In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐3427
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
JOHN GABRIEL,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 13‐cr‐00718 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JULY 6, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 2, 2016
____________________
Before POSNER, SYKES and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. A jury found appellant John Ga‐
briel guilty of producing child pornography and posting it to
the internet. The district court sentenced Gabriel, who is 80
years old, to the statutory minimum of 15 years in prison and
imposed a life term of supervised release. On appeal Gabriel
does not challenge his conviction or his prison term. He ar‐
gues only that the district court did not justify the length or
2 No. 15‐3427
conditions of the supervised release term. We affirm. We re‐
ject, as we have before, the contention that a sentencing court
must separately justify the length of imprisonment and super‐
vised release terms. Also, Gabriel waived any appellate chal‐
lenge to the conditions of supervised release. He had advance
notice of the conditions, was warned that failure to object
could be deemed a waiver, and never objected in the district
court.
The facts of Gabriel’s crime are relevant to the supervised
release issues. In 2012, Gabriel persuaded a 17‐year‐old girl to
participate in a bizarre “program” he had used previously to
manipulate women for his sexual gratification. By joining the
program, Gabriel told the girl, she could help “train” troubled
boys to resist Satan by having sex with them. To that end, Ga‐
briel took sexually explicit photographs of the girl and posted
them to a website he had created to entice the boys.
Gabriel had introduced the girl to the program by sending
her numerous emails, ostensibly from more than a half dozen
program participants, including an “angel.” The girl eventu‐
ally agreed to join, and Gabriel gave her a nude “energy mas‐
sage” during an initiation ceremony. Gabriel had then posted
the sexually explicit photographs and arranged for the girl to
have sex with a 15‐year‐old boy. Before that could happen,
however, the girl’s mother discovered Gabriel’s emails and
contacted authorities.
After the jury found Gabriel guilty of producing child por‐
nography, the district court ordered the probation office to
prepare a presentence investigation report and the parties to
file sentencing memoranda. In its written order the court
warned: “Failure to note objections to the content of the PSR
No. 15‐3427 3
or to the opposing party’s Sentencing Memorandum may re‐
sult in waiver of such objections.” The court clarified in a fol‐
low‐up order that the parties should include in their memo‐
randa “Any objections to any conditions of probation and su‐
pervised release recommended by the Probation Depart‐
ment.”
The probation officer sent her report to the parties in July
2015. She noted that the statutory range for imprisonment
was 15 to 30 years, see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), and calculated a
guideline imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months based on
a total offense level of 38 and criminal‐history category of I.
As for supervised release, both the statutory and guideline
ranges were five years to life, with life being recommended
by the relevant policy statement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k);
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2) & (c). The probation officer also recom‐
mended a number of discretionary conditions of supervised
release. The government largely concurred with those condi‐
tions in its sentencing memorandum. Gabriel did not file a
sentencing memorandum, nor did he object to the presen‐
tence report or the government’s memorandum.
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the court con‐
firmed that Gabriel did not wish to submit a sentencing mem‐
orandum. After hearing arguments from counsel and allocu‐
tion from Gabriel, the court imposed the statutory minimum
of 15 years in prison to be followed by the recommended life
term of supervised release. The court recognized the “sub‐
stantial possibility” that 15 years will amount to a life sen‐
tence for Gabriel but said that a longer sentence would have
been warranted if not for his advanced age and poor health.
The court explained: “Given his sexual deviancy and ease
with which crimes victimizing minors can be committed by
4 No. 15‐3427
means of a computer,” a life term of supervision was war‐
ranted to ensure that Gabriel would not victimize other mi‐
nors should he live long enough to be released from prison.
The district court imposed a number of discretionary con‐
ditions of supervision. Gabriel did not object to any of them.
All but one of those conditions had been recommended by the
probation officer in the July 2015 PSR. The exception, which
prohibits Gabriel from accepting employment without his
probation officer’s approval, had been proposed in the gov‐
ernment’s sentencing memorandum. When the judge asked if
Gabriel objected to any proposed condition, his attorney said
no. Then, at the end of the hearing, the district court asked if
defense counsel had “Anything further,” and again she said
no.
Gabriel first argues that the district judge did not justify
the life term of supervised release. He does not challenge the
sufficiency of the court’s explanation of the prison term in
light of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He argues that the
judge’s failure to refer expressly to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), which
identifies factors for supervised release terms, suggests that
the § 3553(a) criteria incorporated by that provision “were
never considered as part of the separate supervised release
calculus.”
Gabriel acknowledges that we held in United States v. Ar‐
mour, 804 F.3d 859, 868 (7th Cir. 2015), that a district court’s
justification for imposing a term of imprisonment can also ap‐
ply to a term of supervised release. Gabriel argues we should
repudiate this aspect of Armour because its interpretation of
§ 3583(c) will render the provision redundant with § 3553(a).
We have rejected this argument in several cases since Armour.
See United States v. Bloch, No. 15‐1648, — F.3d —, —, 2016
No. 15‐3427 5
WL 3361724, at *4–5 (7th Cir. June 17, 2016) (following
Armour, statutes do not require judge to “provide two sepa‐
rate explanations, one for the term of imprisonment and one
for the term of supervised release”); United States v. Bickart,
Nos. 15‐2890 & 15‐2946, — F.3d —, —, 2016 WL 3361547, at *5
(7th Cir. June 17, 2016) (following Armour); United States v.
