In the Interest of: J.L., a Minor

J-S47001-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee

APPEAL OF: LANCASTER COUNTY
CHILDREN AND YOUTH SOCIAL SERVICE
AGENCY

No. 75 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Dispositional Order December 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-36-DP-0000110-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, LAZARUS, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2016

Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (“CYS” or

“the Agency”) appeals from the order dated December 7, 2015, and entered

on December 11, 2015, adjudicating a male child, J.L. (“Child”) (born in May

of 2015) dependent pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1), and finding

aggravated circumstances under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302.1 The order further

directed that, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6351, both S.L. (“Father”) and L.B.

(“Mother”) shall be granted a plan for reunification with Child and that CYS

____________________________________________

1
See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 508 (Pa. Super. 2007) (explaining that the
thirty-day appeal period is not triggered until the clerk makes a notation on
the docket that notice of entry of the order has been given) (citing Frazier
v. City of Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113 (Pa. 1999)).
J-S47001-16

shall submit a permanency plan to all counsel and the trial court for

approval. We affirm.

We summarize the history of this case as follows.2 In 2008, Father

and Mother were convicted of criminal homicide, endangering the welfare of

a child, and conspiracy to commit those offenses in relation to the April 2007

death of Father’s daughter, Q.L. (born in 1997), from a prior relationship.

Q.L. had suffered from cerebral palsy, was unable to speak, legally blind,

and wheelchair-bound. Q.L. was injured from an accidental hot water burn

while Mother was assisting her in a bathtub. Both Mother and Father failed

to seek appropriate medical treatment for Q.L. for eight days. Their failure

to assist Q.L. resulted in her injuries worsening and led to her death. After

Father and Mother were convicted of the above-stated crimes, they were

sentenced to serve prison terms in 2008. In May of 2014, after serving their

minimum sentences, Father and Mother were released on parole and will

remain subject to supervision until May of 2021. As a condition of her

parole, Mother is restricted her from being around children under the age of

twelve without supervision. Mother’s parole officer has prepared a petition

to remove that restriction. Father is not under any similar restriction.

____________________________________________

2
The trial court fully and aptly set forth a thorough recitation of the factual
background and procedural history of this appeal in its opinion filed pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 5, 2016. Trial Court Opinion, 2/5/16, at 1-
15.

-2-
J-S47001-16

In May of 2015, Child was born. On June 1, 2015, CYS filed a petition

seeking to adjudicate Child dependent, requesting a finding of aggravated

circumstances, and seeking a protective order. On June 1, 2015, the trial

court entered an order placing Child in the temporary legal and physical

custody of CYS.

On June 3, 2015, a master held a shelter care hearing. The trial court

entered a shelter care order on June 4, 2015, in which it found that the

return of Child to the home of his parents was not in his best interest and

ordered that temporary legal and physical custody remain with CYS, and

Child’s placement would remain in foster care. On June 12, 2015, the trial

court entered an order modifying Child’s placement to kinship care in the

home of Father’s niece, K.D., and her husband, L.D., while temporary legal

and physical custody remained with CYS.

On September 3, 2015, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing.

In an order entered on September 28, 2015, the trial court continued the

adjudicatory hearing. Based on the continuance of the hearing, on

October 15, 2015, the trial court entered an order finding the necessity for,

and appropriateness of, placement of Child. Child remained in the

temporary legal and physical custody of CYS.

On December 7, 2015, the trial court held the continued dependency

hearing. At the hearing, CYS presented the testimony of Jayme Suess, an

intake supervisor at CYS, Amanda Schreiber, the ongoing caseworker

-3-
J-S47001-16

assigned to Child, and K.D., who is the kinship caregiver for Child, N.T.,

12/7/15, at 5, 29, and 37. Father testified on his own behalf. Id. at 49.

