United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 26, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-30288
Summary Calendar
ROSEMARY WOOTEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:02-CV-2521-M
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Rosemary Wooten filed an employment discrimination suit
against St. Francis Medical Center, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief for alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act1 and the Family and Medical Leave Act.2 During the
course of the proceedings, the district court granted St. Francis’s
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
2
29 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq.
motion to compel discovery of Wooten’s medical history. The court
subsequently dismissed all of her claims on summary judgment.
Wooten appeals both of the district court’s decisions. We affirm.
I
Wooten, a black female, worked in the patient access area of
St. Francis Medical Center until she was discharged in May 2002.
Her complaint focuses on two incidents that occurred at the
hospital prior to her discharge. First, as the hospital was
undergoing renovations in April 2002, Wooten was transferred from
an office to a small office that had formerly been used as a
storage closet. She alleges that she was transferred because a
white co-worker requested her office space. Second, on May 2,
2002, she complained to her supervisor, Sandra Arnold, that two
security guards had sexually harassed her. Despite Wooten’s
request that Arnold keep the matter secret, Arnold investigated
Wooten’s allegations and spoke with the guards and another woman
who was present during part of the alleged harassment. Arnold also
ordered the security guards not to enter the patient access area
unless motivated by security concerns. A few days later, the two
guards resigned their employment and turned in their equipment.3
Wooten’s employment at St. Francis was terminated just over
two weeks later, on May 17. Wooten filed suit, alleging that her
discharge was motivated by gender and racial discrimination. She
3
In her brief, Wooten also states that the guards were
suspended.
2
also alleged that her move from an office to a storage closet was
discriminatory. St. Francis denied that her firing was motivated
by her race or gender, asserting instead that her disruptive
behavior and refusal to follow orders motivated her termination.
The district court agreed with St. Francis and dismissed her claims
on summary judgment.
II
Wooten raises three arguments on appeal. First, she contends
that the court improperly resolved issues of contested fact in
ruling on St. Francis’s motion for summary judgment. Second, she
asserts that the court used an improper test to evaluate her claim
of gender-based discrimination. Finally, she argues that the
district court erred in compelling discovery of her medical history
over the prior fifteen years.
Wooten’s first argument -- that the district court improperly
resolved facts in St. Francis’s favor -- is without merit.
Although she lists a series of facts in her brief that she claims
were disputed by the parties, she fails to explain why these
allegedly disputed facts were material or how they affected the
district court’s decision. The district court dismissed her claims
on summary judgment because she failed to state a prima facie case
that the alleged harassment by her co-workers had created a hostile
work environment. “To establish an actionable claim of sexual
harassment in the workplace, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) That
she belongs to protected class; (2) that she was subject to
3
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on
sex; (4) that the harassment affected a ‘term, condition or
privilege of employment’; and (5) that the employer either knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action.”4 The district court concluded that St. Francis
immediately investigated her claims of harassment and promptly took
remedial action against the offending employees. Wooten offers no
argument disputing the court’s conclusion, and indeed appears to
concede in her reply brief that she cannot prevail on a hostile
work environment claim.
Recognizing that the court did not err in its harassment
analysis, Wooten next argues that the court should have analyzed
her claim as a disparate treatment claim. She offers two
arguments. First, she asserts that she was treated differently
from the other individuals involved in the harassment incident.
Second, she argues that her work area was relocated to a storage
closet because a white female desired her workspace. Neither
argument is persuasive.
Wooten’s first argument is in actuality a claim that St.
Francis retaliated against her for filing a complaint of sexual
harassment. Title VII provides in pertinent part that “it shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees . . . because he has made a
4
DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591,
593 (5th Cir. 1995).
4
charge . . . under this subchapter.”5 Wooten, however, failed to
include the retaliation claim in her Complaint, and she stipulated
to the district court that she was not raising a claim for
retaliation under Title VII. Thus, the retaliation claim is not
properly before us.
Even were we to consider the issue, Wooten has failed to state
a prima facie case of retaliation. To state a prima facie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in activity
protected by title VII; (2) that the employer took adverse
employment action against the employee; and (3) that a causal
connection exists between that protected activity and the adverse
employment action.6 In the present case, Wooten offered no
evidence supporting the third prong of this test. St. Francis,
moreover, offered substantial evidence that her termination was
motivated by legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons, evidence which
Wooten failed to rebut. As a result, Wooten’s retaliation claim
must fail.
Her discrimination claim based on her office move is similarly
unpersuasive. To prevail on a claim of gender discrimination, a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she is a member of a protected
class, (2) that she was qualified for the position, (3) that she
suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that she was either
5
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
6
Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir.
1992).
5
replaced by someone outside the protected class or treated less
favorably than a person outside the protected class.7 Even
assuming that the first two prongs of this test are satisfied,
Wooten fails to satisfy either the third or fourth element. The
record indicates that Wooten initially worked in a five-by-ten foot
cubicle in a room with four other employees. When the hospital was
renovated, she was temporarily moved to an office, and then
subsequently to another small office that was once used for
storage. Her supervisor, a white female, was moved into the
neighboring office, which was similarly converted from a storage
area. The office move does not constitute an “adverse employment
action” under our precedent.8 Moreover, Wooten offers nothing to
indicate that the change in her work area was motivated by racial
or gender considerations. Wooten’s discrimination claim,
therefore, fails.
Wooten’s final argument is that the district court erred in
granting St. Francis’s motion to compel discovery of fifteen years
of her medical history. Given that the district court properly
dismissed her claims on summary judgment and that Wooten never
7
Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir.
1998).
8
See Green v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund,
284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Adverse employment actions
include only ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting
leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.”); Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997); Dollis v.
Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995).
6
complied with the court’s order compelling production of her
medical records, we find it unnecessary to consider this issue.
AFFIRMED.
7