United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the October 5, 2004
United States Court of AppealsCharles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 03-21127
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JOHN BRENNAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MERCEDES BENZ USA;
UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTE,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
_________________________
Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, cans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
Circuit Judges. §§ 12112-12117, because Brennan could not
prove “the requisite employer-employee rela-
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: tionship to have standing to sue” under the
ADA. Brennan further appeals the summary
Plaintiff John Brennan appeals a summary judgment on his claim of intentional infliction
judgment in favor of defendants Mercedes of emotional distress with respect to which the
Benz USA (“Mercedes”) and United Technical district court found that Brennan could not
Institute of Texas, Inc. (“UTI”). The district demonstrate the necessary conduct. Agreeing
court dismissed Brennan’s claim of employ- with both determinations, we affirm.
ment discrimination under title I of the Ameri-
I. him at CTG. Despite his requests for these
In February 1999, Brennan enrolled in accommodations, CTG refused to accommo-
UTI’s entry-level automotive mechanic school. date his disability, allegedly informing him,
He suffers from learning disabilities in the form “We don’t do that here.” After failing an
of dyslexia and attention deficit disorder. exam, Brennan was removed from the Elite
While at UTI, he requested and received Program on April 9, 2001.
numerous accommodations for his disabilities,
including untimed tests, oral tests, color over- Brennan filed a charge of employment dis-
lays, extra tutoring, and other assistance. He crimination with the Equal Employment Op-
graduated from UTI in June 2000. portunity Commission and received a right to
Although UTI’s program focuses on basic sue letter. He then sued, alleging violations of
entry-level automotive skills, its affiliate cor- the ADA and intentional infliction of emotional
poration, Custom Training Group, Inc. distress The district court held that he lacked
(“CTG”), provides more advanced training standing to bring his ADA claim and could not
that focuses on automobiles from specific demonstrate evidence sufficient to support his
manufacturers. Brennan’s performance at UTI claim of intentional infliction of emotional
earned him admission into CTG’s Mercedes distress
Benz Elite post-graduate training program (the
“Elite Program”). CTG maintains separate II.
staffs and facilities from UTI, and is also com- A.
pletely independent from Mercedes. Merced- We review a summary judgment de novo
es, however, does provide funding for CTG and are bound by the same standards as those
and works with CTG in establishing admis- employed by the district court. See Chaplin v.
sions and failure standards and developing a NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 371 (5th
curriculum that will enable CTG’s students to Cir. 2002). Namely, summary judgment is ap-
gain employment with a Mercedes Benz deal- propriate only where “‘the pleadings, deposi-
ership. tions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if
Admission into the Elite Program, however, any,’ when viewed in the light most favorable
is not an offer of employment. In fact, pro- to the non-movant, ‘show that there is no gen-
gram graduates never end up employed by uine issue as to any material fact.’” TIG Ins.
Mercedes (a parts distribution entity), but Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759
rather seek employment from independent (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Mercedes Benz dealerships and service cen- Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
ters. Brennan admits that he never received Once the moving party has demonstrated that
wages, benefits, or compensation of any kind the non-moving party has no evidence such
from UTI, CTG (which was not named as a that a reasonable jury could support a verdict
defendant), or Mercedes. in its favor, t he non-moving party must put
forth specific facts that demonstrate a genuine
On January 29, 2001, Brennan began his factual issue for trial. Id.
training in CTG’s Elite Program under the im-
pression that accommodations similar to those B.
he received at UTI would be made available to Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination
2
in employment-related decisions based on the Under the text of the ADA, plaintiffs such
disability of an otherwise qualified individual. as Brennan cannot state a viable claim. Sec-
Specifically, § 12112(a) provides, “[n]o cov- tion 12112 specifically discusses employment
ered entity shall discriminate against a qualified opportunities. Its only provision under which
individual with a disability because of the Brennan can attempt to find shelter is its ref-
disability of such individual in regard to job erence to “job training.” This phrase, how-
application procedures, the hiring, advance- ever, when read in context, is equally unhelpful
ment or discharge of employees, employee to Brennan.2
compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id. The entirety of § 12112 affords protection
to “qualified individuals with a disability,” in
the context of employment decisions. Under
Brennan contends that this provision com- Brennan’s reading of the statute, every educa-
pels entities such as UTI and Mercedes to pro- tional institution in which a student received
vide accommodations for his disabilities as part tutelage that may one day be useful in the pro-
of the “job training” component of section curement of employment would be compelled
12112. Nevertheless, the district court held, by the ADA to provide the accommodations
and the defendants argue strenuously on ap-
peal, that the ADA does not provide a cause of
action where the plaintiff is not in an employ- 1
(...continued)
ment relationship with, or an applicant for em- active or prospective employment relationship)
ployment with, the defendant. Because Bren- cannot state a viable claim under Title I. See
nan could not demonstrate such an employ- Collins v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 262 F. Supp.
ment relationship, the district court concluded 2d 959 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting claim of a
that the ADA did not confer standing. spouse of an allegedly discriminatorily-treated
former employee); Foote v. Folks, Inc., 864 F.
