United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 17, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-51299
Summary Calendar
ADELL A DANIELS; OTIS N DANIELS; JENCY VALIENTE; COREY
ANDERSON
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
ADVANTAGE RENT-A-CAR INC
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas, Austin
No. A-01-CV-856-§
Before KING, Chief Judge, and EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs-Appellants Adell Daniels, Otis Daniels, Jency
Valiente and Corey Anderson appeal the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Advantage Rent-A-
Car on Plaintiffs’ claims of unlawful discrimination in violation
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. For the following reasons, we
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
On December 20, 2002, Plaintiffs Adell and Otis Daniels, a
black couple, arrived at Advantage Rent-A-Car location 103
seeking a rental car. Mr. and Mrs. Daniels had been involved in
an automobile accident, and needed a temporary replacement for
their own car. The rental was arranged for and paid by the
Danielses’ insurance company.
Customer service representative Michelle Kamenicky asked Mr.
and Mrs. Daniels for a credit card to cover a deposit for their
rental. Mr. Daniels provided Ms. Kamenicky with a debit card.
On regular, non-insurance rentals paid for with a debit card,
Advantage requires a $200 deposit. Advantage asks for only a $50
deposit for insurance rentals, however. Ms. Kamenicky told Mr.
Daniels that the deposit was $200, since he was paying with a
debit card. At this point, Mr. Daniels provided Ms. Kamenicky
with a different debit card, which was tied to his Merrill Lynch
account.
Ms. Kamenicky swiped the card and informed Mr. Daniels that
it had been declined. As Mr. Daniels’s account resources
exceeded $200 at that time, his card should not have been
declined. In any event, Ms. Kamenicky requested another credit
card or cash. Mr. Daniels, at this point, informed Ms. Kamenicky
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that the Danielses’ insurance company had told them the deposit
would only be $50. Advantage’s District Manager Sharon Slonaker
intervened, and she told Ms. Kamenicky that only $50 was required
for insurance rentals. Mr. Daniels paid $50 in cash.
Mr. and Mrs. Daniels were assigned a Hyundai Accent at a
rate of $21.74/day.1 Mrs. Daniels found the Accent to be too
small and asked for a Ford Escort. The Accent is classified by
Advantage as an “economy” car, and the Escort is a “compact” car.
Advantage charges different rates for these different classes of
cars. Nonetheless, Advantage employees told Mr. and Mrs. Daniels
that they could exchange the Accent for an Escort at Advantage’s
107 location at no extra cost, if they so desired.
Mr. and Mrs. Daniels decided to exchange the Accent, so they
went to location 107. At this new location, Mr. and Mrs. Daniels
waited in line behind Kathryn Burke, a white woman. Ms. Burke,
like Mr. and Mrs. Daniels, was seeking an insurance rental. The
terms of Ms. Burke’s rental had been previously negotiated by
Advantage and Ms. Burke’s insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance.
When Ms. Burke reached the front of the line, the customer
service representative, Jeff Davis, asked for her credit card.
Ms. Burke told Mr. Davis that her credit limit had been reached.
Mr. Davis responded that he was not going to charge her credit
1
Advantage has negotiated different rental rates with
different insurance companies. The Danielses’ rental rate was
set by an agreement between Advantage and Charter Group.
3
card, and that it was only for security purposes. Mr. and Mrs.
Daniels, as previously noted, had been charged a $50 deposit,
and, upon seeing that Ms. Burke was not required to pay a
deposit, Mr. Daniels called Ms. Sloanaker at location 103. Ms.
Sloanaker explained that Ms. Burke should have been charged a $50
deposit, in accordance with company policy. After getting off
the phone with Mr. Daniels, Ms. Sloanaker immediately called Mr.
Davis, informed him of his mistake, and asked him to get a
deposit from Ms. Burke if she was still in the store.
Company policy regarding insurance rentals before October
30, 2000, was to swipe the customer’s credit card and keep the
card number and customer information on file, rather than
charging a $50 deposit to the credit card. Mr. Davis did not
know the company’s policy had changed because he had been working
at the company’s telephone reservation center when the policy
went into effect. Mr. Davis was subsequently reprimanded for not
obtaining a $50 deposit from Ms. Burke.
Ms. Burke was given a Chevrolet Cavalier, a compact car, at
a rate of $19/day.2
When Mr. and Mrs. Daniels returned to the line, Mr. Davis
was helping Jency Valiente, a Hispanic woman, and Corey Anderson,
a black man. Ms. Valiente was renting a car for the use of both
herself and Mr. Anderson. Theirs was a walk-up retail rental,
2
This rate had been set by a prior agreement between
Advantage and Allstate Insurance.
4
rather than an insurance rental. As a security measure,
Advantage requires retail renters to produce a major credit card
in the renter’s name. Advantage’s policy is to charge retail
customers the amount of the rental plus a $200 refundable
deposit.