In the order dated December 7, 2015, and entered on December 11,

2015, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent pursuant to the Juvenile

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1), and found aggravated circumstances under 42

Pa.C.S. § 6302. The order further directed that both Father and Mother shall

be granted a plan for reunification with Child, and CYS shall submit a

permanency plan to all counsel and the court for approval, pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. § 6351. On December 16, 2015, Father’s trial counsel entered an

appearance on behalf of Father.

On January 8, 2016, CYS timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(i) and (b). On January 13, 2016, the trial court entered an order

dated January 8, 2016, and effective December 7, 2015, appointing Mother’s

trial counsel, Attorney Daniel H. Shertzer, Jr., to represent Mother on

appeal.3 On January 14, 2016, the trial court entered an order dated

January 11, 2015, directing all parties except CYS to file answers to CYS’s

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement. The parties complied to the satisfaction of the

trial court.
____________________________________________

3
Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) designates the date of entry of an order as “the day on
which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the
order has been given as required by Pa.R.C.P. 236(b).” Pa.R.A.P. 108(b)
(emphasis added).

-4-
J-S47001-16

CYS presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in its disposition of [C]hild’s
dependency matter, when it ordered that CYS] was required to
make reunification efforts between Mother, [L.B.], and Father,
[S.L.], and [C]hild?

CYS’s Brief at 4.

CYS argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered

CYS to make efforts to reunify Mother, Father, and Child. CYS’s Brief at 11-

16. CYS asserts that the decision was manifestly unreasonable and was not

in Child’s best interest. CYS claims that it cannot identify any combination

of services to provide to Father and Mother to create a reasonable likelihood

that Child could be safely returned to the custody of one or both of the

parents. Id. at 10. CYS is confident that it is not in Child’s best interest to

make reunification efforts because there is no way to ensure, regardless of

the number and type of services put into place, that Child could be safely

returned to the custody of either Father or Mother and that Father and

Mother would prioritize the health and safety of Child. CYS’s Brief at 17.

Accordingly, CYS requests us to reverse the trial court order as it relates to

reunification. Id.

The guardian ad litem argues that the trial court did not err in ordering

a plan of reunification for Father, Mother, and Child. Rather, the guardian

ad litem asserts that, after finding aggravated circumstances, the trial court

examined the underlying facts and properly determined that reunification

efforts were appropriate. Father contends that there was ample evidence to

-5-
J-S47001-16

support a finding that it was appropriate to provide the parents with a

permanency plan containing a primary goal of reunification.

Our Supreme Court set forth our standard of review for dependency

cases as follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we
review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

Regarding the definition of an abuse of discretion, this Court has

stated the following:

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in
reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law,
or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either
manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.

Bulgarelli v. Bulgarelli, 934 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting

Arbet v. Arbet, 863 A.2d 34, 39 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

Additionally, “[t]he burden of proof in a dependency proceeding is on

the petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a child

meets that statutory definition of dependency.” In re G., T., 845 A.2d 870,

872 (Pa. Super. 2004). Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act defines a

“dependent child” as a child who:

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
education as required by law, or other care or control necessary
for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A

-6-
J-S47001-16

determination that there is a lack of proper parental care
or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the
parent, guardian or other custodian that places the
health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including
evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other custodian’s
use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places the
health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1) (emphasis added).

Section 6341 of the Juvenile Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) General rule.— After hearing the evidence on the petition
the court shall make and file its findings as to whether the child
is a dependent child. . . .

* * *

(c) Finding of Dependency.— If the court finds from clear and
convincing evidence that the child is dependent, the court shall
proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing, which shall
occur not later than 20 days after adjudication if the child has
been removed from his home, to make a proper disposition of
the case.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c).

In In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. 2002), a panel of this Court

stated:

[A] court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to make
a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets the
statutory definition by clear and convincing evidence. If the
court finds that the child is dependent, then the court may make
an appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child’s
physical, mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child
to remain with the parents subject to supervision, transferring
temporary legal custody to a relative or public agency, or
transferring custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42
Pa.C.S. § 6351(a).

