United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT December 9, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10946
Conference Calendar
RONNIE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GREG ABBOTT, Attorney General of Texas,
Child Support Division,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:03-CV-892-A
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Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ronnie Anderson has appealed the district court’s order
dismissing his complaint against Greg Abbott, Attorney General of
Texas, Child Support Division (the “Attorney General”), asserting
that too much of his income had been withheld for child support
payments. The district court determined that it did not have
jurisdiction over the action, as the Attorney General is immune
from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-10946
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“[A]n unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens . . . .” See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when the state is the real, substantial
party in interest.” Id. at 101 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Thus, the general rule is that relief sought
nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if
the decree would operate against the latter.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). “And, as when the State
itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials
that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of
whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Id. at 101–02.
An exception is provided for suits against state officials
alleging violations of federal law, in which case “the federal
court may award an injunction that governs the official’s future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.”
Id. at 102–03 (discussing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160
(1908), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666–67 (1974)).
Anderson contends that his complaint falls within the Ex parte
Young exception.
Anderson contends for the first time on appeal that his
action is grounded on a violation of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which amended
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Anderson does not state
No. 03-10946
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specifically which provision of the Social Security Act was
violated by the Attorney General or why he believes that he has a
private right of action under the Social Security Act. See
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–48 (1997).
Anderson contends that his right to due process was violated
and that he is seeking prospective injunctive relief only.
Anderson contends also that the Attorney General violated his
rights under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive
fines. Although Anderson contends that he is suing the Attorney
General in his individual capacity, he does not contend that the
Attorney General was personally involved in a constitutional
violation. Anderson contends only that he asked a child support
officer (not a defendant) to reduce the amount of his child
support payment, but that his request was refused notwithstanding
the fact that the case officer had the discretion under state law
to extend the payment terms on hardship grounds. Anderson has
not alleged facts showing that the case officer’s refusal was
pursuant to an unconstitutional state policy implemented by the
Attorney General. See Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th
Cir. 1987).
Because the appeal is without arguable merit, it is
dismissed as frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20
(5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
APPEAL DISMISSED.