Mr. Davis asked Ms. Valiente for a credit card. As with Mr.
Daniel’s card, Ms. Valiente’s card had adequate funds to pay the
deposit. When Mr. Davis swiped Ms. Valiente’s card, however, he
announced that it had been declined. Ms. Valiente next presented
her father’s debit card, and told Mr. Davis that he could call
her father to get authorization for its use. Mr. Davis told Ms.
Valiente that this was against company policy. Eventually, Ms.
Valiente called her mechanic, who brought $200 cash for the
deposit. After much convincing, the location manager, Victor
Medina, agreed to take the cash. This was against company
policy; Advantage normally required authorization for the full
amount of a retail rental plus the $200 deposit on a credit card.
Ms. Valiente, like Mr. and Mrs. Daniels, was given a Hyundai
Accent. For this, she was charged $23.99/day.3 As it turned
out, the Accent’s wheels were improperly aligned. When Ms.
Valiente reported the problem to location 107, she was told that
3
Walk-up rental rates constantly fluctuate. The rates
are set by Advantage’s “rate analysts” based on what is happening
in the market. When retail customers rent cars from Advantage,
customer service representatives access the current rate on their
computers.
5
the location had no other economy cars to rent to her. Ms.
Valiente and Mr. Anderson called another Advantage location, and
this location agreed to trade the defective car for one with
proper alignment.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Daniels, Ms. Valiente, and Mr.
Anderson brought suit against Advantage for racial discrimination
in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 2000a. After the
close of discovery, Advantage filed a motion for summary
judgment.
The district court granted Advantage’s motion. First, the
district court found that Plaintiffs’ § 2000a claim failed
because the statute covers only places of “public accommodation,”
and rental car establishments do not fall into this category.
Second, the district court found that Plaintiffs’ § 1981 and
§ 1982 claims failed because Plaintiffs had not provided
sufficient evidence showing that Advantage’s proffered
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly unequal
treatment were pretextual.
Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on their claims under § 1981 and § 1982.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion for
summary judgment. Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046
(5th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
6
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c); see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994). “Once a summary judgment motion is made and properly
supported, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and
designate specific facts in the record showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047.
III. DISCUSSION
In analyzing Plaintiffs’ case under §§ 1981 and 1982, the
district court applied the burden-shifting framework established
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).4 The
first step in this analysis requires the plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d
444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996). In this circuit, a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case under § 1981 by showing that “(1)
he or she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had
an intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the
discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated
in the statute.” Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 274
4
Although our research has found no cases in this
circuit applying McDonnell Douglas outside the employment
context, neither party has challenged the district court’s
methodology. Therefore, we will assume, for purposes of this
appeal, that the district court’s methodology was correct.
7
(5th Cir. 1997). In establishing the second element of the prima
facie case, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. Id.
“A cause of action based upon section 1982 likewise requires an
intentional act of racial discrimination by a defendant.”
Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1986) (comparing
§ 1982 to § 1981); cf. Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1200
n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Sections 1981 and 1982 are similar in
language, legislative history, and purpose.”).
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts to the defendant to provide
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; see also Lee v.
Washington County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir.
1980). If the defendant meets this burden, “the McDonnell
Douglas framework--with its presumptions and burdens--
disappear[s].” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000) (quotation marks omitted). At this
point, the plaintiff “must be afforded the opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 143 (quotation marks
omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the [defendant]’s asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the [defendant] unlawfully discriminated.” Id. at 148.
8
Plaintiffs have met the first and the third elements of the
prima facie case. First, Plaintiffs, two black men, one black
woman, and one Hispanic woman, are all racial minorities. In
addition, in contracting with Advantage to lease cars, Plaintiffs
were engaged in activities enumerated in §§ 1981 and 1982; § 1981
prohibits discrimination in making contracts5 and § 1982
prohibits discrimination in leasing property.6
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have put forward evidence from which
the final element of the prima facie case, intentional
discrimination, may be inferred: (1) Advantage declined Mr.
Daniels’s debit card and Ms. Valiente’s credit card, when both
cards had sufficient balances to cover the transactions;
(2) Advantage required Mr. and Mrs. Daniels and Ms. Valiente to
pay deposits, but did not require Ms. Burke to do so; (3) Mr. and
Mrs. Daniels and Ms. Valiente were charged higher rental rates
than Ms. Burke; (4) Ms. Valiente was given a car with faulty
alignment; and (5) Advantage initially refused to accept a cash
deposit from Ms. Valiente. Thus, the district court properly
5
Section 1981(a) provides, “All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as
is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(2000).
6
Section 1982 reads, “All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (2000).
9
found that Plaintiffs’ evidence made out a prima facie case of
racial discrimination in violation of §§ 1981 and 1982.
