Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
DISSENTING OPINION
No. 04-16-00020-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF K.S.L., a Child
From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-PA-00341
Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Dissenting Opinion by: Jason Pulliam, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Jason Pulliam, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 6, 2016
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons.
The appellants signed affidavits of voluntary relinquishment. The affidavits specifically
reflect the appellants’ understanding that termination of their parent-child relationship is in the
best interest of their children. The basis of appellants’ appeal is that evidence, in addition to the
affidavits of voluntary relinquishment, was required to support the trial court’s best interest
finding. I disagree with this premise, and therefore, disagree with the majority’s determination.
Section 161.211(c) of the Texas Family Code expressly applies to cases such as this
involving challenges to the trial court’s best interest finding when an affidavit of voluntary
relinquishment forms the statutory basis for termination. The Family Code states that “[a] direct
or collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights based on an unrevoked affidavit of
relinquishment of parental rights or affidavit of waiver of interest in a child is limited to issues
Dissenting Opinion 04-16-00020-CV
relating to fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.211(c). Appellants have not alleged that the execution of their affidavits was the result of
fraud, duress, or coercion.
In addition, I believe that an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment, in and of itself, is
sufficient to support a trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. The
Texas Supreme Court, in Brown v. McLennan Cnty. Children’s Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390,
394 (Tex. 1982) determined that the Legislature intended for affidavits of voluntary relinquishment
to be sufficient evidence to support a trial court’s best interest finding.
Parental termination cases involving affidavits of voluntary relinquishment are clearly
matters of great significance. Admittedly, there is a split of authority among the courts of appeal
on this specific issue. I believe that the Texas Supreme Court must resolve this matter to provide
clarity for the courts of appeal and the trial courts below. I believe that the Family Code and the
cases interpreting it that find that an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment is sufficient to support
a best interest finding are legally correct.
The majority’s interpretation in this case of requiring evidence in addition to the affidavit
would render the affidavit meaningless. Relinquishment would not mean relinquishment. Such
an interpretation would also allow parents who have voluntarily relinquished their rights an
opportunity to challenge the trial court’s best interest finding based on grounds that are not
specifically referenced in Section 161.211(c). This result is inconsistent with the clear intent of
the law and harms children by leaving them in an uncertain status after their parents have made an
intentional and voluntary decision to relinquish their parental rights.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Jason Pulliam, Justice
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