United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT March 16, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-20170
GUADALUPE GUAJARDO, JR.; CLASS ACTION FOR TEXAS INMATES #844,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before DUHÉ, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
At issue is the district court’s terminating the prospective
relief provided by a 20-year-old consent decree concerning Texas
prison correspondence rules, pursuant to motion by the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2))(PLRA). Essentially for the
reasons stated by the district court, see Guajardo v. Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, et al., No. H-71-570 (S.D. Tex.
filed 24 Sept. 2002)(Guajardo), the judgment is AFFIRMED.
I.
This litigation began approximately 33 years ago, resulting in
this class action challenging the constitutionality of Texas prison
correspondence rules and practices (the rules). An agreed
settlement, approved in 1983, revised the rules (the consent
decree). Guajardo v. Estelle, 568 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.Tex. 1983).
The consent decree has been modified by stipulation on several
occasions. In September 2002, following discovery, and through an
extremely detailed 54-page opinion and order, the district court
granted TDCJ’s motion, filed in 1997, to terminate the prospective
relief provided by the consent decree.
II.
Institutional consent decrees are “not intended to operate in
perpetuity”. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
The PLRA strongly disfavors continuing relief through the federal
courts; indeed, its “fundamental purpose” was to extricate them
from managing state prisons. Cagle v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253, 257
(4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1264 (2000). The PLRA
provides three methods for terminating such consent decrees: (1)
the passage of time, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A); (2) agreement by
the parties, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(B); or (3) “if the relief was
approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that
[it was] narrowly drawn, extend[ed] no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right, and [was] the least
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intrusive means necessary to correct the violation”, 18 U.S.C. §
3626(b)(2), unless “the court makes written findings based on the
record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a
current and ongoing violation” of a federal right (ongoing
violation), and that, consistent with subpart (b)(2) above, the
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary, and is
the least intrusive means, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).
The district court held a hearing (not evidentiary) on TDCJ’s
motion to terminate relief, after discovery and numerous
evidentiary submissions. The court found that the consent decree
provided for greater prospective relief than required by federal
law, and that TDCJ was entitled to termination, unless plaintiffs
established that the relief remained necessary to correct an
ongoing violation. Guajardo at 6-7. Taking plaintiffs’
allegations as true, the court found: there was no system-wide
constitutional violation showing that the prospective relief was
necessary; and relief under the existing consent decree was neither
narrowly drawn nor the least intrusive means to correct any
individual violations. Id. at 49. The court noted an action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remains for prisoners with individual
First Amendment claims. Id. at 50.
Plaintiffs contend the district court erred by: (1) placing
the burden of proof on them to show ongoing violations rather than
requiring TDCJ, the party seeking relief, to demonstrate none; (2)
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failing to treat TDCJ’s motion as one for summary judgment; and (3)
taking an “all-or-nothing approach” for terminating the decree,
rather than maintaining it for particular prison units or rules.
A.
A district court’s allocation of the burden of proof is
reviewed de novo; its findings of fact on whether that burden has
been met, only for clear error. E.g., Stevens Shipping & Terminal
Co. v. Japan Rainbow II MV, 334 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2003). In
placing the burden on plaintiffs, the district court cited the
First Circuit’s decision in Laaman v. Warden, N.H. State Prison,
238 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding, to prevent termination,
burden on prisoners under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) to show ongoing
violations). Noting a possible split between the First and Ninth
Circuits on this point, and relying on Gilmore v. People of the
State of California, 220 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2000), plaintiffs
contend the burden is instead upon the party challenging the
consent decree — here, TDCJ.
Gilmore held the district court erred by terminating a consent
decree pursuant to the PLRA, including by placing the burden of
proof on the prisoners to establish ongoing violations instead of
requiring movant to prove its compliance with the prisoners’ right
of access to the courts. Plaintiffs recognize, however, that only
two years after Gilmore, the Ninth Circuit in another PLRA action
placed the burden on prisoners (movants) seeking a time extension
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for a consent decree. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 741-45 (9th
Cir. 2002). The court reasoned that the consent decree’s impending
expiration could be prevented only if movants proved ongoing
violations. “The ... standard for termination does not differ
materially from the standard to be applied in deciding whether
prospective relief is proper.” Id. at 743. This reasoning —
placing the burden of proof under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) on the
party opposing termination of a consent decree — is in obvious
tension with the earlier reasoning in Gilmore.
