United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT August 4, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30077
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
versus
LEN DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
PAUL HARDY, also known as P., also known as Cool,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
Having been convicted in 1996 for a murder committed in 1994,
Len Davis and Paul Hardy were sentenced to death under the Federal
Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq. (FDPA). On appeal, the
convictions for one of the three counts of conviction were vacated;
concomitantly, the death sentences were vacated; and the case was
remanded for a new sentencing proceeding, with death being one of
the possible sentences. United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407,
410-11 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1277 (2000).
On remand, in the light of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227 (1999), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), and Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), the district court held: the indictment’s not
including the required FDPA intent element and claimed aggravating
factor for substantial planning and premeditation (FDPA elements)
precluded a death sentence. Shortly before oral argument for this
appeal, our court decided United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278
(5th Cir. 2004), which held FDPA aggravating factors’ not being
included in an indictment renders it constitutionally deficient,
but subject to harmless error review.
At issue is whether the harmless error standard of review
applies here because, unlike in Robinson, defendants have not been
sentenced. This issue requires deciding at what point error
attaches for the indictment’s not including the FDPA elements. We
hold the Robinson harmless error standard applies because, for the
unique procedural posture of this case, the error attached not at
sentencing but when the final superceding indictment was returned,
after the Government had given notice of its intent to seek the
death penalty. The error was harmless. VACATED and REMANDED.
I.
Kim Marie Groves was murdered on 13 October 1994 in New
Orleans, Louisiana, through the coordinated efforts of Davis,
Hardy, and Damon Causey. Causey, 185 F.3d at 411. Davis, then a
2
New Orleans police officer, exchanged protection for favors with
Hardy, then a New Orleans drug dealer. One of Hardy’s favors, at
Davis’ request, was to murder Kim Groves.
Davis requested the murder because, on or about 10 October
1994, Kim Groves witnessed Davis’ police partner pistol-whip an
individual in her neighborhood. She filed a complaint against
Davis with the police department’s internal affairs office. After
Davis learned of the complaint at approximately 1:00 a.m. on 13
October, he contacted Hardy by telephone; they discussed a plan to
kill Kim Groves. Davis arranged to have Hardy and Causey meet him
at the police station in order to take them to her.
Throughout the day and into the evening, Davis, Hardy, and
Causey searched for Kim Groves. Eventually, Davis found her that
day and paged Hardy to describe her clothing and location. Davis
then called Hardy on his cellular telephone to order the murder,
and Hardy replied he was “on [his] way”. At approximately 11:00
p.m. on 13 October, Hardy shot Kim Groves in the head, killing her.
At the time he was planning the murder with Hardy and Causey,
Davis was unaware of his being the target of an undercover
investigation, including recording his cellular telephone
conversations. (The evidence at trial included these
conversations, together with the testimony of Davis’ police
partner, who was present during many of them.)
A one-count federal indictment in December 1994 (two months
after the murder) against Davis, Hardy, and Causey was followed by
3
a three-count superceding indictment and a second superceding
indictment. In July 1995, pursuant to the FDPA, the Government
filed two notices of intent to seek the death penalty for Davis and
Hardy and included the requisite FDPA elements. See 18 U.S.C. §§
3592(c) and 3593(a).
In an August 1995 three-count, third superceding indictment
(the indictment), count one charged conspiracy to violate the civil
rights of Kim Groves and an unnamed individual by use of excessive
force, resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. Eight
overt acts, quoted infra in part II.B.2., were alleged in
furtherance of the charged conspiracy. Count two charged violating
Kim Groves’ civil rights by use of excessive force by shooting her
with a firearm, resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
242 and 2. Count three charged willfully killing Kim Groves to
prevent her communications to a law enforcement officer regarding
a possible federal crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1512(a)(1)(C) and 2.
Defendants filed numerous pre-trial motions, including many
contesting the legality and adequacy of the indictment. They never
asserted pre-trial, however, that the indictment gave them
insufficient notice of the charges. The motions were denied.
Their motions regarding the Government’s use of non-FDPA
aggravating factors were denied in part and granted in part. See
4
United States v. Davis, et al., 912 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. La. 1996)
(Davis I).
