United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 20, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-60413
Summary Calendar
LOUIS JAMES CLAY, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MON CREE ALLEN; MARY R. THOMPSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 5:00-CV-39-BrS
Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Louis James Clay, Jr., Mississippi Inmate No. 08452,
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendant Mon Cree Allen, and the district court’s
dismissal without prejudice of his claims against Mary R. Thompson
for lack of service.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Clay does not address the merits of the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in either his initial or reply brief.
When an appellant fails to identify any error in the district
court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not
appealed that judgment. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy
Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987); Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
Clay argues that the district court erred in dismissing
his complaint against the court reporter, Thompson, pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m), for failure to provide a valid address for
service. This court reviews a dismissal for failure to effect
timely service of process for an abuse of discretion. Lindsey v.
United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 445 (5th Cir.
1996). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion. See Rochon v. Dawson,
828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff may not remain
silent but must attempt to remedy any apparent service defects).
Clay argues that the district court erred by denying his
requests for appointment of counsel. The court is not required to
appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff raising a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim in the absence of “exceptional circumstances.” Ulmer
v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). Based upon our
review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion because Clay has not shown such exceptional
circumstances are present in this case.
2
Clay also states that he wishes to “resubmit” his motion
to recuse District Court Judge David Bramlette. Clay also moved
for recusal of Judge Bramlette during a prior appeal of this case.
See Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 680-81 (5th Cir. 2001). We
refused to consider the argument because it was raised for the
first time on appeal. See id. (citing United States v. Sanford,
157 F.3d 987, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1988)). On remand, Clay did not
reurge his recusal motion in the district court, and we again
decline to consider the argument.
AFFIRMED.
3