IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CLARENCE WILLIS; AND THOMAS No. 66286
WILLIS,
Appellants,
vs.
FILED
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE JUL 1 3 2016
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district courtS summary judgment in
an unlawful detainer and real property action.' Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Adriana Escobar, Judge.
Appellants first contend that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the underlying matter because respondent did not
transfer the case from justice court in compliance with EDCR 7.85. We
disagree. See Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 667, 221 P.3d 699, 704
(2009) ("Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo
review."). 2 As respondent points out, EDCR 7.85's mandatory dismissal
'Having considered the parties' arguments on the issue, we conclude
that jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Because appellants' defenses
were treated as de facto counterclaims, the underlying matter was not
simply an unlawful detainer action. Thus, appellants' July 28, 2014,
motion for reconsideration effectively tolled the time for appealing the
district court's July 8, 2014, final judgment. See AA Primo Builders, LLC
v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 585, 245 P.3d 1190, 1195 (2010).
2 Because appellants' argument regarding EDCR 7.85 fails for the
reasons set forth in this order, we assume without deciding that EDCR
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provision is applicable only when one of two conditions is satisfied.
Because it does not appear from the record that either condition was
satisfied and because appellants have failed to address the issue, we
conclude that jurisdiction in the district court was proper. See Ogawa, 125
Nev. at 667, 221 P.3d at 704; cf. Ozawa v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 125 Nev.
556, 563, 216 P.3d 788, 793 (2009) (treating a party's failure to respond to
an argument as a concession that the argument is meritorious).
Appellants next contend that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment based on claim and issue preclusion. We
need not determine whether the district court properly applied claim and
issue preclusion because even if appellants' de facto counterclaims were
construed as an "action" challenging the November 2010 trustee's sale
under NRS 107.080(5) (2010), that action was time-barred by NRS
107.080(5)(b) (2010). Specifically, appellants did not raise their argument
regarding the chain of beneficial interest (which appears to be the basis for
their de facto counterclaims) until after 90 days from the November 2010
sale. 3 Thus, summary judgment on appellants' counterclaim for wrongful
foreclosure was proper, and because appellants' counterclaim for quiet
title was predicated on the purported invalidity of the trustee's sale,
...continued
7.85 implicates the district court's jurisdiction and that appellants' two-
year delay in raising the argument did not amount to a waiver.
3 Even if appellants' initial filing in justice court were construed as
the "action" for purposes of NRS 107.080(5)(b)'s 90-day limitation period,
they failed to comply with NRS 107.080(5)(c)'s requirement that a lis
pendens be recorded within 30 days after the action is commenced.
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summary judgment on the quiet title counterclaim was likewise proper. 4
See Rosenstein v. Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 575, 747 P.2d 230, 233 (1987)
("[T]his court will affirm the order of the district court if it reached the
correct result, albeit for different reasons.").
Appellants also contend that the district court should have
dismissed the underlying matter because respondent (1) did not timely file
an opposition to one of appellants' motions, (2) did not hold an NRCP 16.1
case conference, (3) violated Local Justice Court Rule of Practice 17 when
submitting the proposed transfer order to the justice court judge, (4)
violated Local Justice Court Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) upon the transfer
order's entry, or (5) lacked standing to institute the underlying action
based on a failure to comply with NRS 80.055 and NRCP 7.1. We conclude
that none of these arguments warrant reversal because, among other
reasons (1) the district court was not obligated under EDCR 2.20 to grant
appellants' motion, (2) the district court had discretion under NRCP
16.1(e) to not dismiss the underlying action, (3) appellants have not
identified any authority suggesting that a purported violation of Rule 17
would have warranted dismissal, (4) appellants have not identified any
authority suggesting that a purported violation of Rule 5(b) would have
warranted dismissal, and (5) appellants have not cogently argued that
respondent is an entity that would need to comply with NRS 80.055 and
4Although appellants argue on appeal that they should have been
permitted to conduct discovery, they did not provide the district court with
an affidavit articulating a specific issue that warranted discovery or why
they had not been able to procure that discovery. See NRCP 56(f).
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NRCP 7.1, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38,
130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006); cf. Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 417, 168
P.3d 1050, 1054 (2007) (noting that this court will not entertain an
argument made for the first time in a motion for reconsideration when the
district court did not entertain the motion on its merits). Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Cherry
,J.
J.
Gibbons
cc: Hon. Adriana Escobar, District Judge
Robert F. Saint-Aubin, Settlement Judge
Kurth Law Office
Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
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