Trial began on 8 April 1996; approximately two weeks later,
the jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts against
Davis and Hardy. Causey was found guilty on the first two counts;
the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the third. At the
sentencing phase of trial, the jury was charged to decide whether
an FDPA “death qualifying factor” existed for either Davis or
Hardy. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592 and 3593(d). The jury found Davis
and Hardy: intentionally killed Kim Groves; and did so after
substantial planning and premeditation (the FDPA aggravating factor
included in the earlier-referenced notices of intent to seek the
death penalty, see 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9)). Accordingly, the
district court conducted a capital sentencing hearing. See 18
U.S.C. § 3593(e). At that hearing, the jury decided the death
penalty was appropriate. Thereafter, Davis and Hardy were
sentenced to death; Causey, to life imprisonment.
On appeal, our court affirmed the convictions for all three
defendants for counts one and two but vacated them for count three
for Davis and Hardy (as noted, Causey had not been convicted on
that count). Causey, 185 F.3d at 410-11. Davis and Hardy’s death
sentences were vacated because it was impossible to conclude that
the jury recommended the death penalty on the basis of counts one
5
and two, but not three. The case was remanded for resentencing.
Id. at 423.
On remand, the Government again filed notices of intent to
seek the death penalty against Davis and Hardy. The Government
notified Davis of its intent to seek that penalty based on evidence
of intent, as required by the FDPA, see 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-
(D), the FDPA aggravating factor of substantial planning and
premeditation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9), and his prior conviction
for a drug offense that allowed imposition of a sentence exceeding
five or more years, see 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(12). (This notice was
amended to change Davis’ felony conviction from a FDPA aggravating
factor to a non-statutory aggravating factor.)
Utilizing the same FDPA elements, the Government also notified
Hardy of its intent to seek the death penalty. In addition, the
Government filed a notice of non-FDPA aggravating factors for both
defendants.
In response, Hardy moved to have the FDPA aggravating factors
declared unconstitutional. Each defendant filed numerous related
motions (including re-urging all previous ones). Hardy also moved
to prohibit retrial based on double jeopardy and to prohibit the
Government’s relying on his convictions on counts one and two as
evidence of his intent to murder Kim Groves. The district court
denied the first motion; it ruled the second moot because the
Government conceded that the verdict on those two counts was not a
6
finding by the jury that either Davis or Hardy had the specific
intent to murder.
Davis and Hardy appealed the district court’s not dismissing
on double jeopardy grounds. In April 2002, our court affirmed the
denial.
That July, Davis moved in district court for reconsideration,
based on Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (holding that, “because Arizona’s
enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense’ ... the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury”) (quoting
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19). Later, Hardy moved in limine to
preclude, inter alia, the Government’s seeking the death sentence.
These motions were granted in part and denied in part in
December 2002. The district court ruled that the indictment’s not
including the requisite FDPA intent element and claimed aggravating
factor precluded a death sentence: “[T]he right to grand jury
presentment is not waivable and has not been waived. Jeopardy has
likewise indisputably attached to the convictions already rendered.
Under these unique circumstances ... the Fifth Amendment prohibits
further capital proceedings”. United States v. Davis, No. 94-381
(E.D. La. 12 December 2002) (Davis II).
II.
The Government concedes both the attachment of jeopardy and
the timeliness of the challenge to the indictment for failure to
7
include the FDPA elements. Because jeopardy has attached, the
Government is, of course, precluded from re-indicting Davis and
Hardy. On this record, the linchpin to the Government’s appeal is
the applicable standard of review for the indictment’s not
including the FDPA elements. (Davis has withdrawn his cross-appeal
contesting our jurisdiction.)
A.
As noted, the district court held that Ring, in conjunction
with Cotton, Apprendi, and Jones, requires an indictment to charge
the FDPA elements necessary for the death penalty. Jones, 526 U.S.
