In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-1180
C ARNELITA S TOKES and N YOKIA S TOKES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
B OARD OF E DUCATION OF T HE C ITY OF C HICAGO,
a municipal corporation, and JOHNNY B ANKS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 08 CV 493—Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge.
A RGUED D ECEMBER 10, 2009—D ECIDED M ARCH 19, 2010
Before P OSNER, M ANION, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
H AMILTON, Circuit Judge. On January 23, 2007,
Principal Johnny Banks encountered what looked like a
fight among several adult women in the office of his
Chicago elementary school. At Principal Banks’ request,
the police arrested four women. After criminal charges
2 No. 09-1180
were dropped, two of the women sued Principal Banks
and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago. Plain-
tiffs Nyokia and Carnelita Stokes are the mother and
grandmother, respectively, of four children who attended
the school at the time of the incident. The Stokes
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Banks
violated their Fourth Amendment rights by swearing to
false complaints of disorderly conduct and causing
false arrests. Plaintiffs added state-law claims for false
arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants on
all claims. Plaintiffs appealed, and we affirm.
I. The Facts for Purposes of Summary Judgment
We review the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment de novo, construing all facts and reasonable infer-
ences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties. Casna v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 424 (7th
Cir. 2009). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment
if the evidence establishes that there are no genuine
issues of material fact, leaving the moving parties
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Many factual details are disputed in this case, but a
factual dispute is material only if its resolution might
change the suit’s outcome under the governing law. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
factual issue is genuine only if there is sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor
No. 09-1180 3
of the non-moving party on the evidence presented. See id.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, neither
the district court nor this court may assess the credibility
of witnesses, choose between competing reasonable
inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting
evidence. The courts must view all the evidence in the
record in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-
moving parties. See id. at 249-50.
We state the facts in light of the standard for summary
judgment and without vouching for the objective truth
of this account, especially as it might reflect on those
who are not parties to this case. In the weeks before the
fight, Nyokia Stokes’ third-grade daughter experienced
conflict with another girl in her class. The conflict
escalated to the parents. The night before the incident
that resulted in arrests, the other girl’s mother (Ebony
Scott) and a male companion went to Nyokia’s home
and threatened her. The police were called, but they
deferred to school authorities. The next morning,
January 23, 2007, Nyokia and Carnelita met with the
police and Principal Banks at the school. Banks said that
he would set up a meeting between the Stokes and Scott.
Around 2:30 p.m. that day, Nyokia and Carnelita re-
turned to the school to pick up Nyokia’s daughter in
kindergarten and to check on the status of the
proposed meeting with Scott. They waited in the school
office, which is where kindergarten children are picked up
and which is adjacent to Principal Banks’ office. While
they were waiting, Scott entered with a female com-
panion identified only as “Scott’s cousin Pony.” Scott
4 No. 09-1180
approached Nyokia aggressively and yelled at her for
telling Principal Banks about the events of the
previous night. Nyokia responded by saying only, “that’s
not why we’re here.” Scott and Pony then set upon
Nyokia, grabbing her hair and tearing out her artificial
braids, causing her to bleed and suffer significant pain
and distress. By the time the attack ended, Scott and Pony
had pulled approximately eight braids (and the natural
hair to which they were attached) from Nyokia’s scalp.
Nyokia estimated that the attack lasted 20 minutes,
though that seems highly improbable under the circum-
stances. By all later accounts of witnesses, Scott and Pony
were the aggressors, and neither Nyokia nor Carnelita
retaliated verbally or physically. Carnelita called 911
to summon the police, apparently as the altercation was
ending.
During the attack, approximately 30 kindergartners
were dismissed from school and entered the office to-
gether. They became extremely agitated by the scene
they encountered and began to yell. Nyokia testified
that they were “hollering for 20 minutes” until Principal
Banks arrived. One student was knocked over as a result
of the adults’ assault.
Principal Banks arrived in the office either as the fight
was breaking up or immediately after it had broken up.
Nyokia testified that he entered the office “at the last
minute” when “everything was over with.” Carnelita
testified that up until the moment that Banks entered the
office, Scott was on the floor with her hands gripping
Nyokia’s hair. Nyokia was still upright, and Scott was
No. 09-1180 5
attempting to pull her to the floor with her. It is unclear
exactly how Pony was positioned, but her hands were
also in Nyokia’s hair. Nyokia was using her hands to try
to remove her attackers’ hands from her hair. Carnelita
further testified that when Principal Banks approached,
Scott and Pony let go of Nyokia’s hair and backed away.