Lewis, No. 14‐3635, — F.3d —, —, 2016 WL 3004435, at *5 (7th
Cir. May 24, 2016) (upholding life term of supervision when
district court had not said “much about its reasons for order‐
ing a life term of supervised release” but the justification
“was clear from the entirety of the sentencing hearing”). We
do not require a sentencing judge to start all over again when
explaining supervised release after having explained the rea‐
sons for a prison sentence.
The district judge justified sufficiently the life term of
supervised release. The judge said that given Gabriel’s
“sexual deviancy and ease with which crimes victimizing
minors can be committed by means of a computer, the term
of supervised release for the balance of defendant’s life is
needed to ensure that even at an extremely advanced age the
defendant will not be able to victimize any more minors.”
That makes sense to us, and particularly in the absence of an
objection, the judge did not need to say more. See Lewis, —
F.3d at —, 2016 WL 3004435, at *5.
Gabriel also challenges some of the discretionary condi‐
tions of his supervised release. Those conditions: allow his
probation officer to visit him at home; require that he report
to his probation officer “promptly,” answer his probation of‐
ficer’s inquiries, submit to computer monitoring, and partici‐
pate in sex‐offender treatment; and prohibit him from pos‐
6 No. 15‐3427
sessing internet‐capable devices and working or having con‐
tact with minors without approval from his probation officer.
Gabriel contends these conditions are vague, overly restric‐
tive of his liberty, or unsupported by adequate findings.
Gabriel waived his appellate challenge to these conditions
by failing to raise any of these objections in the district court.
The details of the procedure in the district court are important
for this conclusion. Where the district court has already made
a decision and said definitively that it is imposing certain con‐
ditions of supervised release, a defendant need not take an
“exception” to preserve the issue for appeal. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 51(a); United States v. Miranda‐Sotolongo, No. 14‐2753, —
F.3d —, —, 2016 WL 3536675, *6 (7th Cir. June 28, 2016). But a
district court can announce a tentative decision or view and
invite objections. A failure to object in those circumstances
can amount to waiver. United States v. Lewis, — F.3d at —,
2016 WL 3004435, at *6.
In this case, the district court followed the procedure we
recommended in United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842–44
(7th Cir. 2015), and other cases and ensured that the parties
had ample advance notice of proposed conditions of super‐
vised release. The court took the further step of warning the
parties in writing that failure to object to conditions recom‐
mended in the presentence report could be treated as waiver.
If that were not enough to support a finding of waiver, and
it is, counsel then confirmed at the start of the sentencing
hearing that Gabriel did not wish to object, and later the law‐
yer said no when asked if she had “any objection to those con‐
ditions.” Compare Bloch, — F.3d at—, 2016 WL 3361724, at *8
(applying waiver where defendant received advance notice of
No. 15‐3427 7
conditions and did not object when given opportunity at sen‐
tencing), and Lewis, — F.3d — at—, 2016 WL 3004435, at *5
(same), with United States v. Sainz, No. 13‐3585, — F.3d —, —
, 2016 WL 3513893, at *8–9 (7th Cir. June 27, 2016) (no waiver
where defendant received advance notice of proposed condi‐
tions but without warning about waiver and without oppor‐
tunity to object at sentencing, and where government agreed
that remand was needed to correct unconstitutional condi‐
tions). Our waiver finding in this case is not based on the
judge’s broad “anything else?” question at the end of the
hearing. See United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 857–58 (7th
Cir. 2016) (no waiver where judge asked defendants at end of
sentencing only whether there was “anything unclear or con‐
fusing” and they said no). As we explained in Lewis, the “sen‐
tencing in the district court is the main event.” — F.3d at —,
2016 WL 3004435, at *5–6. If Gabriel had concerns about the
proposed conditions, he should have brought them to the dis‐
trict court’s attention rather than waiting until appeal to com‐
plain for the first time.
Finally, we note that several of the conditions Gabriel chal‐
lenges are not as troubling as he contends. Gabriel claims the
home visit condition will allow the probation officer to subject
him to nighttime searches of his home, but the district court
required only that Gabriel submit to searches at reasonable
times. That proviso adequately cabins the probation officer’s
discretion. See Bickart, — F.3d at —, 2016 WL 3361547, at *8
(approving identical condition). Likewise, although Gabriel
claims he is unsure how quickly he must act to comply with
the condition requiring that contacts with law enforcement be
reported “promptly” to his probation officer, the written
judgment defines “promptly” as “within 72 hours.” See
8 No. 15‐3427
United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 862 (7th Cir. 2015) (rec‐
ognizing that written judgment may clarify oral pronounce‐
ment if the two do not conflict). Finally, Gabriel worries that
a condition requiring him to answer his probation officer’s in‐
quiries might infringe upon his right against self‐incrimina‐
tion, but the judgment specifies that Gabriel must answer
such inquires only “absent constitutional or other legal privi‐
lege.” See also United States v. Douglas, 806 F.3d 979, 987 (7th
Cir. 2015) (general obligation to appear and answer questions
truthfully does not convert otherwise voluntary statements
into compelled ones; supervisee may invoke privilege if he
wishes), quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984).
In any event, to the extent Gabriel may feel in the future a
need to raise substantive challenges to any conditions, he
could do so in a district court under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). See
United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2016).
AFFIRMED.