eroded by the
decision in Sweet?
We conclude the resolution of this question has been best answered in
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). In Agostini, the United States Supreme
Court stated,
We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other
courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication,
overruled an earlier precedent. We reaffirm that “[i]f a precedent of
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”
11
521 U.S. at 237 (alteration in original) (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
Our supreme court has said much the same in stating,
Yet it is the prerogative of this court to determine the law,
and we think that generally the trial courts are under a duty to follow
it as expressed by the courts of last resort, as they understand it,
even though they may disagree. If our previous holdings are to be
overruled, we should ordinarily prefer to do it ourselves.
State v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1957).
Because Lyle, as well as State v. Pearson, 863 N.W.2d 88, 95-97 (Iowa
2013), a similar case involving a juvenile offender facing a mandatory-minimum
sentence, have not been overruled and directly control the issue before us, we
remain bound by the principles of Lyle.
Here, the district court noted eight factors that it considered in reaching its
sentencing decision:
In considering the appropriate sentences to be imposed in this
case, the court has considered the following factors: (1) the
defendant’s prior record of convictions; (2) the defendant’s
employment circumstances, including the defendant’s economic
circumstances; (3) the defendant’s family circumstances; (4) the
plea agreement; (5) the nature of offenses, including whether a
weapon or force was used and the effect on the victims; (6) the
maximum opportunity for rehabilitation of the defendant; (7) the
protection of the community and society; and (8) the age of the
defendant. In determining the appropriate sentences to be
imposed the court considered the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, to the extent such circumstances exist, in relation to
each of these factors.
The court then discussed each of those eight factors. After considering
those factors, the court specifically found that Majors was the “exceptional case
in which sentences providing for the maximum period of incarceration, including
a mandatory minimum sentencing provision, are appropriate.” The district court
12
did provide an individualized sentencing hearing, imposed a sentence within the
allowable statutory framework, and carefully considered the factors stated in Null
and Lyle to the extent the record reflected information on each factor.3 We
cannot say the sentences imposed were unreasonable or based upon untenable
grounds. We find no abuse of discretion. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
3
We acknowledge the district court stated the older the juvenile—the more intelligent
and mature they can expected to be. The court in Sweet found this fact “not a very
helpful factor” in determining if a juvenile facing a life sentence should be afforded
immediate parole eligibility. Although the child’s age may not serve as a proper basis to
determine maturity, the court gave consideration to the child’s age as it was required to
do, and we decline to be hyper-technical to say the court abused its discretion.