Here, the consent decree was approved before enactment of the
PLRA, without the now required findings that relief be narrowly
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of
a federal right, and be the least intrusive means to correct the
violation of that right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2); see also Castillo
v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d 339, 351-52 (5th Cir. 2001).
Therefore, the prospective relief terminates unless the district
court makes these findings and, as discussed, also finds ongoing,
system-wide violations.
TDCJ, in seeking termination, must initially establish the
requisite passage of time. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(iii) (relief
terminable upon motion of any party, but “in the case of an order
issued ... before the date of enactment of the [PLRA], 2 years
after such date of enactment”). As held by most courts, the burden
of proof then shifts to the prisoners to demonstrate ongoing
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violations and that the relief is narrowly drawn. 18 U.S.C. §
3626(b)(3). See Laaman, 238 F.3d at 20; Ruiz v. Johnson, 154 F.
Supp.2d 975, 984 n.12 (S.D.Tex. 2001) (observing that
constitutional violations were found where prisoners met their
burden of proof); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 11 F. Supp.2d
586, 604 (E.D.Pa. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Imprisoned Citizens Union
v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding PLRA not
unconstitutional for placing on prisoners burden for proving
ongoing violations).
We agree with the great majority of courts to address this
issue: a plain reading of the PLRA, including its structure,
imposes the burden on the prisoners. Section 3626(b)(3) places a
limitation on the termination of prospective relief under a consent
decree if the court makes the requisite written findings based on
the record; but the burden of proof to support these findings is
obviously on the party opposing termination. Accordingly, that
burden was allocated correctly to plaintiffs.
B.
In maintaining that the district court erred by not treating
TDCJ’s motion to terminate as one for summary judgment, plaintiffs
cite two instances in which the court characterized the motion as
one for summary judgment: at a hearing in April 1998; and during
a telephonic status conference in early September 2002. This
latter instance was only 18 days before the district court ruled.
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At the April 1998 hearing, the court instructed plaintiffs to
provide
a more refined statement of exactly what
issues you believe to require additional
discovery, and I would take that as a
supplement to what is essentially a Rule 56-F
motion, that is a request for additional
discovery prior to the Court rendering a
decision on the summary judgment motion that’s
pending.
(Emphasis added.) This instruction concerning additional discovery
was restated in the hearing minutes. At that hearing, the court
also made the following statement to plaintiffs:
Precisely what issues, if any, would require
further examination if the decree were not
terminated under the PLRA.
You have listed what you see as those
issues.... How do they relate to the issues
that were the basis of the summary judgment
motion, the motion to terminate?
The other instance cited by plaintiffs is the following
colloquy from September 2002:
THE COURT: All right. Now I need some way to
approach this in a manageable fashion. There
was an indication in your [plaintiffs’]
pleadings ... that it was your assumption that
the Court was going to treat it as a motion
for summary judgment. Is that correct?
[Plaintiffs’ counsel]: That is correct, Your
Honor.
(Emphasis added.) The court, however, did not make any
pronouncement, then or at any point during the litigation, that the
motion would be treated as one for summary judgment. Indeed, the
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words “summary judgment” are noticeably absent from the court’s 54-
page opinion terminating the decree, rendered 18 days after the
September 2002 colloquy. See Guajardo.
Moreover, the only references by the court to summary judgment
procedure were made in the context of managing discovery for the
purpose of identifying issues relevant to terminating the consent
decree. The court permitted plaintiffs to conduct additional
discovery, akin to that permitted under Rule 56(f); there is,
however, no basis for concluding that the court considered the
motion as one for summary judgment. The court was aware of, but
obviously did not agree with, plaintiffs’ position that the motion
should be treated in that fashion. These isolated statements in
five years of litigation on the motion fall far short of reflecting
that the district court considered the motion as one for summary
judgment.
