08-5570-ag
Rezaul v. Holder
BIA
Straus, IJ
A079 076 722
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 27 th day of January, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _______________________________________
12
13 KARIM REZAUL, ALSO KNOWN AS KARIM
14 MD REZAUL,
15
16 Petitioner,
17
18 v. 08-5570-ag
19 NAC
20 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
21 ATTORNEY GENERAL, *
22
23 Respondent.
24 ______________________________________
25
26 FOR PETITIONER: David J. Rodkin, New York, New York.
*
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., is
automatically substituted for former Attorney General
Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
1 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
2 General, Civil Division; Michelle
3 Gorden Latour, Assistant Director;
4 Kimberly A. Burdge, Trial Attorney,
5 Office of Immigration Litigation,
6 Civil Division, U.S. Department of
7 Justice, Washington, D.C.
8
9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
10 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
11 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
12 is DENIED.
13 Petitioner, Karim Rezaul, a native and citizen of
14 Bangladesh, seeks review of an October 28, 2008 order of the
15 BIA affirming the November 17, 2006 decision of Immigration
16 Judge (“IJ”) Michael Straus denying petitioner’s application
17 for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
18 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Karim Rezaul, No.
19 A 079 076 722 (B.I.A. Oct. 28, 2008), aff’g No. A 079 076
20 722 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Nov. 17, 2006). We assume the
21 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
22 procedural history of the case.
23 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
24 decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen
25 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The
26 applicable standards of review are well-established. See
27 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d
2
1 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
2 I. Asylum and CAT Relief
3 As the government argues, in his brief before this
4 Court, Rezaul does not challenge the agency’s pretermission
5 of his asylum application or its denial of his application
6 for CAT relief. Thus, we consider only the agency’s denial
7 of Rezaul’s application for withholding of removal.
8 II. Withholding of Removal
9 In his decision, the IJ found that even assuming Rezaul
10 had suffered past persecution, any presumption of a
11 likelihood of persecution had been rebutted. When an
12 applicant for withholding of removal has been found to have
13 suffered past persecution, the presumption of a likelihood
14 of future persecution may be rebutted if an IJ finds that
15 there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such
16 that the applicant’s life or freedom would no longer be
17 threatened in the country of removal on account of one of
18 the five statutory grounds. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A).
19 The BIA has elaborated that the presumption may be rebutted
20 if, in the applicant’s country, the offending government has
21 been overthrown and no longer wields influence, the new
22 leadership does not “harbor the same animosities as the
3
1 old,” and human rights practices have improved. See In re N-
2 M-A-, 22 I & N Dec. 312, 320-21 (BIA 1998); In re O-Z- & I-
3 Z-, 22 I & N Dec. 23, 26-27 (BIA 1998). We find no error in
4 the agency’s conclusion that the government successfully
5 rebutted any presumption of persecution because “there is no
6 basis why [members of the BNP] would continue to look for
7 the respondent, being that he has left Bangladesh for over
8 11 years and has not been politically active since then.”
9 Rather than challenge these findings, Rezaul argues only
10 that the BIA’s decision made no sense because it noted that
11 the BNP’s elevation to power in 2001 could constitute
12 changed country circumstances excusing his late filing of
13 his asylum application, but also found that a change in
14 circumstances rebutted the presumption that he would face
15 future persecution. Such a bare assertion is insufficient
16 to meaningfully challenge the agency’s decision. See Norton
17 v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not
18 sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and
19 normally will not be addressed on appeal.”).
20 Rezaul also argues that the IJ placed insufficient
21 weight on his arrest warrant as proof that Bangladeshi
22 authorities were still looking for him. However, this Court
4
1 generally accords deference to the agency’s evaluation of
2 documentary evidence. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of
3 Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the
4 weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration
5 proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the
6 agency). Although Rezaul argues that if the IJ had doubts
7 about the veracity of the arrest warrant, then he should
8 have sent it to be authenticated, the IJ was under no
9 obligation to do so. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.6.
10 III. Motion to Remand
11 Finally, Rezaul argues that the BIA abused its
12 discretion by failing to remand his case so that the IJ
13 could evaluate supplemental documentary evidence. “Such an
14 abuse may be found if the Board’s decision provides no
15 rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established
16 policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only
17 summary or conclusory statements; that is to say, where the
18 Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”
19 Singh v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 290, 293
20 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)
21 states that a “party asserting that the Board cannot
22 properly resolve an appeal without further factfinding must
5
1 file a motion for remand. If further factfinding is needed
2 in a particular case, the Board may remand the proceeding to
3 the immigration judge or, as appropriate, to the Service.”
4 (emphasis added). Here, the BIA reasonably held that remand
5 was unnecessary because the new evidence submitted was:
6 (1) previously available at the time of the proceedings; (2)
7 unauthenticated; and (3) cumulative of previously discussed
8 country conditions evidence. It therefore did not abuse its
9 discretion in declining to remand. See Singh, 461 F.3d at
10 293.
11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
12 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion
13 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
14 Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is
15 DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate
16 Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
17 FOR THE COURT:
18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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