United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 15, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-10629
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUAN ESTRELLA-SALVADOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:03-CR-76-1
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Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Juan Estrella-Salvador was convicted, pursuant to his
conditional guilty plea, of one count of possession of more than
five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. The
district court sentenced him to serve 151 months in prison and a
five-year term of supervised release. Estrella-Salvador appeals
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Estrella-
Salvador argues that the district court erred in determining that
he was detained for a reasonable amount of time in connection
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-10629
-2-
with traffic violations and that he voluntarily consented to the
search of his vehicle. He relies on City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), in support of his argument that the
stop of his vehicle was illegal because it was pretextual.
Estrella-Salvador’s pretext argument is unavailing. As long
as a traffic law infraction that would objectively justify a stop
takes place, the fact that the police officer may have other
motives for the stop is irrelevant. United States v. Sanchez-
Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 2003). Edmond is materially
distinguishable and does not affect our pretext analysis. See
531 U.S. at 34-36.
Our review of the record shows that the district court did
not err in determining that the initial traffic stop of Estrella-
Salvador’s vehicle was reasonable and that this stop later
evolved into a consensual encounter. See Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431,
434 (5th Cir. 1993). We are likewise convinced that the district
court did not err in determining that Estrella-Salvador
voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. See United
States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 2000). Estrella-
Salvador has not shown that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. Consequently, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.