Nyokia described a noisy, chaotic scene in the office,
crowded with adults and children even after her
attackers were disentangled from her. Banks testified
that he entered the school office from his adjoining
office, while others testified that he entered the school
office via the hallway. Upon entering, Banks instructed
Scott and Pony to go into his office, and he told the
Stokes to go to another room down the hall. Carnelita
and Nyokia Stokes eventually did so, accompanied by
teacher Mylea Fossett.
Fossett and Banks testified that at this stage, Principal
Banks was attempting to assess the situation but
had difficulty doing so because Carnelita refused to leave
the office and yelled at Banks for an extended period of
time. Fossett testified that Carnelita remained near
Banks and continued yelling while Banks was trying to
keep the parties separate and was trying to ask certain
individuals, including Nyokia, about the circumstances
of the attack. Fossett further testified that Carnelita
yelled at Banks when he came to talk to the Stokes while
they waited for him in a room down the hall. Both Fossett
and Banks testified that Carnelita’s behavior interfered
with Banks’ ability to keep the parties separate and to
regain control of the school.
6 No. 09-1180
Carnelita’s testimony disputes this account, but only
to a limited extent. She contends that she said nothing at
all to Banks until he came to see them in the nearby
room. She did not testify about and has not disputed
the defendants’ evidence that she was yelling in the
moments immediately following the attack, that she
did not immediately comply with Banks’ request that she
go with Nyokia to the room down the hall, and that she
was yelling at Banks once he entered that room.
Fossett and the Stokes waited together for Banks in the
nearby room. Banks entered with police officers and told
them to arrest both Nyokia and Carnelita. According to
the Stokes’ testimony, the following exchange occurred:
The police asked Banks why he wanted them arrested.
Banks responded: “First of all, I want her [Carnelita]
arrested.” When Carnelita asked why, Banks replied:
“Because you’re not supposed to be here.” Nothing in
the record indicates that Carnelita had been denied
permission to be at the school. Nyokia pleaded with
Banks not to have her mother arrested, saying that
Carnelita had nothing to do with the altercation. Nyokia
told Banks: “Don’t lock her up. Take me to jail. Because
she’s sick, my mom is sick.” Banks responded: “I’m going
to have to lock both of you up.” The police again asked
Banks if he was sure about his decision. His reply was
affirmative.
Banks and the officers then left the room to complete
paperwork. Banks swore out criminal complaints with
the police against Ebony Scott, “Pony,” and both of the
Stokes. The complaint against Carnelita stated that she
No. 09-1180 7
“did knowingly and intentionally fight with another
person, use loud profane language causing a crowd to
gather in such an unreasonable manner as to alarm and
disturb the calm of the school and provoke a breach of
the peace.” The complaint against Nyokia stated that she
“did knowingly and intentionally fight with another
person and refused to stop [and] used loud profane
language causing a crowd of students to gather thereby
disturbing the calm of the School thereby provoking a
breach of the peace.” While it is undisputed that Banks
tried to ascertain more information about the incident
before he signed the complaints, the court must assume
that Banks did not attempt to determine which parties
were the aggressors.
Nyokia and Carnelita were escorted into the hallway,
where they were arrested and handcuffed within sight of
Nyokia’s children. Before the police took them away,
janitor Michael Bell spoke with Banks and told him that
he did not think Nyokia or Carnelita should be arrested.
Banks responded, “they can’t do this on school property.”
The Stokes were released late that night, at about 3:00 or
4:00 a.m. The criminal charges against them were dis-
missed, and Banks later told Carnelita Stokes that he had
made a mistake and should have had only the other
women arrested.
The district court granted summary judgment on all
claims. The court acknowledged the conflicting testimony
regarding what Banks actually witnessed, the history of
conflict between the Stokes and Scott, and what happened
after the women were separated. The court determined
8 No. 09-1180
that these factual disputes were immaterial to the central
issue: whether Banks had “a reasonable basis to believe
the Stokes were involved in disturbing the school and
upsetting 30 schoolchildren when he called the police
and caused their arrest?” The court granted summary
judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims. The court
also granted summary judgment on the state-law claims,
finding that the plaintiffs “failed to proffer any admissible
evidence that Banks’ decision to call the police or cause
their arrests was maliciously motivated, and not based
on probable cause, or that he intentionally inflicted emo-
tional distress.” The Stokes appealed.
II. Fourth Amendment False Arrest Claims
The Stokes argue that genuine issues of material fact
barred summary judgment against them on their
Fourth Amendment false arrest claims. They assert that
Principal Banks did not have probable cause to swear out
the criminal complaints against them causing their
arrest for the offense of disorderly conduct as defined
under Illinois law. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/26-1(a)(1).
Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false arrest
asserted under the Fourth Amendment and section 1983.
McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant police officer). We may
reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment
only if we find that the Stokes offered sufficient evidence
to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
the existence of probable cause.
No. 09-1180 9
Probable cause exists if, at the time of the arrest, the
facts and circumstances within the defendant’s knowl-
edge “are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one
of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances
shown, that the suspect has committed . . . an offense.”
E.g., Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2008)
(reversing summary judgment for arresting officer). A
court evaluates probable cause not with the benefit of
hindsight, and not on the facts as perceived by an omni-
scient observer, but on the facts as they appeared to a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position, even if that
reasonable belief turned out to be incorrect. Id.; Kelley v.
Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for arresting officer).
A police officer’s probable cause determination depends
on the elements of the applicable criminal statute.
Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 761 (7th Cir.
2006) (reversing summary judgment for officer who
arrested plaintiff for violating Indiana disorderly con-
duct statute). Illinois law defines disorderly conduct as
“knowingly [doing] any act in such unreasonable
manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke
a breach of the peace[.]” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/26-1(a)(1).
The offense is intended to guard against “an invasion of
the right of others not to be molested or harassed, either
mentally or physically, without justification.” People v.
Davis, 413 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ill. 1980) (affirming convict-
ion where defendant entered home of elderly invalid
and implicitly threatened her with harm if she testified
against his brother). Whether conduct is reasonable
depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.
10 No. 09-1180
People v. Queen, 859 N.E.2d 1077, 1085 (Ill. App. 2006)
(finding that officer had reasonable grounds to arrest
for disorderly conduct, although officer cited a different
statute to justify arrest). A person’s conduct must
actually bring about a breach of the peace, not merely
tend to do so. In re D.W., 502 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ill. App.
1986) (affirming conviction where defendant threatened
to beat up classmate at school). The issue here is not
whether the Stokes actually committed the crime of
disorderly conduct. We must determine only whether
the facts taken in the light reasonably most favorable to
the Stokes show that a reasonable person in Principal
Banks’ position could have had probable cause to
believe that the Stokes engaged in disorderly conduct.
See Kelley, 149 F.3d at 646.
To form a belief of probable cause, an arresting officer is
not required, and certainly a complaining witness like
Principal Banks is not required, to act as a judge or jury
to determine whether a person’s conduct satisfies all of
the essential elements of a particular statute. See Driebel v.
City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622, 645 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirm-
ing summary judgment for arresting officer). Rather,
probable cause involves the exercise of judgment, which
“turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to
a neat set of legal rules.” Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998
F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232 (1983). While this determination is often left
to the jury, the court may decide whether probable
cause existed if the facts material to the probable cause
determination are not in dispute. E.g., Neiman v. Keane, 232
F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary
No. 09-1180 11
judgment for officer who had probable cause for arrest for
theft of services); Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240,
1246-48 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment for
officers who had probable cause for arrest for battery
and had no duty to conduct further investigation);
Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 438-42 (7th Cir. 1986)
(affirming summary judgment for officers who had
probable cause for arrest for shoplifting and had no duty
to conduct any investigation).
Even when all genuine factual disputes are resolved in
the Stokes’ favor, Principal Banks entered the office from
the hallway, where he could hear children screaming
and unidentified adult female voices shouting obsceni-
ties. When Banks entered the office, he found Nyokia,
Scott, and Pony still tangled together in a violent ex-
change. Nyokia was upright and positioned over Scott,
who was on the floor. Scott’s and Pony’s hands were in
Nyokia’s hair, and she was using her hands to try to fend
off her assailants. Nyokia was yelling loudly, in an “hys-
terical” state. The room was full of many other people,
including 30 young kindergarten students, who were
also yelling in response to the distressing scene. The chaos
was continuing up to the time Banks arrived.
Scott and Pony released their grip on Nyokia once
Banks had fully entered the office. However, the accounts
of Nyokia and Carnelita do not contradict Banks’ asser-
tion that before he fully entered the office, he saw the
three women entangled with arms “reaching and
swinging and punching.” With the benefit of hindsight
on summary judgment, we must assume that Nyokia was
12 No. 09-1180
an innocent victim of an assault. Nevertheless, the undis-
puted facts show that a reasonable person in Principal
Banks’ position at the time could easily have viewed her
as an equal participant in the fight. Accordingly,
Banks had probable cause to sign a criminal complaint
against Nyokia Stokes for disorderly conduct. See Mustafa
v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2006)
(affirming summary judgment for officer who had proba-
ble cause to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct when
he arrived at the scene to find “ ‘commotion’ and ‘agita-
tion’ in progress, with [claimant] at its center, at a
crowded ticket counter at an international airport,” even
though claimant had been acting peaceably); 720 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/26-1(a)(1).