-7-
J-S47001-16

Id. at 617. “The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care

and control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete

questions: whether the child presently is without proper care or control, and

if so, whether such care and control are immediately available.” Id. at 619

(citation omitted).

Section 6341(c.1) of the Juvenile Act addresses aggravated

circumstances and provides as follows:

(c.1) Aggravated circumstances.—If the county agency
or the child’s attorney alleges the existence of aggravated
circumstances and the court determines that the child is
dependent, the court shall also determine if aggravated
circumstances exist. If the court finds from clear and convincing
evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, the court shall
determine whether or not reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for removing the child from the home or to
preserve and reunify the family shall be made or continue to be
made and schedule a dispositional hearing as required by section
6341(c.1) (relating to disposition of dependent child).

42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.1).

Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act sets forth pertinent definitions of

various terms and defines “aggravated circumstances” as including the

following circumstance:

(2) The child or another child of the parent has been the victim
of physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual
violence or aggravated physical neglect by the parent.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302.

Regarding the placement of a child who has been adjudicated

dependent, this Court has explained:

-8-
J-S47001-16

When a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper
placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not on
what the parent wants or which goals the parent has achieved.
See In re Sweeney, 393 Pa. Super. 437, 574 A.2d 690, 691
(PA. Super. 1990) (noting that “[o]nce a child is adjudicated
dependent . . . the issues of custody and continuation of foster
care are determined by the child’s best interests”). Moreover,
although preserving the unity of the family is a purpose of the
Act, another purpose is to “provide for the care, protection,
safety, and wholesome mental and physical development of
children coming within the provisions of this chapter.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1). Indeed, “[t]he relationship of parent
and child is a status and not a property right, and one in which
the state has an interest to protect the best interest of the
child.” In re E.F.V., 315 Pa. Super. 246, 461 A.2d 1263, 1267
(Pa. Super. 1983).

In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Upon a careful review of the certified record in this matter, including

the testamentary and documentary evidence, we discern that the trial court

did not err or abuse its discretion in allowing Father and Mother an

opportunity to reunify with Child if they successfully complete a permanency

plan. We adopt the trial court’s opinion for its analysis in support of its

decision. Trial Court Opinion, 2/5/16, at 16-20. In addressing the claims of

CYS, the trial court appropriately noted the binding instructions of our

Supreme Court to this Court regarding appropriate appellate review of

dependency decisions set forth in R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Trial Court

Opinion, 2/5/16, at 22. We stress that the trial court emphasized that it has

ordered CYS to provide Father and Mother only:

with the opportunity to achieve reunification with [C]hild. It has
not ordered that reunification between the parents and the
[c]hild take place at this time, as that outcome is ultimately

-9-
J-S47001-16

dependent upon the completion by one or both parents of the
objectives set forth in [C]hild’s Permanency Plan which the
[c]ourt approved as part of the disposition. Further, to assure
that [C]hild’s interest in achieving timely permanency was
advanced, the [c]ourt directed that [C]hild’s Permanency Plan
incorporate a concurrent permanency goal of placement for
adoption.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/5/15, at 21-22 (emphasis in original). Accordingly,

we are constrained by R.J.T. to affirm the order of the trial court, which we

do on the basis of the trial court opinion.4

Order affirmed.

Judge Jenkins joins the Memorandum.

Judge Lazarus Concurs in the Result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/11/2016

____________________________________________

4
The parties are directed to attach a redacted copy of the February 5, 2016
opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.

- 10 -
 .:
Circulated 06/29/2016 03:11 PM

IN THE COURT OF COiv'IMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JUVENILE DIVISION

IN THE INTEREST OF Term No. CP-36-DP-110-2015
... Illmlllt (D.O.B. 5/./15) FID: 36-FN-70-2015

OPINION SUR APPEAL
This opinion addresses the appeal of the Lancaster cqgnt:rg
c: ..)<,.