Consistent with their contention, plaintiffs maintain the
court was obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to them as nonmovants. Evaluating the evidence according to this
claimed summary judgment standard, plaintiffs assert they created
material fact issues on ongoing constitutional violations, which
entitles them to the benefit of further proceedings. See FED R.
CIV. P. 56.
Plaintiffs provide no basis for a motion to terminate a
consent decree being treated as one for summary judgment. Indeed,
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summary judgment procedure is in tension with the framework of the
PLRA, which requires the court to make written, outcome
determinative findings based on the record, not intermediate
written findings on whether issues of fact compel further
proceedings.
In any event, the district court carefully considered each of
the violations claimed by individual plaintiffs. Guajardo at 8-48
(plaintiffs claimed, with numerous individual allegations: (1)
unnecessary delays in processing publications, in violation of the
72-Hour Rule; (2) delayed mail, resulting in a denial of access to
courts; (3) improper processing and opening of special or
privileged correspondence; (4) restrictions on media mail; (5)
content-based denials of correspondence and publications; (6) lack
of meaningful opportunity to appeal censorship decisions; and (7)
retaliation). As the district court noted, the Supreme Court has
required system-wide injury for system-wide injunctive relief. Id.
at 48; see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). The district court
found that none of the allegations, if true, constituted an
ongoing, system-wide violation. Guajardo at 49. Concomitantly, it
noted that prisoners claiming violations may pursue individual
relief pursuant to § 1983. As the district court ruled, the
prospective relief granted under the consent decree was neither
narrowly drawn, extending no further than necessary to correct a
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constitutional violation, nor the least intrusive means necessary
to correct a constitutional violation. Id. at 49-50.
In so ruling, the district court noted that both sides
indicated at the 6 September 2002 status conference that no
evidentiary hearing was required. Id. at 7 n.7. Plaintiffs state
they did not then seek an evidentiary hearing because they
understood that the motion would be treated as one for summary
judgment. Under that standard, plaintiffs note that, as
nonmovants, the record would be viewed in their favor, including
all inferences to be drawn from it. Because the motion was not
treated in that fashion, they claim they are entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. Even assuming this point was not waived in
district court, plaintiffs collide, again, with the PLRA’s
structure.
Whether to hold a PLRA pre-termination evidentiary hearing is
within the discretion of the district court; generally, to receive
such a hearing, plaintiffs’ submissions must allege specific facts
which, if true, would amount to an ongoing violation. See Guajardo
at 7 n.7; Cagle, 177 F.3d at 258. The district court concluded,
however, that none of plaintiffs’ allegations satisfied that
requirement. Guajardo at 7 n.7. It did not abuse its discretion
by not holding an evidentiary hearing.
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C.
Plaintiffs also contend the district court abused its
discretion by terminating the consent decree rather than at least
maintaining it (1) at certain TDCJ units where numerous ongoing
violations allegedly persist; and (2) for certain rules concerning
those alleged violations. Plaintiffs fail to identify either those
TDCJ units or precisely the alleged violations. A PLRA termination
decision is reviewed de novo. See Castillo, 238 F.3d at 347.
Plaintiffs’ contention is contrary to the scope of the
district court’s findings. It evaluated the numerous individual
claims for each of the claimed violations and found in each
instance there was no ongoing, system-wide violation. Plaintiffs
identified a number of alleged violations for the court, but these
allegations were expressly rejected.
Along this line, plaintiffs fail to identify any ongoing
violations the district court failed to consider. Instead, they
seek to re-litigate two aspects of the terminated decree: what
constitutes a “package” (claiming failure of rules to provide a
standard for “what constitutes a package” had the effect of denying
plaintiffs access to the courts) and the “72-Hour Rule” (claiming
violation of 72-Hour Rule caused unnecessary delays in processing
publications; the rule requires written notice for inmate and
editor or publisher within 72 hours of the rejection of any
publication, including reasons for rejection and right to appeal).
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As the district court found, however, plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a system-wide constitutional violation concerning
either that would require continuation of the consent decree.
Guajardo at 12 and 26. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that
the court overlooked ongoing violations or was incorrect in
determining past violations no longer persisted.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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