While plaintiffs emphasize Banks’ concession that he did
not recall Carnelita Stokes “being involved in the physi-
cal,” the crime of disorderly conduct does not require
an element of physical force. A person engages in disor-
derly conduct if he or she “knowingly: (1) Does any act
in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb
another and to provoke a breach of the peace.” 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/26-1(a)(1). Banks entered a chaotic elemen-
tary school office crowded with young and distressed
children. While Carnelita was not physically entangled
with the other women, she was very much at the center of
the scene. Banks also knew she was the mother of Nyokia,
who was in the physical swarm. A reasonable person in
his position could have inferred that Carnelita shared
some responsibility for the incident. Carnelita’s behavior
reasonably led Banks to believe that she would continue
to be an agitating factor who would limit his ability to
No. 09-1180 13
regain peace and order in the school. Both Banks and
teacher Fossett testified that Carnelita was yelling con-
stantly after the physical altercation had ended and that
she refused to comply with Banks’ requests that she
leave the area.
While Carnelita denies ever saying anything to Banks,
her testimony does not contradict the assertions of Banks
and Fossett that she was yelling hysterically after the
fight had broken up and that this conduct interfered
with Banks’ ability to restore order in the school.1
Carnelita has not testified that she remained calm or
quiet or that she immediately complied with Banks’
request to go down the hall to separate the adults. Given
Carnelita’s proximity and her family connection to the
brawl, her hysterical yelling after it had ended, and Banks’
responsibility to restore order to the school, a reason-
able person in Banks’ position could have perceived
Carnelita as unreasonably alarming or disturbing others
and provoking a breach of the peace. Plaintiffs have
not met their burden of coming forward with evidence
showing that Banks did not have probable cause to
believe that Carnelita had engaged in disorderly conduct.
Plaintiffs argue further that Banks failed to investigate
the incident. They say that if he had properly gathered
1
Plaintiffs point to the transcript of Carnelita’s 911 call as
evidence that she was acting calmly. While the 911 transcript
suggests that Carnelita remained calm during the call and that
Banks was present for part of the call, it does nothing to inform
us about her behavior before or after the brief time period
covered by the transcript.
14 No. 09-1180
more information by questioning witnesses, he would
have learned that the Stokes bore no responsibility for the
disturbance and did not engage in disorderly conduct. We
see no basis for imposing such obligations on a school
principal to investigate before asking police officers to
take steps to restore order in a public school.2
The law gives a police officer latitude to make rea-
sonable judgments in light of the circumstances. While
an officer may not close his or her eyes to clearly exculpa-
tory facts, the Fourth Amendment does not require an
officer with probable cause to arrest to wait while pur-
suing further investigation. McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703,
707-08 (7th Cir. 2009) (officer had probable cause to arrest
both participants in a physical altercation after talking to
participants and viewing an inconclusive surveillance
video; officer had no duty to interview witnesses or to
2
It is unusual to see a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim
against a civilian school principal who did not arrest the
plaintiffs himself, though defendants have not tried to portray
Principal Banks as a typical civilian witness. Banks was acting
under color of state law in his capacity as principal. We have
held, by way of comparison, that a police officer may be
liable for a constitutional false arrest claim by signing a false
criminal complaint that led to the claimant’s arrest. Acevedo v.
Canterbury, 457 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2006); McCullah v. Gadert,
344 F.3d 655, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2003). Since the police gave
Banks the authority to sign a criminal complaint, he could be
liable for false arrest if he lacked probable cause to allege the
criminal acts detailed in the complaint. See Acevedo, 457 F.3d
at 723.
No. 09-1180 15
examine additional evidence); Mustafa v. City of Chicago,
442 F.3d at 548 (affirming summary judgment for
officers; police have no duty to investigate extenuating
circumstances or to search for exculpatory evidence once
they have probable cause to arrest). In some situations,
an officer may be required to conduct some investigation
before making an arrest; in others, an officer may have
probable cause for arrest without any need for investiga-
tion. Relevant factors include the information available
to the officer, the gravity of the alleged crime, the danger
of its imminent repetition, and the amount of time that has
passed since the alleged crime. See Mason v. Godinez, 47
F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995) (“amount of information
the police are required to gather before establishing
probable cause for an arrest is in inverse proportion to the
gravity of the crime and the threat of its imminent repeti-
tion”); BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 1986)
(same, finding no probable cause where it was unclear
whether a crime had actually occurred, and if it had, there
was no threat of its imminent repetition); Gramenos v.
Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding defen-
dant officers did not need to conduct investigation and
stating: “Probable cause can be a matter of degree, varying
with both the need for prompt action and the quality of
information at hand.”); see also Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan,
37 F.3d 1240, 1247 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that where
there is “a lapse of time between the alleged lawbreaking
and the arrest, . . . we find it more likely that some type of
investigation—for example, the questioning of wit-
nesses—will be appropriate,” but finding no need for
investigation where the alleged crime had just occurred
and the officers arrived to find a chaotic scene).
16 No. 09-1180
We apply these factors to a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position. When considering the amount of
information available to Banks, we must recall that he is
an elementary school principal, not a police officer. A
principal is responsible for maintaining order and pro-
tecting the children in his or her charge. The principal
is not responsible for performing police investigations
and deciding just how to allocate fault for the violent
and disruptive actions of adults present in the school.
The amount of information that Banks could reasonably
be expected to gather was limited.
A full investigation here would have taken a significant
amount of time. There were four possible arrestees and
dozens of potential witnesses. Many young children
were present and were agitated and distressed. Banks’ job
was to manage the school and to restore the order that
the adults had destroyed. He did not have the time or the
duty to carry out a police investigation. There is no evi-
dence that Banks ignored information that would have
undermined probable cause. While janitor Bell told
Banks that he thought the Stokes should not be arrested,
he said so after the probable cause determination had
been made and with only a one-sentence personal
opinion, unaccompanied by any specific facts.
The need for prompt action was high, given the
potential for further harm to students and the prospect
that the fight could start up again. While disorderly
conduct is not usually considered a grave offense, it can be
a prelude to serious violence. And it can be a particularly
serious matter when the conduct involves violence and
No. 09-1180 17
loud profanity in the presence of young children, espe-
cially in a school. At least one kindergarten student
was knocked down by the brawl. Many others showed
they were distressed at the sight of such violence right in
front of them at school. The children and their parents
had a right to expect the principal and the police to
act swiftly to restore order. The situation jeopardized
the physical safety of the students, the staff, and the
four women involved. It also threatened the psycho-
logical well-being of many young children. It was not
unreasonable for Banks to act immediately to remove
any further threat of physical or psychological harm, and
to ask the police to do so without further investigation at
the time. If the police had qualms about the arrests, they
were capable of investigating further if they thought it
necessary. See BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d at 128 (affirming
judgment for plaintiffs arrested without probable cause
for child neglect; it was not witness’s duty to supply
information relevant to probable cause but was the duty of
the “investigating and arresting police officer . . . to extract
that information.”). The undisputed facts show that
Principal Banks had probable cause to sign criminal
complaints for disorderly conduct against Nyokia and
Carnelita Stokes.
III. State-Law Claims
Lack of probable cause is a common element of the
Illinois claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution. See, respectively, Ross v. Mauro
Chevrolet, 861 N.E.2d 313, 317 (Ill. App. 2006); Reynolds v.
Menard, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ill. App. 2006); and
18 No. 09-1180
Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 784 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ill. App.
2002). The fact that Banks had probable cause to sign the
criminal complaints for the Stokes’ arrest means that
defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on
these supplemental state-law claims.
To survive summary judgment on the remaining claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs
must present evidence showing that (1) the defendant’s
conduct was truly extreme and outrageous, (2) the defen-
dant either intended to inflict emotional distress or
knew there was at least a high probability that he would
cause severe emotional distress, and (3) the conduct in
fact caused severe emotional distress. E.g., Feltmeier v.
Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80 (Ill. 2003); McGrath v. Fahey, 533
N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988). The Stokes have offered no
evidence supporting the first element, truly extreme and
outrageous conduct. To satisfy this element, a defendant’s
conduct must be “so extreme as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency and be regarded as intolerable in a
civilized community.” Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d at 83. Even
when the facts are taken in the light reasonably most
favorable to the Stokes, Principal Banks’ actions to secure
the arrest of plaintiffs based on probable cause, designed
to restore order to a public school, did not come close
to being “truly extreme and outrageous,” even though he
was mistaken about these plaintiffs’ roles in the distur-
bance. We affirm summary judgment on the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The judgment of the district court is A FFIRMED.
3-19-10