Children and Youth Social Service Agency (hereinafter, the~ ld'
. ~ N
--.... ~
"Agency") of this Court's Order of Adjudication and Dispo~tion-

Child Dependent dated December 7, 2015, which was entered upon

the Clerk of Courts' docket on December 11, 2015.

The Agency's Notice of Appeal was timely filed on January 8,

2016.

At the hearing, the father, Slll~LIIIIIIIIII (hereinafter,

"Father") was present and was represented by Jeremy s.
Montgomery, Esquire, and mother, Lllllllt ~EIIII.. [ (hereinafter,

"Mother") was present and was represented by Daniel H. Shertzer,

Jr., Esquire. David J. Natan, Esquire, was present and

represented the Agency, and JoAnne Murphy, Esquire, was present

L,-- (hereinafter, the "Child") was not present due to his

tender age (as he was born on May - 2015).

The Agency alleges one error by this Court, specifically,

that this Court erred by ordering the Agency to make

reunification efforts between the Mother, the Father and the
Child after finding that aggravated circumstances were proven as

to both parents.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. ,Ji (hereinafter, the "Child") was born on

May It, 2015. (Agency's Petition for Temporary Custody)

2. ~ L ("Father") is the biological fat her of

the Child.

3. L••• B,••• ("Mother") is the biological mother of

the Child.

4. Mother had been a care giver for Father's children for

some years before she and Father entered into a relationship,

and, as such, was familiar with them and their needs. (N.T.

9/3/2015 at pages 34-36)

5. Father was responsible for the personal needs and care

of his son S~, .... , when that child was an infant. (N.T.

9/3/2015 at pages 89-92)

6. Father and Mother began a personal relationship about

the year 2005. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 23)

7. During or about April, 2007, Father and Mother had been

living together, in Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, for

approximately four months, having moved there from Cleveland,·

Ohio, in 2006. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 7)

8. In addition to Father and Mother, their household then

consisted of Father's

-2-
years of age) and Q .. lllllll {then ten years of age) and Mother's

{then nine years of age), and Father and Mother's

children B.. llllt (then two years of age) and ~ (then one

year of age). {N.T. 9/3/2015 at pages 6-7, page 22, and page 61)

9. Father and another woman (not his former wife) share a

daughter, 8..... S••• who is presently approximately

twenty-two years of age and who recently graduated from college.

When Father and Mother moved from Cleveland, Ohio, to Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania, that daughter remained in Ohio. {N.T. 9/3/2015 at

page 67; N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 60 and pages 70-72)

10. Father is also the father of J Bllllt, who is

approximately sixteen years of age. Father did not learn of this

child until she was five years of age and he has not been

involved in raising her. {N.T. 12/7/15 at pages 70-71)

11. Father and Mother previously had an additional child

together, but lost that child to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.

(N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 21)

12. Father's daughter Qillllllll suffered from cerebral palsy

from birth; she was unable to speak, was legally blind, and was

wheelchair bound. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 10)

13. Before the family left Ohio, was involved in

weekly physical therapy. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 89)

14. After they moved to Harrisburg and before the tragic

events described below took place, Father and Mother saw to it

-3-
that Qllllllllllllkhad appropriate medical care and physical therapy

at Hershey Medical Center. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 88)

15. Father's son 8~111191, Jr., suffers from hydroencephalitis

and has a drainage shunt installed between his head and his

stomach. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 16 and page 37)

16. Before the tragic events described below took place and

from the time sllllt, Jr., was an infant, Father actively

participated in the care of Smllilt, Jr.'s special and ordinary

needs. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at pages 89-90)

17. After they moved to Harrisburg and before the tragic

events described below took place, Father was working two full

time jobs in order to support the household, while Mother was a

stay at home parent. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at pages 18-19)

18. Despite his demanding work schedule, Father was an

involved parent who found time for his children. (N.T. 9/3/2015

at page 43)

19. Mother had come from a troubled home where she had

fulfilled parental duties when she was a child (due to her own

mother's drug addiction). She nevertheless had earned her

G.E.D., participated in the Jobs Corps when she was approximately

nineteen years of age, and obtained education as a certified

nurse assistant and also had trained to be a home health aid

assistant. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 13 and page 27)

-4-
 20. Mother was twenty-seven years of age in April, 2007,

when Q 's injuries and subsequent death occurred, as

described below. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 26)

21. At the time that Father and Mother were arrested (in

April 2007) because of the events described below, the three

children in their household who were of school age (Qlllllllit
8.... , Jr. , and BF () were appropriately enrolled in and

attending school programs designed to meet their needs. (N. T.

