J-S25044-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
H.R.B. PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.A.B., MOTHER No. 1834 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order entered October 21, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 56 in Adoption 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
D.R.B. PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.A.B., MOTHER No. 1835 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree entered October 21, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 56A in Adoption 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
R.J.B. PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.A.B., MOTHER No. 1836 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree entered October 21, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 56B in Adoption 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
B.G.B., A/K/A M.B. PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.A.B., MOTHER No. 1837 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree entered October 21, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 56C in Adoption 2014
J-S25044-16
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY, and JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JULY 26, 2016
Appellant, M.A.B. (“Mother”), appeals from the October 21, 2015
decrees involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her children, H.R.B.,
born July of 2012; D.R.B., born October of 2007; R.J.B., III, born September
of 2005; and B.G.B.1, born October of 2004 (collectively, “Children”).2 We
affirm.3
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case, which we incorporate herein. On
September 2, 2014, Erie County Office of Children and Youth (“OCY”) filed
petitions for involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother to Children.
On March 6, 2015, March 31, 2015, and May 6, 2015, the trial court held
hearings on those petitions. Of particular importance, the trial court heard
the testimony of Kenneth Parmerter, an OCY caseworker; Alyssa Beer, an
OCY supervisor; Kim Covatto, a permanency unit OCY caseworker; and
Mother.4 On October 20, 2015, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b).
1
B.G.B. is also known as M.B.
2
The parental rights of R.J.B., Jr. (“Father”) to Children were also
terminated involuntarily pursuant to these decrees. Father is not a party to
the instant appeals nor has he filed separate appeals.
3
On December 10, 2015, this Court consolidated these appeals.
4
Additionally, the trial court heard testimony from Shawn Wills, a Millcreek
Township police officer; Cory Suchland, an investigator with Auglaize
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On November 20, 2015, Mother timely filed notices of appeal, together
with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
Mother raises four questions on appeal:
1. Did the [trial court] commit an abuse of discretion or error of
law when it concluded that [OCY] established the grounds for
termination under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)?
2. Did the [trial court] commit an abuse of discretion or error of
law when it concluded that [OCY] established sufficient
grounds for termination under Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2)?
3. Did the [trial court] commit an abuse of discretion or error of
law when it concluded that [OCY] established sufficient
grounds for termination under Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(5)?
4. Did the [trial court] commit an abuse of discretion or error of
law when it concluded that termination of [Mother’s] parental
rights was in the [Children’s] best interest?
Mother’s brief at 48, 53, 58, 60-61.
Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is
as follows:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental
rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the
trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an
abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary
support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.
Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily
County, OH, Children’s Services; T.H., Children’s Foster Mother; Nora Lynn
Kreider, a licensed marriage and family therapist; Alicia Twilla, a therapist;
B.G.B.; R.J.B. III; Sara Dieringer, a community support provider for the
Family Resource Center in St. Marys, OH; Jeanne Homan, a mental health
and drug and alcohol counselor at Coleman Behavioral Health in St. Marys,
OH; and Shannon Marabella, a mental health intern at Maryhaven Mental
Health Center.
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terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing
judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a
jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review
of the record in order to determine whether the trial court’s
decision is supported by competent evidence.
In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting In re C.S., 761
A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2000)). In termination cases, the burden is
upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid.
Id. at 806. We have previously stated the standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re J.L.C. &
J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).
The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (quoting In re Diaz, 669 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa. Super. 1995)).
“[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm
even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption
of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting In re: N.C.,
N.E.C., 763 A.2d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2000)). Additionally, this Court
“need only agree with [the trial court’s] decision as to any one subsection in
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order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d
380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court relied upon,
inter alia, Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act, which provide as
follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied
by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
With respect to Section 2511(a)(2), the grounds for termination of
parental rights due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not
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limited to affirmative misconduct; “to the contrary, those grounds may
include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In
re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). Parents are required to
make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full
parental responsibilities. Id. at 340. A child’s life “simply cannot be put on
hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super.
2008). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and
rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental
duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or
her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M.,
856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).
On appeal, Mother argues that OCY cannot establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that she cannot or will not remedy the conditions that
led to Children’s placement. In her brief, Mother argues that, while OCY
alleged that it had concerns about Mother’s drug and alcohol use, it
presented no evidence to substantiate this concern. Mother’s Brief at 55.
Mother also argues that she has participated in her own therapy. Id. at 57.
At the hearing, Mr. Parmerter testified that Mother has made minimal
progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the
original placement, and that Mother has been minimally compliant with the
permanency plan. N.T., 3/6/15 at 50. Additionally, Mr. Parmerter testified
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that Mother did not seek out services until about 60 days into the 90-day
review period.5 Id. at 87. Mr. Parmerter testified that Mother only visited
Children twice during the three-month review period. Id. at 52.
Ms. Beer testified that she began her attempts to contact Mother via
telephone on October 7, 2013, and that Mother finally returned Ms. Beer’s
phone calls on January 21, 2014. Id. at 106. Ms. Beer testified that, when
questioned why Mother did not contact OCY before that date, Mother
responded that she did not have a good answer to that question. Id. at
107. Ms. Beer testified she stressed to Mother the importance of
maintaining contact with Children, as well as with OCY. Id. at 110. Ms.
