FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 22 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SEPIDEH CIRINO, an individual, No. 12-56038
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:11-cv-01890-AG-JPR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GMAC MORTGAGE LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company; et al.,
Defendant - Appellees,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 14, 2016**
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Sepideh Cirino appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging federal claims relating to her mortgage and the foreclosure of
her property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We may
affirm on any ground supported by the record. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab
Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
Dismissal of Cirino’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim
was proper because Cirino failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any
defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6) (definition of “debt collector” under FDCPA); Schlegel v. Wells Fargo
Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) (complaint “must plead factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that defendant is a
“debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Cirino’s Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”) claim because Cirino failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she
gave proper notice under the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b); see also Nelson
v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2002) (the
FCRA requires consumers to “filter” their complaints about inaccurate information
through the credit reporting agency).
Dismissal of Cirino’s mail fraud claim was proper because the mail fraud
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statute does not provide a private right of action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
Cirino has waived any challenge to the dismissal of her claims under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and securities acts by agreeing
to the dismissal of these claims before the district court. See Mendoza v. Block, 27
F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party
must make known to the court any objection to the court’s action.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cirino further leave
to amend because the deficiencies in Cirino’s amended complaint could not be
cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend should
be given unless the deficiencies in the complaint cannot be cured by amendment).
AFFIRMED.
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