9/3/2015 at page 39)

22. On or about April 22, 2007, Father's daughter QIIIIIII..
was accidentally scalded while in Mother's care. (N.T. 9/3/2015

at pages 14-16)

23. Qlll....lltls scalding
1 injuries were severe and consisted

of third degree burns covering her back, the back of her arms,

and the back and bottom of her left foot. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page

9; N.T. 12/7/15 at page 14 and pages 36-37; Petitioner's

Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 5 of 12/7/15)

24. The severity of Qllllllllt's injuries was not immediately

apparent to Mother, as there was no immediate blistering. (N.T.

9/3/2015 at page 21)

25. Mother hesitated to seek professional medical care for

Q because of concerns she had that Father's children might

be placed in foster care. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 16)

-5-
 26. Father was concerned about Qlllllllltwhen her injuries

occurred, but Mother assured Father that Mother was able to care

for her. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 17)

27. Mother believed that her medical training enabled her

to adequately care for Qllllllllt (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 36)

28. During the days which followed, Mother continued to

feed Q and to monitor Q~'s condition, and she

assured Father that the child was progressing. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at

pages 17-18, page 37, and pages 59-60)

29. Father checked regularly on~ during the days

which followed her injury, but did not observe the extent of her

injuries during that time, as he relied on Mother's reports.

(N.T. 9/3/2015 at pages 60-63)

30. Based upon what Mother told him, Father believed that

Q was well enough to attend school during the week which

followed her injury and that she was in fact attending school.

(N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 44)

31. On the morning of the eighth day after Q.. lllllllwas

injured, Mother discovered that the child's appearance had

changed and her breathing was labored. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page

18)

32. Mother informed Father about Qllllll..'s worsened

condition. Father performed CPR and directed Mother to call

-6-
9-1-1. It was at that time that Father for the first time

observed the full extent of Q~s injuries. (N.T. 9/3/2015

at page 18, pages 62-63)

33. By the time that medical intervention was sought,

Q 's condition had deteriorated to the point that she could

not be revived. Q••••died that day, April 27, 2007. (N.T.

9/3/15 at pages 14-16 and page 18)

34. Q~died as a result of complications ensuing from

her scalding injury, and those complications could have been

prevented with appropriate medical intervention. (Petitioner's

Exhibit 5 of 12/7/2015)

35. As depicted by photographs taken during the post mortem

examination conducted upon Q~'s body, the child's injuries

were extensive and gruesome. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3

of 12/7/2015)

36. Both Father and Mother were charged with criminal

homicide (a felony of the first degree), endangering the welfare

of children by a parent or guardian (a felony of the third

degree), and separate counts of conspiracy relative to the

homicide and endangering charges (and, accordingly, felonies of

the first and third degree, respectively).1

The Court takes judicial notice of the information found at Docket
Number CP-22-CR-0002451-2007 in respect to Father and at Docket Number CP-22-
CR-0002457-2007 in respect to Mother as found in CPCMS in respect to Findings
of Fact 36. through 40.

-7-
 37. Father was convicted of all charges on June 26, 2008,

at the conclusion of a jury trial.

38. Father was subsequently sentenced on July 24, 2008, to

a term of confinement of seven to fourteen years.

39. Mother was convicted of all charges by guilty pleas

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Pennsylvania, on May 23, 2008.

40. Mother was sentenced on May 23, 2008, to a term of

confinement of seven to fourteen years.

