IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
MEDALLIC ART LIMITED No. 68776
PARTNERSHIP, A REVOKED NEVADA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; MEDALLIC
ART CORPORATION, A NEVADA
CORPORATION; MEDALLIC ART
COMPANY, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY; AND ROSS
HANSEN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND D/B/A
FILED
NORTHWEST TERRITORIAL MINT, JUN 20 2016
LLC, MEDALLIC ART LIMITED TRACE K. LINDEMAN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
PARTNERSHIP, MEDALLIC ART BY S. YC
CORPORATION AND MEDALLIC ART DEP LlirtC7.4
COMPANY, LLC,
Appellants,
vs.
ROBERT HOFF; AND CONNIE HOFF,
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
Respondents.
ORDER VACATING AND REMANDING
This is an appeal from a post-judgment order awarding
attorney fees in a contract action. Third Judicial District Court, Lyon
County; Leon Aberasturi, Judge.
The district court awarded attorney fees to respondents under
Section 31 of the Lease Agreement, which authorizes an award of fees to a
"Prevailing Party," defined as "a Party who substantially obtains or
defeats the relief sought." The district court found that respondents
substantially obtained the relief they had sought at trial because they
obtained a judgment (1) enjoining appellants from bringing certain
hazardous substances onto the premises, (2) requiring appellants to pay a
tax penalty, (3) requiring appellants to provide respondents with notice
that appellants have retained contractors for HVAC maintenance and fire
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certification, and (4) requiring appellants to pay a security deposit.
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On appeal, appellants contend that the district court did not
(1) enjoin appellants from bringing hazardous substances onto the
premises to be used in conducting electroplating operations, and (2) did
not award respondents damages for roof repairs. According to appellants,
because those two trial successes were more "substantial" than
respondents' trial successes, the district court abused its discretion in
determining respondents were the "Prevailing Party." See Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep't v. Blackjack Bonding, Inc., 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 10, 343
P.3d 608, 614 (2015) (reviewing an award of attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion). Having considered the parties' arguments and the record, we
agree preliminarily with appellants' stance, as we are unable to determine
from the district court's November 19, 2014, order why the district court
did not give credence to appellants' two trial successes. In particular,
whereas the November 19, 2014, order downplays the significance of
appellants' first trial success, the district court's April 1, 2014, post-trial
order suggests that the electroplating issue was one of the primary
disputes between the parties. Similarly, although the November 19, 2014,
order alludes to appellants' success on the roof-repair issue, the order does
not attempt to quantify the significance of that issue.'
Accordingly, based on the current record, we are unable to
conclude that the district court was within its discretion in determining
1 Inthis regard, it is unclear why the roof-repair issue was afforded
the same weight as other issues for purposes of the district court's tally of
‘`areas" and "claims" won by each side. Moreover, some of the "areas"
appear to be duplicative of one another, and respondents appear to have
been given full credit for at least one area and claim where both sides
partially prevailed. For these reasons and others, the district court's tally
of areas and claims won by each side does not provide a justifiable basis
for affirming the November 19, 2014, order.
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that respondents were the "Prevailing Party" under Section 31. 2 See id.
(recognizing that an abuse of discretion can occur "when the district court
bases its decision on a clearly erroneous factual determination"). We
therefore vacate the district court's November 19, 2014, order that
determined respondents were entitled to attorney fees, and we necessarily
vacate the district court's July 30, 2015, order awarding attorney fees to
respondents. 3 We remand this matter with instructions for the district
court to consider and explain how appellants' two trial successes factor
into the determination of who is entitled to attorney fees under Section
31. 4
It is so ORDERED.
J.
Douglas
)0Thy--7 J.
Gibbons
cc: Hon. Leon Aberasturi, District Judge
Leverty & Associates Law, Chtd.
Oshinski & Forsberg, Ltd.
Third District Court Clerk
neither side has raised the issue on appeal, we do not
2 Because
address whether Section 31 contemplates a situation in which there could
be more than one "Prevailing Party."
3J of this disposition, we decline to consider appellants' other
arguments as to why the award should be vacated, modified, or reduced.
4Thefact that this disposition did not expressly address appellants'
other trial successes should not be construed as prohibiting the district
court from considering those successes on remand.
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