United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 13, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-21211
Summary Calendar
GUADALUPE GUAJARDO, JR.; Et Al.,
Plaintiffs,
GUADALUPE GUAJARDO, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-71-CV-570
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Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Guadalupe Guajardo, Jr., Texas inmate #170864, appeals from
the district court’s denial, for lack of jurisdiction, of his
motion seeking to hold the defendant in contempt and for
injunctive relief. Guajardo filed his motion in the underlying
class action litigation after the class plaintiffs had noticed
their appeal from the district court’s final judgment terminating
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-21211
-2-
the prospective relief afforded by a consent decree pursuant to
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). See
18 U.S.C. § 3626. This court subsequently affirmed the district
court’s judgment. See Guajardo v. Texas Dept. of Criminal
Justice, 363 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. June 11, 2004) (No. 03-1663).
“This circuit follows the general rule that the filing of a
valid notice of appeal from a final order of the district court
divests that court of jurisdiction to act on the matters involved
in the appeal, except to aid the appeal, correct clerical errors,
or enforce its judgment so long as the judgment has not been
stayed or superseded.” Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 928 (5th Cir. 1983). Guajardo’s brief
nominally advances seven arguments. However, even according his
filing the benefit of liberal construction, we are able to
ascertain only four distinct contentions.
Guajardo’s argument that the district court could not
terminate the consent decree because it was a contract is an
attack on the underlying judgment terminating the consent decree,
rather than a jurisdictional argument, and it does not show error
on the part of the district in denying Guajardo’s motion for lack
of jurisdiction. In any event, given the termination provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 3626, Guajardo’s argument is without merit. See
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997).
No. 03-21211
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Guajardo argues that the consent decree remained in effect
during the pendency of the appeal from the district court’s
termination of the consent decree. His contention fails because
no party sought a stay of the district court’s final judgment
terminating the consent decree. See United States v. City of
Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1361 (5th Cir. 1980); FED. R. CIV.
P. 62(c).
Because the district court’s final judgment was not stayed,
and because the judgment put an end to all prospective relief
afforded by the decree, any distinction between “termination” and
“vacatur” of the consent decree is without legal significance.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), (7), (9). Finally, we reject
Guajardo’s contention that the district court had jurisdiction
over his motion pursuant to the All Writs Act. See Williams v.
McKeithen, 939 F.2d 1100, 1104 (5th Cir. 1991).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.