41.

culpability

10)
for the death of Q-.
At the time of her guilty pleas, Mother acknowledged

{N. T. 9/3/2015 at page

42. While Father was incarcerated, Father elected to

participate in the training and education which was available to

him. Specifically, Father earned his G.E.D. and successfully

completed Victim Awareness Education, the Violence Prevention -

Moderate program, Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

training, the National Center for Construction Education and

Research's Core Curricula course, the NCCER's HVAC Level One

course, the NCCER's HVAC Level Two course, the AC&R Safety

Coalition's training in safe handling of R-410A, the F.D.I.C.

Money Smart Course, a 15 hour seminar on Small Business

Ownership, and 165 hours of instruction in Vocational Warehouse

Operations & Forklift Certification. {N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 64

-8-
and 77; N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 78; Father's Exhibit 1 of

9/3/2015)

43. Father was released from incarceration on May 6, 2014,

at the expiration of his seven years minimum term. (N.T.

9/3/2015 at page 49)

44. During her incarceration, Mother took two different

parenting classes, performed hospice services, took a course

entitled Thinking For A Change, took violence prevention classes 1

participated in a weight loss program1 and participated in a

program referred to as the "puppy program". (N.T. 9/3/2015 at

page 12)

45. Mother was released from incarceration on May 7, 2014,

at the expiration of her minimum term. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page

11)

46. Both Father and Mother will remain subject to state

parole supervision until May, 2021. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at pages 49-

50)

47. A condition of Mother's parole is that she must be

supervised by a responsible adult if she is around a child who is

under the age of twelve years. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 11)

48. Father has no criminal history other than for the

convictions he sustained in relation to the charges filed in

connection with ~s death, except for a receiving stolen

property conviction in Ohio he received when he was eighteen

-9-
years of age and for which he successfully completed six months

of probation. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 50-51)

49. Mother has no criminal history other than for the

convictions she sustained in relation to the charges filed in

connection with C9llllllla' s death. (N.T. 9/3/2007 at page 7)

50. Neither Father nor Mother has had any violations of

their parole. (N.T. 9/3/2007 at page 22 and page 50)

51. Neither Father nor Mother had any, involvement with a

Children and Youth agency or a similar agency before the incident

relating to Q-'s death. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 39 and page

54)

52. Following Father's arrest in April 2007, Father's child

with his now former wife, S~, Jr., returned to live with his

mother in Ohio. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 53)

53. As a result of their arrest and incarceration, Mother's

son B~ and Father and Mother's children B•••• and BB••••
were placed by the Dauphin County Social Services for Children

and Youth, and their parental rights to these children were

subsequently involuntarily terminated. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 6

and pages 53-54i N.T. 12/7/2015 at pages 17-18)

54. Father completed a mental health evaluation in July,

2013, which indicated that Father did not require any mental

health services. (N.T. 9/~/2015 at page SSi Father's Exhibit 2

of 12/7/2015 at page 1 of 5)

-10-
 55. Since Mother's .release from incarceration, she

underwent a mental health evaluation that indicated no further

treatment was necessary. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 13)

56. Soon after their release from incarceration, Father and

Mother resumed their relationship. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at pages 24-

25)

57. During or about April, 2015, Mother contacted the

Agency herself to report that she was pregnant because she did

not want to hide anything from the Agency. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at

page 28)

58. At about that same time, the Agency noted a referral

with concerns that the parents had been incarcerated and their

parental rights to another child had been terminated. (N.T.

