UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4703
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD DWAYNE GRANT, a/k/a Dog,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-4706
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD DWAYNE GRANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00296-FL-1; 5:06-cr-00100-FL-1)
Submitted: July 20, 2016 Decided: July 29, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant. John
Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Reginald Dwayne Grant appeals the 46-month sentence he
received upon pleading guilty to two counts of distributing a
quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2012), and the 18-month sentence he received after the district
court revoked his supervised release. In these appeals, Grant
contends that the sentences, which the court ordered to run
consecutively, are substantively unreasonable. * We disagree.
When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
imposed upon conviction, we consider “the totality of the
circumstances” under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In evaluating a sentence
for an abuse of discretion, “we give[] due deference to the
[d]istrict [c]ourt’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, on the whole, justified
the sentence.” Id. at 59-60. The sentence must be “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of
sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume that a within-
Guidelines sentence, as here, is substantively reasonable.
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). Grant may rebut that presumption
*Grant does not claim that the district court committed any
procedural error in sentencing him for either the crimes of
conviction or the revocation of supervised release.
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only “by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). Although the
sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to
satisfy the goals of sentencing, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a),
3583(e) (2012), “the sentencing court retains broad discretion
to revoke a defendant’s [supervised release] and impose a term
of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that Grant fails to rebut the presumption that
either sentence is substantively reasonable. In fashioning the
46-month sentence for the crimes of conviction, the district
court considered Grant’s request for a lesser sentence in light
of the § 3553(a) factors, such as Grant’s history and
characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense,
and the need for the sentence imposed. The court also
adequately explained its reasons in imposing a revocation
sentence within the statutory maximum.
Additionally, Grant’s argument fails because the revocation
sentence is separate and distinct from the sentence for the
crimes of conviction. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-38 (observing
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that revocation sentence is designed to punish defendant’s
failure to abide by terms of supervised release). Moreover, the
argument also runs contrary to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 7B1.3(f), p.s. (2015), which provides for imposition of
consecutive sentences in situations such as Grant’s. Accord
United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 208 (6th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that, although not binding, district court should
consider § 7B1.3(f), p.s., in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences and that such decision is discretionary).
Accordingly, we conclude that the sentences are
substantively reasonable, and we affirm the district court’s
judgments. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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