at 250-52, held that provisions of a carjacking statute,
establishing higher penalties when the offense resulted in serious
bodily injury or death, provided additional elements of the
offense, not sentencing considerations. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490,
later held that any fact (other than a prior conviction) that
“increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt”. Applying Jones and Apprendi, the Court in
Cotton, 535 U.S. at 634, held an indictment’s not including any
allegation regarding the quantity of drugs involved in enhancing
sentences beyond the statutory maximum was error; but, where there
was no timely objection at trial, this error did not affect
substantial rights where the evidence of quantity was “overwhelming
and uncontroverted”. Most recently, Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, held an
8
Arizona statute permitting the judge to determine whether
aggravating factors necessary for the death penalty are present
violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
The district court held: the “addition of Ring to the rules
set forth in Jones and Apprendi compels the conclusion that in a
federal capital case, the grand jury must both find the FDPA intent
and [aggravating] factors upon which the death penalty is premised
and must set forth those findings in the allegations of [the]
indictment in order to pass Fifth Amendment muster”. Davis II at
5. It concluded: the allegations for those necessary FDPA
elements are not found in counts one and two; and count three could
not be considered in evaluating whether the grand jury found
defendants willfully committed murder or engaged in concomitant
substantial planning and premeditation because the convictions for
this count had been vacated for lack of evidence. Davis II at 12;
Causey, 185 F.3d at 407. (In dictum, the court added it was
reluctant to conclude there was sufficient notice of substantial
planning and premeditation because, besides federal courts, only
two jurisdictions that impose the death penalty consider this an
aggravating factor warranting that penalty. Davis II at 13.)
The FDPA intent element not alleged in the indictment requires
finding a defendant
(A) intentionally killed the victim;
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(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily
injury that resulted in the death of the
victim;
(C) intentionally participated in an act,
contemplating that the life of a person would
be taken or intending that lethal force would
be used in connection with a person, other
than one of the participants in the offense,
and the victim died as a direct result of the
act; or
(D) intentionally and specifically engaged in
an act of violence, knowing that the act
created a grave risk of death to a person,
other than one of the participants in the
offense, such that participation in the act
constituted a reckless disregard for human
life and the victim died as a direct result of
the act.
18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D).
The FDPA lists 16 aggravating factors, for which notice must
be provided, that may form the basis for a federal death sentence
for a homicide conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). Examples of those
factors are: pecuniary gain; substantial planning and
premeditation; conviction for two felony offenses; and
vulnerability of victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8), (9), (10), (11).
As noted, the aggravating factor included in the notice of intent
to seek the death penalty, but not alleged in the indictment, is
“substantial planning and premeditation”, defined by the FDPA as
when “[t]he defendant committed the offense after substantial
planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person or commit
an act of terrorism”. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9).
10
The Government claims the indictment is not deficient if read
with maximum liberality. In its original brief, the Government
contended that the indictment includes “words of similar import” to
the missing FDPA elements, so that a “fair construction” of the
indictment must include them (quoting United States v. Vogt, 910
F.2d 1184, 1201 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083
(1991), (quoting Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir.
1958))).
Shortly before oral argument here, however, our court decided
Robinson; it held: (1) “the government is required to charge, by
indictment, the statutory aggravating factors it intends to prove
to render a defendant eligible for the death penalty, and its
failure to do so ... is constitutional error”; and (2) this error
is subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 284-85 (emphasis
added). In the light of Robinson, the parties were ordered to
provide supplemental briefing.
In its supplemental brief, the Government acknowledges
Robinson’s holdings; nevertheless, it insists maximum liberality,
not harmless error pursuant to Robinson, is the appropriate
standard of review for this case, given its unusual procedural
posture — Davis and Hardy have not been sentenced. According to
the Government, the constitutional error vel non will occur at
sentencing, not when the final superceding indictment was returned
by the grand jury. A fortiori, it posits, as the district court
11
noted in dictum, that harmless error analysis cannot apply because
no error has been committed.
Davis and Hardy agree, observing: in Robinson, our court
reviewed, post-sentencing, the grand jury’s not including FDPA
elements in the indictment; here, Davis and Hardy’s death sentences
having been vacated, they are, in effect, awaiting sentencing for
the first time. Consequently, they claim permitting the Government
to seek the death penalty, knowing the indictment to be
constitutionally deficient, would be tantamount to sanctioning the
commission of error, but holding prospectively that it will be
harmless.
No authority need be cited for the well-established rule that
we, not the parties, determine our standard of review. For the
unique procedural posture of this case, and contrary to the
parties’ positions, constitutional error arising out of the FDPA
elements’ not being in the indictment attached prior to sentencing.
On this record, because the Government, prior to the final
superceding indictment, provided notice of intent to seek the death
penalty under the FDPA, error occurred when that final indictment
was returned without the requisite FDPA elements.
The attachment of Indictment Clause error at this point,
rather than later at sentencing, is reflected in the Fifth
Amendment. “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
12
a Grand Jury....” U.S. CONST. amend. V. “[H]eld to answer for”
does not refer only to sentencing, but rather to having to defend
against the charged crime. Whether defendants have been sentenced
is not determinative for the indictment’s constitutional
sufficiency vel non.
