J-S49001-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LASHAWN D. SANDERS
Appellant No. 3521 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered October 27, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008238-2009
BEFORE: PANELLA J., and OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 05, 2016
Lashawn D. Sanders (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the order
dismissing as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as
follows. On December 16, 2008, Appellant was arrested and charged with
rape, robbery, and related offenses. Following various continuances
requested by the both the Commonwealth and Appellant, as well as a mental
health evaluation for Appellant and the denial of his suppression motion,
Appellant pled guilty on May 27, 2011. On August 31, 2011 the trial court
sentenced him, in accordance with the plea agreement, to an aggregate
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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term of 12½ to 25 years imprisonment, followed by 15 years of probation.
Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
On October 18, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel, who filed a “no-merit” letter and petition to
withdraw, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
banc), based upon PCRA counsel’s conclusion that Appellant’s petition was
untimely. On September 14, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent
to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Appellant sent his response directly
to the PCRA court’s chambers. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition
as untimely, and permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw. This timely appeal
follows.
Appellant raises five issues involving trial court error, constitutional
violations, or the ineffectiveness of counsel. See Appellant’s Brief at e.- f.
Before addressing them, however, we must first determine whether the
PCRA court correctly concluded that Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition was
untimely filed.
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an
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exception to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met. A PCRA petition invoking one of these
statutory exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of the date the claims
could have been presented.” Id., at 651-52 (citations omitted). See also 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 30,
2011, when the thirty-day time period for filing an appeal to this Court
expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Appellant needed to file
the petition at issue by September 30, 2012, in order for it to be timely. As
Appellant filed the instant petition over a year later, it is untimely unless he
has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated
exceptions applies.
Within his PCRA petition, Appellant neither acknowledged the PCRA’s
time bar nor attempted to prove any exception thereto. Thus, the PCRA
court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s
untimely PCRA petition. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying
Appellant post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/5/2016
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