As explained below, however, Advantage has presented
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the occurrences listed
by Plaintiffs. The question, then, is whether Plaintiffs have
presented sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to determine
that Advantage’s proffered reasons are pretextual. Because we
find that Plaintiffs have produced insufficient evidence
suggesting that Advantage’s given reasons are pretextual, we hold
that summary judgment in favor of Advantage was proper.
First, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
Advantage’s explanation for rejecting Mr. Daniels’s and Ms.
Valiente’s cards was untrue. Advantage claims that the cards
were rejected by Advantage because, when swiped, they were
declined. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that their
credit cards were not actually declined, or that Advantage
employees lied when they told Mr. Daniels and Ms. Valiente that
the cards had been declined. Plaintiffs merely provide evidence
that their cards should have had sufficient resources to cover
the charges. This evidence is insufficient to survive summary
judgment.
Second, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence contradicting
Advantage’s explanation for charging Mr. and Mrs. Daniels, Ms.
Valiente, and Ms. Burke different deposit amounts. Advantage
asserts that its company policy is to charge insurance renters a
10
$50 deposit and to charge retail renters a $200 deposit.
According to Advantage, Ms. Valiente was charged a higher deposit
because she was a retail renter, rather than an insurance renter,
like Mr. and Mrs. Daniels and Ms. Burke. Plaintiffs have offered
no evidence suggesting that this explanation is false.
Advantage concedes that both Mr. Daniels and Ms. Burke
should have been charged $50 deposits. But Advantage has put
forward evidence that Ms. Kamenicky’s attempt to charge the
Danielses a $200 deposit and Mr. Davis’s failure to charge Ms.
Burke a $50 deposit were caused by confusion over Advantage’s
policy with regard to insurance rentals, not racial animus. Ms.
Kamenicky, mistakenly applying Advantage’s retail rental policy,
asked Mr. and Mrs. Daniels for a $200 deposit. Ms. Slonaker,
Advantage’s District Manager, quickly intervened to inform Ms.
Kamenicky that insurance rentals require only a $50 deposit.
Accordingly, Mr. and Mrs. Daniels eventually paid only a $50
deposit--the correct amount. Similarly, Mr. Davis, acting in
accordance with Advantage’s former insurance rental policy, did
not charge Ms. Burke a deposit. When Ms. Slonaker discovered
this, however, she informed Mr. Davis that a deposit was required
for all insurance rentals, and she reprimanded him for not
obtaining a deposit from Ms. Burke. Again, Plaintiffs have put
forward no evidence contradicting any of Advantage’s evidence on
this point, or suggesting that they were charged deposits because
of their race.
11
Third, Plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence that
Advantage’s given reason for charging Mr. and Mrs. Daniels and
Ms. Valiente higher rental rates than Ms. Burke was pretextual.
Advantage has provided evidence that retail customers, like Ms.
Valiente, are subject to different rates than insurance
customers, like Mr. and Mrs. Daniels and Mrs. Burke. Although
Mr. and Mrs. Daniels and Ms. Burke were all insurance customers,
Mr. and Mrs. Daniels used a different insurance company than Ms.
Burke. The two insurance companies, apparently, had negotiated
different rates with Advantage. Therefore, the uncontroverted
evidence suggests that Advantage’s reason for charging an array
of rental rates for differently situated customers had nothing to
do with the customers’ races.
Fourth, Ms. Valiente has put forward no evidence suggesting
that Advantage purposefully rented her a car with faulty
alignment. Ms. Valiente has not even demonstrated that Advantage
knew about the problem before renting the car to her. Rather,
the undisputed evidence is that, when Ms. Valiente called another
Advantage location, the location readily agreed to exchange the
car for one with proper alignment. The evidence put forward by
Ms. Valiente is insufficient to allow a rational jury to infer
discriminatory motivations on the part of Advantage.
Fifth, Plaintiffs point to no evidence that Advantage’s
explanation for refusing to accept a cash deposit from Ms.
Valiente was specious. Advantage contends that its policy
12
required retail renters to present a valid credit card to which
Advantage could charge the full amount of the rental plus a $200
deposit. Thus, accepting a $200 cash deposit was contrary to
Advantage’s policy. This policy is a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for Advantage’s initial reluctance
to accept the cash. In response, Plaintiffs have presented no
evidence that this was not Advantage’s policy, or that Advantage
only enforced this policy against minorities. Therefore,
Plaintiffs have not met their burden on this allegation.
Since Plaintiffs have put forward no summary judgment
evidence suggesting that Advantage’s legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for its employees’ actions were pretextual, this case
presents no issue of disputed material fact, and Advantage is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, the district
court properly granted Advantage’s motion for summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Advantage is AFFIRMED.
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