It can be urged, of course, that an otherwise sufficient
indictment without FDPA elements is not deficient; that it is
sufficient for a non-death penalty offense. For example, United
States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub
nom. Benford v. United States, 537 U.S. 1138 (2003), held an
indictment’s not including the drug quantity forming the basis for
a greater sentence, although constitutional error, was not
reversible plain error. In so doing, it concluded the Indictment
Clause error attached at sentencing.
We also emphasize that the constitutional
error likewise does not lie in the indictment
itself.... Thus, it would be imprudent for
defense counsel to object to an indictment
which, by all rights, is facially sound....
Instead of objecting to a valid indictment ...
the proper time for a defendant to raise a
challenge to his sentence is at the time the
actual violation occurs –– sentencing.
Id. at 310. The court reached this conclusion in a case, unlike
here, where the Government did not provide pre-trial notice of its
intent to seek the greater sentence. Id. at 325.
13
Where, however, as in this case, there is an operative notice
of intent to seek the death penalty under the FDPA and that notice
has been provided prior to the final superceding indictment, an
otherwise sufficient indictment is caused by the earlier notice to
be constitutionally deficient; there is no reason to conclude the
error does not attach until sentencing. For this unique case, the
proper focus in examining Indictment Clause error is not at
sentencing but earlier when the final superceding indictment is
returned (which, again, was post-notice of intent to seek the death
penalty).
Obviously, the focus of our Indictment Clause inquiry is not
on the petit jury’s verdict, but rather on the grand jury’s
charging decision for the indictment. (As noted, the Government
concedes that defendants’ objection at sentencing was timely. The
final superceding indictment was returned in 1995, before Jones,
Apprendi, Cotton, or Ring.) On the other hand, it bears reminding
that, imposition of the death penalty is determined by the petit,
not grand, jury. For purposes of assessing an indictment’s
constitutionality, there is no substantive difference in doing so
when, as here, the Government is seeking the death penalty as
compared to when it is seeking to preserve a death penalty
conviction. For the penalty to be imposed, the petit jury must be
presented with, and must find beyond a reasonable doubt, the FDPA
elements. That is what the petit jury did in Robinson, 367 F.3d at
14
289 (and likewise what the petit jury did here, before the
conviction was vacated in part, Causey, 185 F.3d at 407). On
remand, if the death sentence is to be imposed, the charge to the
petit jury will again include the FDPA elements; those elements
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.
Along this same line, we ordinarily do not review this type of
Fifth Amendment challenge until post-sentencing; usually, that is
when we have jurisdiction. Here, however, our jurisdiction derives
from the district court’s effectively dismissing the indictment to
the extent that it would permit a death penalty. Therefore, our
court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, permitting review of
an order dismissing an indictment. Section 3731 is to be liberally
construed, see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975);
and our court has recognized it as authority for our jurisdiction
over a district court order striking death as a permissible
sentence, United States v. Woolard, 981 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir.
1993) (“There is little question but that the district court’s
ruling was in every practical way as much of an alteration from the
grand jury’s charge as the striking of predicate acts and
forfeiture allegations. The district court effectively removed a
discrete basis of criminal liability.”). Indeed, our court has
recognized jurisdiction under § 3731 over an order dismissing the
death penalty where the FDPA elements were not included in the
indictment. United States v. Frye, 372 F.3d 729, 733-34 (5th Cir.
15
2004) (vacating district court’s holding constitutional speedy
trial delay precluded seeking death penalty).
B.
As noted, post-Robinson, the Government continues to urge
reviewing the indictment with maximum liberality. We are bound,
however, by our court’s precedent. E.g., United States v. Walker,
302 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2002). Pursuant to Robinson, our
binding precedent, failure to present the FDPA elements to the
grand jury for consideration in its charging decision, but
nevertheless seeking the death penalty, was constitutional error.
See Robinson, 367 F.3d at 284. Accordingly, we must decide whether
that error was harmless. See id. at 285.
Robinson describes the test for harmless constitutional error
announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), focusing on
whether the error affects substantial rights. Robinson, 367 F.3d
at 284-85. This is accomplished by examining two of the primary
functions of an indictment: (1) providing the defendant notice of
the crime charged, thereby allowing him to prepare a defense, and
(2) “interpos[ing] the public into the charging decision, such that
a defendant is not subject to jeopardy for a crime alleged only by
the prosecution”. Id. at 287.
