United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 5, 2004
_________________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04 - 50157
SUMMARY CALENDAR
_________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ERIC SEAN WILEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 03-CR-229-ALL-SS
_________________________________________________________________
Before JONES, SMITH and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Eric Sean Wiley (“Wiley”) appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress and requests the Court to vacate
his guilty-plea conviction for possession of a firearm by a
felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He
was sentenced to 36 months in prison and three years of
supervised release.
1
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
Wiley’s plea agreement was conditioned on his ability to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. That motion sought
to suppress the evidence that formed the basis of his conviction
– the gun he was carrying when police officers stopped and
frisked him in a restaurant parking lot in Austin, Texas
following the commission of a crime to which the officers
believed he was connected. Wiley argued that the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him. The district court
denied Wiley’s motion, finding that the gun seized during the
detention and frisk was legally obtained. The Court agrees.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When “reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, this Court accepts findings of fact unless clearly
erroneous but reviews de novo the ultimate conclusion as to the
constitutionality of the law-enforcement action.” United States
v. Neufeld-Neufeld, 338 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001). “A
factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is
plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Jacquinot, 258
F.3d at 427. This Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party that prevailed below. United States v.
Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1314 (5th Cir. 1993).
2
III. DISCUSSION
Law enforcement officers “may stop and briefly detain an
individual for investigative purposes if they have reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,” even if they lack
probable cause. Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730,
736 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968)); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
Reasonable suspicion must be supported by particular and
articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant an intrusion. Goodson, 202
F.3d at 736; United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 840 (5th
Cir. 1994)(en banc). The search requires “at least a minimum
level of objective justification.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 124 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). The court
affords due weight to factual inferences and deductions drawn by
law enforcement officers, which are based on their experience and
specialized training. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273-74 (2002). Whether a stop and search is predicated on
reasonable suspicion is determined by the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981); Neufeld-Neufeld, 338 F.3d at 378. As such, “a collection
of otherwise lawful conduct can amount to reasonable suspicion.”
Neufeld-Neufeld, 338 F.3d at 380 (citing Arizu, 534 U.S. at 277).
3
In this case, the testimony at the suppression hearing
revealed that the arresting officers knew a criminal transaction
involving a stolen car was about to occur in the restaurant
parking lot and the principal suspect in that offense was a
female identified as Brenda, who was communicating with the
potential victim by cell phone in the minutes leading up to the
crime. The officers testified that the restaurant was located in
a high-crime area. The testimony also indicated that Wiley
arrived at the restaurant parking lot only minutes before Brenda
was due to arrive, that he emerged from his car speaking on a
cell phone and looking around the parking lot, that he did not
enter the restaurant, and that he rapidly attempted to leave the
area when patrol units converged on Brenda’s car. Also relevant
to the officers’ suspicion is the fact that, at the time of the
arrest, they had been investigating a rash of robberies in the
area in which female perpetrators lured illegal immigrants to
certain areas where their male counterparts robbed the
immigrants.2 Given the totality of the circumstances, and based
on their experience and specialized training, the police officers
could have formed reasonable suspicion that Wiley was a lookout
or enforcer for Brenda, or was otherwise involved in the criminal
transaction. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
2
Although the government did not prove that the victim of the underlying criminal
transaction was an illegal immigrant, the victim was of Mexican descent and did not speak English
well.
4
124-25. Therefore, the district court properly denied Wiley’s
motion to suppress.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
5