FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 22 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS RASMUSSEN, No. 13-35108
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 6:12-cv-00057-DLC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., sucessor by
merger to Successor BAC Home Loans
Servicing, LP; RECONTRUST
COMPANY, NA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 14, 2016**
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND , Circuit Judges.
Thomas Rasmussen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal claims related to the foreclosure of his home.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Gant v. County of Los Angeles,
772 F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 2014), and for an abuse of discretion a denial of a
motion for leave to file an amended complaint, see Metzler Inc. v. GMBH v.
Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rasmussen’s Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”) and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) claims as barred
by the statute of limitations, and Rasmussen failed to plead facts demonstrating
that equitable tolling should apply. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (prescribing at most a
three-year statute of limitations for violations of RESPA); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an
action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged
violation); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th
Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling applies where “despite all due diligence, the party
invoking equitable tolling is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the
existence of the claim” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rasmussen’s
motion for leave to file an amended complaint because the only viable claim in the
proposed complaint was a state law breach of contract claim, and the district court
indicated that it would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that
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claim. See Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (no abuse of
discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile); see also
Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[O]nce
the district court, at an early stage of the litigation, dismissed the only claim over
which it had original jurisdiction, it did not abuse its discretion in also dismissing
the remaining state claims.”). Contrary to Rasmussen’s assertions, the district
court did not dismiss his proposed breach of contract claim with prejudice.
Contrary to Rasmussen’s contention that the magistrate judge lacked
jurisdiction to issue findings and recommendation, Rasmussen’s consent to the
magistrate judge’s designation was not required because the magistrate judge did
not enter dispositive orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); see also Estate of
Conners by Meredith v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing
scope of magistrate judge’s authority under § 636(b)(1)(B)). The district court
properly conducted a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations and Rasmussen’s objections thereto, and entered final judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
AFFIRMED.
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