1.
The requisite notice was provided to Davis and Hardy, albeit
not by the indictment. As discussed, in July 1995, prior to the
16
August 1995 final superceding indictment and well in advance of
trial in April 1996, the Government provided individualized notice
to them of its intent to seek the death penalty on conviction on
any count, and identified the applicable FDPA elements to establish
death-eligibility under the FDPA. After the sentences were
vacated, the Government again provided specific notice of its
intent to seek the death penalty, again identifying the relevant
FDPA intent element and the aggravating factor of substantial
planning and premeditation.
2.
The next question is whether Davis and Hardy’s substantial
rights were affected by “losing the right to have the public
determine whether there existed probable cause to charge the
[required FDPA] factors” that would be used to sentence them.
Robinson, 367 F.3d at 287. This is answered by deciding “whether,
on the basis of the evidence that would have been available to the
grand jury, any rational grand jury presented with a proper
indictment would have charged that [Davis and Hardy] committed the
offense in question”. Id. at 288.
Considering the overt acts alleged in the indictment returned
by the grand jury, there is no doubt that a rational grand jury
would have found probable cause that the FDPA intent element and
substantial planning and premeditation aggravating factor were
present, had those elements been presented to it.
17
As discussed, the two remaining counts of the indictment
charged Davis and Hardy with conspiracy to violate the civil rights
of Kim Groves and an unnamed individual by use of excessive force,
resulting in death, and with violating Kim Groves’ civil rights by
use of excessive force by shooting her with a firearm, resulting in
death. For count one, the indictment alleged the following overt
acts:
1. After learning that Kim Marie Groves had
filed a civil rights complaint against him,
defendant [Davis] contacted defendant [Hardy]
on several occasions by cellular telephone on
or about October 13, 1994, to arrange the
murder of Kim Marie Groves.
2. On or about October 13, 1994, defendant
[Davis] contacted defendant [Causey] by
cellular telephone to arrange a meeting
whereby defendant [Davis] would identify Kim
Marie Groves to defendants [Hardy and Causey]
thereby facilitating the murder of Kim Marie
Groves.
3. On or about October 13, 1994, defendant
[Davis], while on-duty and while using his
official police car, conducted surveillance of
Kim Marie Groves for the purpose of reporting
Groves’ physical description and location to
defendant [Hardy].
4. On or about October 13, 1994, at 10:01
p.m., defendant [Davis], during a cellular
telephone conversation, ordered defendant
[Hardy] to “get that whore,” thereby ordering
the murder of Kim Marie Groves. Defendant
[Hardy] agreed to kill Kim Marie Groves and
stated in response, “Alright, I’m on my way.”
5. On or about October 13, 1994, at 10:55
p.m., defendant [Hardy] shot Kim Marie Groves
in the head with a 9 mm firearm, which
resulted in her death.
18
6. Defendant [Causey] did conceal the 9 mm
firearm used to kill Kim Marie Groves by
hiding the firearm in a chest-of-drawers in
his bedroom, located at 3930 Florida Avenue,
Apartment B, New Orleans, Louisiana.
7. On or about October 14, 1994, [Davis], in
a cellular telephone conversation, spoke with
[Hardy] about killing the [unnamed] individual
and [Hardy] replied that he wanted to kill the
person that night. [Davis] asked [Hardy] to
“hold off” killing that individual that night
because it would be “too suspicious.”
8. On October 17, 1994, [Davis] told [Hardy]
in a cellular telephone conversation, that
there was no need to kill the other known
individual unless he was persistent in
complaining against [Davis]. [Davis] added
that if the individual complained about
[Davis], it would be “Rock-A-Bye, Baby”
(death) for the person.
These overt acts do not explicitly include the FDPA intent
element or the substantial planning and premeditation aggravating
factor. Obviously, these FDPA elements are consistent with these
alleged overt acts. No rational grand jury could allege these
overt acts, but fail to allege the specific intent to kill and
concomitant substantial planning and premeditation.
As a result, these elements’ not being included in the
indictment did not affect Davis and Hardy’s substantial rights.
Accordingly, the error is harmless.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the order precluding the Government
from seeking the death penalty against Davis and Hardy is VACATED;
19
this case is REMANDED for sentencing proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
VACATED and REMANDED
20