MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Aug 05 2016, 7:43 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
regarded as precedent or cited before any and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Karl Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jesse Jones, August 5, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
54A01-1602-CR-297
v. Appeal from the Montgomery
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Heather Dennison,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
54D01-1401-FD-1
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1602-CR-297 | August 5, 2016 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary
[1] Jesse Jones (“Jones”) pled guilty to Possession of Paraphernalia as a Class D
felony1 and received a sentence of three years, six months executed, and two
and a half years suspended to probation. While on probation, Jones allegedly
left the scene of an automobile accident causing bodily injury, a Class A
misdemeanor.2 Following a revocation hearing, the trial court entered a
judgment revoking Jones’s probation. Jones appeals, claiming the State did not
provide sufficient evidence to warrant probation revocation. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On March 20, 2014, Jones entered a guilty plea to Possession of Paraphernalia
as a Class D felony pursuant to a plea agreement. He was sentenced to three
years, with all but six months suspended to supervised probation. Under the
probation order, Jones was prohibited from violating any law, and was
compelled to pay $100 in initial probation user’s fees, $100 in administrative
fees, and $30 monthly, the balance of which was to be paid before Jones was
discharged from probation. (App. at 25) On October 2, 2014, Jones’s
probation was modified to include at least six months of “inpatient treatment at
1
Ind. Code § 38-48-4-8.3(a) & (b). The offense was elevated from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class D
felony because Jones had a prior unrelated conviction under this section. This offense would now be
classified as a Class A misdemeanor. At all times, we refer to the version of the statute in effect at the time of
Jones’s offense.
2
I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1(b)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1602-CR-297 | August 5, 2016 Page 2 of 7
New Life Recovery Program (“New Life”) and follow[ing] all the rules and
recommendations made as a result of that program.” (App. at 35)
[3] On May 10, 2015, Deputy Jeremy Minor (“Deputy Minor”) of the
Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office was sent to search for a vehicle involved
in a hit-and-run accident on Interstate 74 East. (Tr. at 15) Deputy Minor was
advised to look for a black Pontiac car with front-end damage. (Tr. at 16-17)
He came across a construction zone where he found Jones standing outside a
black Pontiac with the hood open. (Tr. at 17) Upon approaching the vehicle,
Deputy Minor noted the car had front-end damage. (Tr. at 18)
[4] Deputy Minor asked Jones how his car had acquired the damage, and Jones
stated the car had some previous damage and the hood was usually held down
by a cable. (Tr. at 18) Deputy Minor then arrested Jones because he “had left
the scene of an accident with injury.” (Tr. at 19) Jones stated that he did not
know anyone had been hurt, and further claimed he thought he hit a toy. (Tr.
at 20-21) While being transported to the jail, Jones was apologetic and
appeared “bummed out with the whole situation.” (Tr. at 21) Jones later
claimed he lied to the officer because he felt intimidated. (Tr. at 22)
[5] On May 13, 2015, the Probation Officer for the Courts of Montgomery County
filed a petition to revoke or modify probation, alleging Jones had violated three
terms of his probation, namely: “[Term 1] You shall not violate any law”;
“[Term 10] You shall pay Probation User’s Fees”; and, “[Term 17] You shall
complete substance abuse evaluation/treatment/education as Probation/Court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1602-CR-297 | August 5, 2016 Page 3 of 7
Referral directs, pay all costs, and authorize release of information to Probation
and the Court.” (App. at 37) On June 25, 2015, the trial court held a fact-
finding hearing on this petition.
[6] At this hearing, Deputy Minor testified to the facts detailed above. He also
stated that an expert had determined that the damage to the front-end of Jones’s
car likely came from the tow hitch on the victim’s vehicle. (Tr. at 22) Jones
also testified, admitting to owing a balance of $590 in probation user’s fees (Tr.
at 6); however, he testified he had a plan to pay in full before the end of his
probation, complying with Term 10 of the probation order (Tr. at 34-35). Jones
also testified to blacking out at the time of the accident due to a week-old head
injury, but did admit he felt an “impact.” (Tr. at 39) Marilyn Ritchardson
(“Ritchardson”) of Rainbow Recovery Resources, a program through New
Life, testified that Jones had completed all program work except for the final
paperwork. (Tr. at 31)
[7] The trial court found that Jones had violated his probation, stating:
The Court will find that Jesse Wayne Jones is in violation of the
terms of his probation by committing a new criminal offense,
specifically Failure to Stop After an Accident, a Class B
Misdemeanor, failure to pay his probation user’s fees, and failure
to successfully complete the program at New Life.
(Tr. at 52-53) On January 11, 2016, after Jones made some attempts to repeat
the New Life Recovery Program, the court held a disposition hearing.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1602-CR-297 | August 5, 2016 Page 4 of 7
Ultimately, the court revoked Jones’s probation and ordered him to serve the
suspended time in the Department of Correction. Jones now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence on probation. Monroe v. State,
899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, such placement is a “matter
of grace” and a “conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.” Million v. State,
646 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-1(b)
provides that if a probationer “commits an additional crime, the court may
revoke the probation.”
[9] During a revocation hearing, the trial court must make two determinations: (1)
whether a violation of the terms of probation has occurred; and (2) if the
probationer has violated the terms, what sanctions should be imposed. Pierce v.
State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). One violation of a condition of
probation is enough to support a probation revocation. Id. Under Indiana law,
the State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f).
[10] Jones first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving that he committed
another criminal offense, specifically, leaving the scene of an accident. Under
I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1, an operator who is in an accident is required to stop the
vehicle immediately or as near to the accident as possible, remain at the scene
until the operators can exchange names and license information, and, in the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1602-CR-297 | August 5, 2016 Page 5 of 7
event of injury, provide reasonable assistance and call law enforcement or
emergency personnel. I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1(a). A person who fails to comply
commits the Class B misdemeanor of leaving the scene. I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1(b).
The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Jones had
committed this offense. The evidence most favorable to this finding shows that
Jones’s car had front-end damage consistent with a collision involving the
victim’s vehicle. Also, Jones appeared to have stopped because the hood of his
car unlatched and obstructed his vision. He did not exchange information with
the driver of the other vehicle. Furthermore, Jones apologized for lying to the
officer about the source of his car’s damage, and stated that he did not know
that anyone was injured in the accident. From these facts, a reasonable finder
of fact could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that Jones left the
scene of an accident.
[11] Jones argues that he lacked the required mens rea to commit this offense because
he blacked out at the time of the accident. Jones also states that he stopped his
car as cautiously and as quickly as possible once he regained consciousness and
noticed his damaged hood. However, in presenting these arguments, Jones
invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
[12] Jones further argues that he was not delinquent on his probation fees and, at the
time of the new offense, had completed the treatment program at New Life.
The State appears to concede these points. (Appellant’s Brief at 14) The
language of the probation agreement specifically states that all fees “must be
paid before you [Jones] are discharged from probation.” (App. at 25)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1602-CR-297 | August 5, 2016 Page 6 of 7
Furthermore, the testimony of Ritchardson demonstrated that, for all intents
and purposes, Jones had in fact completed the required programming through
New Life, and merely had to complete the discharging paperwork to formally
end his treatment. Thus, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to
find that Jones had violated Terms 10 and 17 of his probation.
[13] Nonetheless, we once again note that a single probation violation is enough to
support probation revocation. Pierce, 44 N.E.3d at 755. Thus, because there
was sufficient evidence to find that Jones had violated his probation by
committing a new criminal offense, we affirm the trial court’s decision to
revoke Jones’s probation.
[14] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1602-CR-297 | August 5, 2016 Page 7 of 7