09-0904-cv
Behling v. Commissioner of Social Security
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . C ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1.1.
W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 16 th day of March, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL,
7 ROBERT D. SACK,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11
12 BETTY BEHLING,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 09-0904-cv
17
18 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
19
20 Defendant-Appellee.
21
22
23 FOR APPELLANT: BETTY BEHLING, pro se, North Babylon, New
24 York.
25
26 FOR APPELLEE: DIANE C. LEONARDO-BECKMANN, Assistant
27 United States Attorney (Varuni Nelson,
28 Kathleen A. Mahoney, Assistant United
29 States Attorneys, on the brief), for
30 Benton J. Campbell, United States
31 Attorney for the Eastern District of New
32 York, Central Islip, New York.
33
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
2 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bianco, J.).
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
5 AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District
6 Court for the Eastern District of New York be AFFIRMED.
7 Appellant Betty Behling appeals from the February 9,
8 2009 judgment of the United States District Court for the
9 Eastern District of New York (Bianco, J.), granting
10 appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
12 Appellee, the Commissioner of Social Security,
13 determined that appellant was not entitled to disability
14 insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security
15 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (the “Act”). This
16 determination was made in light of the fact that appellant
17 failed to demonstrate that she was disabled within the
18 meaning of the Act prior to December 31, 2003, the date on
19 which appellant was last insured. We assume the parties’
20 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
21 history, and the issues presented for review.
22 In conducting our review of “a disability benefits
23 determination, our focus is not so much on the district
24 court’s ruling as it is on the administrative ruling.”
2
1 Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2003)
2 (internal quotation marks omitted). We engage in “a plenary
3 review of the administrative record to determine if there is
4 substantial evidence, considering the record as a whole, to
5 support the Commissioner’s decision” and to determine “if
6 the correct legal standards have been applied.” Burgess v.
7 Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
8 marks omitted). We review the district court’s decision to
9 grant judgment on the pleadings de novo but defer to the
10 Commissioner’s resolution of any conflicting evidence in the
11 record. See Clark v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 143 F.3d 115,
12 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
13 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step
14 sequential analysis for evaluating disability claims. 20
15 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human
16 Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983). In this case, the
17 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that appellant
18 retained the residual functional capacity to perform light
19 work and that she could return to her past relevant type of
20 work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); see also Halloran
21 v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
22 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that
3
1 appellant did not suffer from a disability, as that term is
2 defined in the Social Security Act, prior to the date on
3 which she was last insured. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
4 While it is true that “subjective evidence of pain or
5 disability testified to by the claimant” is relevant in
6 evaluating a claim for disability insurance, Brown v. Apfel,
7 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999), appellant’s subjective
8 complaints alone are not a basis for an award of disability
9 insurance benefits in the absence of corroborating objective
10 medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Poupore v.
11 Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
12 Appellant asks this Court to consider her current
13 condition, which she alleges is deteriorating. However,
14 appellant was required to demonstrate that she was disabled
15 as of the date on which she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §
16 423(a)(1)(A); see Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.
17 1989). Any new impairments are not relevant to our
18 disposition of appellant’s present appeal.
19 We have considered appellant’s remaining arguments and
20 find them to be without merit. Therefore, for the foregoing
21 reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby
22 AFFIRMED.
4
1 FOR THE COURT:
2 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
3
5