This court has yet to address the proper Supp. 1327, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (conclud-
scope of standing under title I. Facing similar ing that the legislative history of the ADA
questions, other circuits have adopted the indicates it was intended to protect job appli-
reading favored by the district court in this cants and employees). Similarly, other circuits
caseSSi.e., requiring the existence of an em- have rejected claims under Title I of the ADA
ployment relationship. In McGuinness v. where the plaintiff was a former employee and no
Univ. of N.M., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir. longer was an applicant for that position or was
1998), the court rejected a suit by a medical unable to perform the essential job functions as the
student who claimed discrimination, because “qualified individual” provision of the statute
the lack of compensation received by students requires. See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century
for their work foreclosed the possibility of Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.
2000).
finding the requisite employment relationship
required to bring a claim under Title I.1 2
Cf. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132
(1993) (noting that it is a “fundamental principle of
statutory construction (and, indeed, of language
1
Two district courts have concluded that itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be de-
plaintiffs situated as Brennan is (i.e., lacking a termined in isolation, but must be drawn from the
(continued...) context in which it is used”).
3
Brennan sought at CTG. We reject this whether alleged conduct is sufficiently outra-
reasoning. geous to fall under the ambit of the cause of
action, the Texas courts have warned that the
Therefore, although it is obvious that Bren- conduct must have been “’so outrageous in
nan and others are enrolled in CTG’s Elite character, and so extreme in degree as to go
program with an eye toward receiving training beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
that would help them gain employment from a be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolera-
small group of specific employers (i.e., Mer- ble in a civilized society.’” Twyman v. Twy-
cedes Benz dealerships and service centers), it man, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) (quot-
is equally manifest that no such employment ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
relationship yet existed. As noted above, cmt. d).4
Brennan never received compensation for his
“work” at the Elite program (either from Mer- Brennan claims that defendants’ conduct
cedes, UTI, or even CTG), nor did he ever ap- meets this “utterly intolerable”5 level of mis-
ply for employment with any of the named behavior in that he was not offered the accom-
defendants. As a result, district court was en- modations for his disability that he believed
tirely correct in granting summary judgment were necessary to his success. As a result,
with respect to Brennan’s ADA claim. Brennan alleges he suffered emotional distress
because, in his own words, “I have lost my
Brennan’s brief makes repeated references chances of what I wanted to do with my life to
to statutory provisions that neither formed the work on Mercedes Benz cars.”
basis of his complaint nor have any relevance
to its allegations. Brennan’s reliance, there- The district court appears quite correct in
fore, on the Individual with Disabilities in Ed- its conclusion that Brennan has been unable to
ucation Act, title II of the ADA, and the Reha- demonstrate any evidence suggesting the sort
bilitation Act of 1973 is therefore misplaced.3 of “severe” distress that is required for recov-
ery under this cause of action.6 But, putting
C. the nature of the alleged distress aside, Bren-
In Texas, for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim nan cannot demonstrate a scintilla of evidence
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, suggesting the defendants’ conduct constituted
he must demonstrate that the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly, that the conduct
4
was extreme and outrageous, and that the See also Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254
conduct caused him severe emotional distress. F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing Texas’s
Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 requirements for claims of intentional infliction of
S.W.3d 604, 610 (Tex. 2002). In determining emotional distress).
5
Hughes Training, 254 F.3d at 594 (citing
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d 1,
3
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (does not apply 13 (Tex. App.SSTyler 2000, pet. denied)).
to post-secondary institutions); 42 U.S.C.
6
§§ 12131-12134 (deals solely with “public enti- GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d
ties,” defined as instrumentalities of state of local 605, 618 (Tex. 1999) (requiring emotional distress
governments); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795 (applies only that is “so severe that no reasonable person could
to entities receiving federal financial support). be expected to endure it”).
4
anything near the sort of outrageous behavior
needed to support a claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress
Brennan concedes that UTI granted him the
accommodations he desired while he was a
student in UTI’s entry-level training program,
and Brennan’s brief does not even make a
cursory attempt to address this deficiency, so
summary judgment was proper. Additionally,
because Mercedes’s participation in the CTG
Elite Program is limited to establishing stan-
dards and developing curriculum, Brennan
cannot even muster evidence demonstrating
contact with Mercedes, let alone contact of the
outrageous sort necessary to support his claim.
AFFIRMED.
5