United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 1, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-60389
Summary Calendar
ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY; BECKMAN COULTER, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
PAW PAW’S CAMPER CITY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. and Beckman
Coulter, Inc., appeal the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of appellee Paw-Paw’s Camper City, Inc., arguing
that the district court erred in its construction of Mississippi’s
borrowing statute. We agree, reverse the grant of summary judgment
and remand for further proceedings.
In 1999 a Beckman Coulter employee began experiencing
mechanical problems with the company van he was driving from New
Jersey to New Orleans, and dropped the van off at Paw Paw’s Camper
City in Hammond, Louisiana for repairs. After the repairs the
employee continued to drive the van toward New Orleans only to
notice that, fifteen miles from appellee’s facility, smoke began
escaping from the hood. A short while after the driver pulled into
the emergency lane, the van became engulfed in flames and was
destroyed, along with the medical electronic equipment it was
carrying.
Almost two years later, St. Paul’s, a Minnesota corporation,
and Beckman Coulter, a Delaware corporation, filed suit in
Mississippi federal court against Paw-Paw’s, a Mississippi
corporation, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Paw-Paw’s
moved for summary judgment on the basis that Louisiana’s one-year
prescription period applied to bar the plaintiffs’ suit. St. Paul
and Beckman Coulter responded that Mississippi’s three-year statute
of limitations was applicable. The district court applied
Louisiana’s statute of limitations on the basis that Mississippi’s
borrowing statute precluded application of that state’s statute of
limitations. The borrowing statute reads:
When a cause of action has accrued outside of this state,
and by the laws of the place outside this state where
such cause of action accrued, an action thereon cannot be
maintained by reason of lapse of time, then no action
thereon shall be maintained in this state; provided,
however, that where such a cause of action has accrued in
favor of a resident of this state, this state’s law on
the period of limitation shall apply.1
1
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-65 (2002) (emphasis added).
2
St. Paul’s and Beckman Coulter contended that the borrowing
statute did not prevent the court from applying Mississippi’s
statute of limitations because they were residents of Mississippi
for purposes of the statute. Although admitting that neither was
incorporated or had their principle place of business in
Mississippi, they presented proof that St. Paul’s had been
authorized to do business in Mississippi since 1935, and Beckman
Coulter since 1990.
The district court correctly framed the issue as whether “a
foreign corporation, with a valid certificate of authority or
license to do business in Mississippi, [is] a resident of
Mississippi for the purpose of the borrowing statute.” It noted
that this issue was novel and required the court to interpret the
statute. Applying Mississippi’s rules of statutory construction,
it concluded that the statute was unambiguous: It provided that
only residents were permitted to take advantage of the Mississippi
statute of limitations in cases such as the one at issue. Because
the plaintiffs were not incorporated in Mississippi, did not have
their principle place of business in Mississippi, and were not
domestic corporations, the district court concluded that they could
not be residents of the state under the plain terms of the
statutory language.
On appeal, St. Paul’s and Beckman Coulter urge, as they did in
the district court, that we should look to the Mississippi Supreme
3
Court’s interpretation of the state long-arm statute for guidance
on the issue of residency. Like the borrowing statute, the long-
arm statute distinguishes between residents and nonresidents,
providing:
Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited
partnership, or any foreign or other corporation not
qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state
as to doing business herein, who shall make a contract
with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or
in part by any party in this state ... shall by such act
or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi and
shall thereby be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state.2
Relying on C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster,3 appellants contend that
foreign corporations qualified to do business in Mississippi are
considered residents for purposes of invoking the long-arm statute
against nonresident defendants. The plaintiffs in Doster, foreign
corporations qualified to do business in Mississippi, filed suit
against a nonresident defendant for breach of a contract which was
to be performed in Mississippi.4 In determining whether the long-
arm statute allowed Mississippi courts to assert jurisdiction over
the defendant, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained that it
first had to answer “whether a foreign corporation who has
qualified to do business in this state is a resident within the
meaning of [the long-arm statute] so that such party may bring a
2
Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-57 (2002) (emphasis added).
3
211 So. 2d 813 (Miss. 1968).
4
Id. at 813-14.
4
suit under” its terms.5 In resolving this issue it found important
that Mississippi law “provides that a foreign corporation qualified
to do business in this state shall, until qualification is revoked
or withdrawn as provided in the Act, enjoy the same, but no
greater, rights and privileges as a domestic corporation.”6 It
reasoned from this that “a foreign corporation qualified to do
business under the corporate laws of this state should have the
same privileges and advantages of invoking the aid of the courts of
this state under [the long-arm statute] as resident corporations if
they are to have equal protection of the laws.”7 Applying these
principles the Doster court held that “the nonresident plaintiffs
in the present case are residents within the meaning of” the long-
arm statute.8
Concluding that the borrowing statute’s reference to
“resident” was so clear in a single meaning that no other would be
permitted, the district court disavowed reliance on Mississippi
case law, including Doster, to interpret the term.9 Applying de
5
Id. at 814.
6
Id. (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 5309-222 (1942 & Supp. 1966),
recodified as Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-15.05(b) (2002)).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See Coatings Mfrs., Inc. v. DPI, Inc., 926 F.2d 474, 476
(5th Cir. 1991) (“Because the Mississippi [Supreme Court] has not
resolved the question ..., we examine the language of the statute,
and if unclear, other Mississippi statutes and case law to
5
novo review, we find that the term “resident” is unclear.10 In
concluding that the term “resident” is ambiguous we are influenced
by the fact that in Doster the state’s highest court held, in the
context of the long-arm statute, that “resident” had a meaning
different from that declared by the district court in this case,
one that includes foreign corporations doing business within the
state. Informed by the Mississippi Supreme Court’s effort in
Doster to avoid unequal treatment between residents and
nonresidents who do business in the state, we conclude that that
court would consider the appellants to be residents for purposes of
the borrowing statute. Therefore we REVERSE the district court’s
determine how the Mississippi Supreme Court likely would interpret
the statutory language were the question presented to it.”).
10
The district court restricted the term “resident” to
corporations that are either incorporated or have their principle
place of business in the state. Of course, these characteristics
define a corporate “citizen” of a state for purposes of federal
diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), but that does
not necessitate courts’ circumscription of “resident” to include
only corporations bearing those characteristics. See, e.g.,
Black’s Law Dictionary 1473 (4th ed. 1968) (defining “residence” as
“bodily presence as an inhabitant of a place” and stating that “a
person may have two places of residence”).
We further note that although Mississippi’s rules of
statutory construction hold that a court should not look to outside
sources if the statutory language is unambiguous, as federal courts
sitting in diversity Erie necessitates that our decision on whether
a statutory term is unambiguous be informed by the state courts’
own conclusion as to the ambiguity of the term. Here the district
court’s conclusion that “resident” was unambiguous ran contrary to
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s implicit determination in Doster
that, as used in a closely related statutory provision, the term
“resident” was ambiguous and required reference to outside sources
for interpretation.
6
grant of summary judgment in favor of Paw Paw’s Camper City and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
7