United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 16, 2003
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-40370
Summary Calendar
HAROLD R. HAYES, II,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARK A. DIAZ; ET AL.,
Defendants,
MARK A. DIAZ; SABAS ENCINIA, JR.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(C-98-CV-325)
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Before JOLLY, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Harold R. Hayes, II, Texas prisoner number
536997, filed the instant suit, alleging that the defendants had
violated his right of access to courts by unreasonably denying him
legal visits with a more knowledgeable inmate. The case proceeded
to trial, and a jury found in favor of the defendants. The
magistrate judge denied Hayes’s motion for a new trial and entered
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
judgment in favor of the defendants. Hayes now appeals that
judgment.
Hayes’s primary argument is that the magistrate judge erred in
denying his motion for new trial. Because Hayes failed to move for
a directed verdict, we will review this claim only to determine
whether there is “any evidence to support the jury’s verdict,
irrespective of its sufficiency, or whether plain error was
committed which, if not noticed, would result in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v.
International Paper Co., 889 F.2d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 1989)
(internal citation omitted); see also McConney v. City of Houston,
863 F.2d 1180, 1187 (5th Cir. 1989).
Hayes has not shown that the magistrate judge erred in denying
his motion for new trial. The defendants’ statements that they did
not recall reviewing Hayes’s requests for legal visits, combined
with Hayes’s own testimony that unnamed officers would dispose of
his written requests for visits, provides some evidence to show
that the defendants took no personal action against Hayes and thus
did not violate his right of access to courts. Accordingly, this
evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict in favor of
the defendants under the applicable standard of review. Hayes has
not shown that the magistrate judge erred in denying his motion for
new trial.
Hayes also argues that the magistrate judge erred in admitting
his disciplinary record into evidence because the record
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constituted inadmissible evidence of his extrinsic bad acts. We
review this issue under a heightened abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Alarcon, 261 F.3d 416, 424 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1099 (2002).
Hayes has not shown that the magistrate judge abused her
discretion in admitting the report. This evidence was highly
relevant to one of the theories put forth by the defense and thus
shed light on an issue other than Hayes’s character. See United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
Moreover, the probative value of this evidence outweighed any
prejudicial effect it may have had, especially in light of Hayes’s
testimony concerning his disciplinary convictions. Hayes’s
argument on this issue is unavailing.
Finally, the appellants argue that, even if they did violate
Hayes’s constitutional rights, they are not liable to him because
they are entitled to qualified immunity. Because Hayes has not
shown that the jury’s verdict should be overturned, we need not
consider this issue. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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