MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 30 2016, 9:41 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer L. Koethe Gregory F. Zoeller
LaPorte, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher Beckman, June 30, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
46A03-1510-CR-1773
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael S.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bergerson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D01-1504-F3-298
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Christopher Beckman appeals his conviction for aggravated battery, as a Level
3 felony, and his sentence following a jury trial. 1 Beckman raises three issues
for our review, which we restate as follows:
1. Whether Beckman preserved for appellate review his
argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted the medical records of his victim;
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
Beckman’s conviction; and
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
sentenced Beckman.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On March 31, 2015, Beckman got into an argument with Daniel Mashburn,
who was seeing a former girlfriend of Beckman’s, at a local church. Following
the argument, Beckman confronted Mashburn in an adjacent parking lot.
Beckman removed a box cutter from his clothing and used it to attack
Mashburn. The pastor of the church, James A. Cross, Jr., observed Beckman
1
The jury also found Beckman guilty on two lesser charges of battery, for which the trial court initially
entered judgments of conviction. However, in its sentencing statement, the trial court clarified that the lesser
convictions “are hereby merged into the judgment of conviction” for aggravated battery, as a Level 3 felony.
Appellant’s App. at 197. We interpret that statement to mean that the trial court vacated Beckman’s lesser
convictions for battery as alleged in Counts II and III.
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attacking Mashburn with the box cutter and broke up the fight. A neighbor,
Lindsey Jankowski, also observed Beckman attacking Mashburn with the box
cutter, and she called police and described Beckman to them. Beckman fled the
scene when he heard the police cars nearby, but officers apprehended him about
ten blocks away shortly thereafter.
[4] The officer who escorted Beckman to the police station asked Beckman if
Beckman’s heavy cough was tuberculosis, and Beckman responded that it was
not, “unless I caught something when I cut him open.” Tr. at 296-97. Later,
Beckman asked a member of the jail’s staff where his glasses were. The staff
member suggested they may have been taken as evidence, to which Beckman
responded, “possibly, I tried to cut his head off.” Id. at 404.
[5] Mashburn was transported to the emergency room at St. Anthony Memorial
Hospital in Michigan City. According to his medical records, Mashburn
reported that he had been attacked with a box cutter. Mashburn had severe
lacerations on his head and face. The lacerations on his head were likely to
scar, but the six centimeter long laceration on his face was described by
Mashburn’s treating nurse as “[c]ertain[]” to scar. Id. at 371.
[6] The State charged Beckman, in relevant part, with aggravated battery, as a
Level 3 felony, and for being a habitual offender. A jury found him guilty of
battery, as a Level 3 felony. Thereafter, Beckman pleaded guilty to being a
habitual offender. The court entered its judgment of conviction accordingly
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and sentenced Beckman to an aggregate term of twenty-six years in the
Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Admission of Medical Records
[7] Beckman first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
Mashburn’s medical records as evidence because those records contained
hearsay from Mashburn that he had been cut with a box cutter. But we agree
with the State that Beckman has not preserved this issue for appellate review.
[8] “[T]he failure to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of
evidence at trial, so as to provide the trial court an opportunity to make a final
ruling on the matter in the context in which the evidence is introduced, results
in waiver of the alleged error on appeal.” Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146,
1152 (Ind. 2000). Further, a party may not object on one ground at trial and
rely on a different argument on appeal. Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747
(Ind. 2000).
[9] Here, when the State sought to introduce Mashburn’s medical records,
Beckman’s counsel objected and initially suggested that the records were
inadmissible hearsay. However, when pressed by the trial court, Beckman’s
counsel clarified that his objection to Mashburn’s medical records was not that
they contained hearsay but that the State had failed to lay a proper foundation
for the admission of the records, and that the State’s suggested exception to the
general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay could be met only if the
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proper foundation for the records was established. Tr. at 348, 352. The State
responded by calling Mashburn’s treating nurse as a witness to establish that
foundation. Id. at 353. In response to the nurse’s testimony, when the State
sought to formally introduce Mashburn’s medical records as evidence,
Beckman’s counsel responded that he had no objection. Id. at 360.
[10] We conclude that Beckman’s argument on appeal that the medical records were
inadmissible hearsay was not properly preserved in the trial court. Beckham
objected in the trial court on foundation grounds, not on grounds that the
records were inadmissible hearsay, and apparently withdrew his objection in
response to the testimony from the State’s ensuing witness. As Beckman’s
appellate argument is not properly before us, we will not consider it.
Issue Two: Sufficient Evidence
[11] Beckman also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support his conviction for aggravated battery, as a Level 3 felony. Our standard
for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal
conviction is as follows:
First, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of
witnesses. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009).
Second, we only consider “the evidence supporting the [verdict]
and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
evidence.” Id. (quoting Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind.
2008)). A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial
evidence of probative value supporting each element of the
offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “It is the job of
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the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular
case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we
consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s
ruling.” Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 2005)
(citations omitted).
Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015). To demonstrate aggravated
battery, as charged here, the State was required to show that Beckman’s attack
on Mashburn resulted in a serious permanent disfigurement to Mashburn. See
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5(1) (2014). On appeal, Beckman challenges only
whether the State presented sufficient evidence to show that his attack left
Mashburn with a serious permanent disfigurement.
[12] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Beckman’s conviction. As
we have explained: “We have defined ‘permanent’ as ‘continuing or enduring
without fundamental or marked change’ and ‘disfigure’ as: ‘to make less
complete, perfect or beautiful in appearance or character: deface, deform,
mar.’” Cornelious v. State, 988 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
James v. State, 755 N.E.2d 226, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied), trans.
denied. In Cornelious, we held that the State presented sufficient evidence of
serious permanent disfigurement when it demonstrated that the defendant’s
attack left his victim with a serious, permanent facial scar. Id. Here,
Mashburn’s treating nurse testified that it was “[c]ertain[]” that the six-
centimeter long wound on Mashburn’s face would scar. Tr. at 371. We hold
that this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate serious permanent
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disfigurement and to support his conviction for aggravated battery, as a Level 3
felony.
Issue Three: Sentencing
[13] Finally, Beckman asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it
sentenced him because the court did not give sufficient mitigating weight to his
guilty plea. But the Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that the weight
assigned or not assigned by the trial court to mitigating factors is not
appealable. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007). Accordingly,
we reject this argument. Further, while Beckman alternatively claims to make
an argument under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), his only actual argument on
appeal is that the trial court erred in its weighing of the guilty plea mitigator.
Accordingly, he has forfeited any review of his sentence under Rule 7(B). See,
e.g., Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 135-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
Conclusion
[14] In sum, we affirm Beckman’s conviction and sentence.
[15] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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