Beer testified that her next telephone conversation with Mother occurred on
March 7, 2014, and that Mother informed Ms. Beer that she was pregnant
and was due to give birth on March 20, 2014. Ms. Beer’s final phone call
with Mother occurred on April 21, 2014. Id. at 115. Ms. Beer testified that
Mother told Ms. Beer that she was unaware that she was required to
maintain contact with OCY regarding Children. Id. at 117. Ms. Beer
testified that she had no further contact with Mother. Id. at 118. The trial
court found that OCY sustained its burden of proof in terminating Mother’s
5
The trial court ordered Mother to: (1) participate in a psychological
evaluation; (2) submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation; (3) complete an
OCY-approved parenting class; (4) complete an OCY-approved domestic
violence class; (5) obtain safe and stable housing; (6) obtain employment;
and (7) attend appointments and be actively involved in the lives of
Children. N.T., 3/6/15 at 43. OCY offered these services and made referrals
for Mother. Id. at 47-48.
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parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Trial Court Opinion,
10/20/15, at 44. The trial court noted that Mother’s “behaviors, her
inaction, and her limp explanations to OCY representatives and the [trial]
court illustrate [M]other’s incapacities to parent cannot or will not be
remedied by [M]other.” Id. at 45. The trial court found that Mother
demonstrated incapacity, abuse, neglect and refusal with regard to Children.
Id. The trial court also found that Mother’s “incapacity to follow through
with court ordered services, and her incapacity to engage in services and
comply with the reunification orders in a substantial, consistent, and
meaningful way to achieve reunification with [Children]” illustrates the lack
of a diligent effort to assume full parental responsibilities. Id.
This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts
towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.
In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous. Id. at 340. Instantly, the evidence showed that Mother has
made only a minimal effort to maintain any type of relationship with
Children. Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/15, at 43. The evidence also
demonstrated that Mother’s continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
to parent could not or would not be remedied, despite OCY’s offering of
reasonable efforts to assist in her reunification with Children.
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After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the
trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by
competent evidence in the record. In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s determinations regarding section
2511(a)(2) are supported by sufficient, competent evidence in the record.
The trial court must also consider how terminating Mother’s parental
rights would affect the needs and welfare of Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(b). Pursuant to section 2511(b), the trial court’s inquiry is specifically
directed to a consideration of whether termination of parental rights would
best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the child.
See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal
denied, 587 Pa. 705, 897 A.2d 1183 (2006). “Intangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and
welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We have instructed
that the court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child
bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. See id.
In her brief, Mother argues that OCY did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that she could not provide a stable home environment
at the present time, or in the near future. Mother states that she would
characterize her relationship with Children as “good.” Mother’s Brief at 61.
Mother further argues that OCY has not demonstrated that Mother and
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Children could not build a stable relationship through family therapy, and
that testimony from both therapists involved indicates that parental
involvement and input would have been therapeutically beneficial. Id. at
62.
The trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights will
promote stability for Children and is in the best interest of Children. Trial
Court Opinion, 10/20/15, at 49. Children have not had any contact with
Mother since late July 2014. Id. Children have not inquired about Mother.
Id. All Children are placed in the same foster home. Id. at 48. B.G.B. and
R.J.B. refer to their Foster Mother as their “mom,” and do not want to return
to the care of Mother. Id. Moreover, the trial court found that Children are
doing well and are happy in foster care. Id. at 49.
Mr. Parmerter testified that R.B.J., III, was standoffish during the visit
with Mother that took place on June 14, 2014, the first time Mother had
seen Children since September of 2013. N.T., 3/6/15, at 54. Mr. Parmerter
testified that he recommended a goal change to adoption because Children
were scared to return to Mother’s care, and that Children were getting
settled into their foster home, were doing well in school, and were receiving
the services they needed. Id. at 55-56. Mr. Parmerter further testified that
Children were progressing well in their foster home, and enjoyed being in
the foster home, and that their needs were being met in the foster home.
Id. at 64.
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Ms. Covatto testified that Children are doing well in the foster home.
N.T., 3/6/15, at 134. Ms. Covatto further testified that Children are very
angry with Mother and do not wish to return to Mother’s care. Id. at 137.
In particular, Ms. Covatto testified that B.G.B. and R.J.B., III, stated that
they hate Mother and were very upset at the thought of returning to
Mother’s care. Id. at 140. Ms. Covatto testified that Children enjoy that
they have a constant home that is not a car or a hotel. Id. Ms. Covatto
concluded that Children would feel more at ease if Mother’s parental rights
were terminated because they would not fear instability any more. Id.
We have stated that, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008). After this
Court’s careful review of the record, we find that the competent evidence in
the record supports the trial court’s determination that there was no bond
between Mother and Children which, if severed, would be detrimental to
Children, and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of Children. Thus, we will not disturb the trial
court’s determinations. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74.
After a careful review, we affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s
parental rights on the basis of section 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decrees affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/26/2016
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