12/7/2015 at pages 6-7)

59. The Agency next received a referral on May 30, 2015, to

the effect that the Child had been born at Women's and Babies

Hospital in Lancaster. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 7)

60. The Agency caseworker went to the hospital to inquire

of the parents if there were other resources for the Child due to

the Agency's concerns. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 7)

61. There were environmental concerns regarding the home in

which the parents were living so the Agency was granted temporary

legal and physical custody of the Child. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at

pages 7-9)

-11-
 62. The Shelter Care Hearing was held June 3, 2015, at

which time temporary legal and physical custody of the Child were

granted to the Agency. (Master's Recommendation for Shelter

Care)

63. A kinship resource (specifically, Father's niece) was

identified and the Child was moved to the kinship home on June

12, 2015. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 79; N.T. 12/7/2015 at pages 9-

10)

64. Mother is employed as a cashier at a Dollar Tree store

on a full-time basis. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 12 and page 30)

65. The parents are having supervised weekly visits with

the Child. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 12)

66, The parents attend all the visits with the Child.

(N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 22)

67. Both Father and Mother interact with the Child during

the visits. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at pages 29-30)

68. The caseworker does not have to intervene during the

visits with the Child. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 30)

69. The Agency has no concerns regarding the visits between

the parents and the Child. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 13)

70. The parents attended three of the Child's four

scheduled medical appointments which had occurred before the

final hearing date. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 26)

-12-
 71. As of the first hearing date (on September 3, 2015),

Father was forty years of age and Mother was thirty-six years of

age. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 26 and page 51)

72. Mother has learned that she cannot do everything by

herself and she will seek the appropriate help in taking care of

the Child. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 27)

73. Mother accepts responsibility for what happened to

Quiniece and she is remorseful about her actions at that time.

Father also accepts responsibility for his daughter's death.

(N.T. 9/3/2015 at pages 27-28, page 40, and page 79)

74. The present parole restriction requiring that Mother be

supervised around children under the age of twelve years can be

modified in the event the Child is returned to her care. Father

and Mother's state parole officer has prepared a petition for

Mother's restriction regarding no unsupervised contact with

children under the age of twelve years to be removed. (N.T.

9/3/2015 at pages 28-29i N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 76)

75. Father and Mother will cooperate with the Agency

9aseworker in respect to services. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 26 and

page 81)

76. Father and Mother have proactively worked on strategies

to better address decision making in the future. Father utilizes

the practice of journalling to help him think through issues and

-13-
limit responses born of emotional reaction. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at

page 78; N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 68)

77. Mother and Father began attending parenting classes

(specifically, the COBYS Family Nurturing Program2) on their own

volition and have successfully completed the course. (N.T.

9/3/2015 at page 29; N.T. 12/7/2015 at pages 52-53)

78. Since about February, 2015, Father has been

successfully self-employed as an electrician, and he has a steady

stream of work which he performs as a sub-contractor. Father's

work hours are adjustable so that he has flexibility to care for

the Child. Father has been offered a position as an employee of

an electrical company, which position would include benefits.

(N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 31, pages 58-59, and pages 65-66; N.T.

12/7/2015 at page 61-62)

79. Mother has no drug or alcohol contingencies as terms of

her parole; with the exception of the condition previously

mentioned regarding contact with children under twelve years of

age, all Mother is required to do is to maintain employment and

housing. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 32)

80. Father's terms of parole require him to maintain

employment; further, he is subject to random drug screens. There

are no parole restrictions regarding Father and children. (N.T.

9/3/2015 at page 50 and page 58)

2 The Court is aware that this program is sponsored and endorsed by
the Agency.

-14-
 81. Father proposes to live in a two bedroom apartment with

the Child. Father moved to the two bedroom apartment on

September 9, 2015. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 72; N.T. 12/7/2015 at

page 51)

82. Father has a crib and the other necessities to care for

the Child. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 72)

83. Father has extended family in the area. Father's

sister-in-law is available to care for the Child while he is at

work, and if she is not, Father is capable of obtaining

appropriate alternative child care. (N.T. 9/3/2015 at page 59

and page 66)

84. Father's daughter, who is 22 years old and presently

lives in Ohio, is available to care for the Child and would move

in with Father if necessary. (N.T. 12/7/2015 at pages 54-55, 60)

85. Mother is not listed as a tenant on the lease of

Father's apartment, and she is not living with Father there.

(N.T. 12/7/2015 at page 51 and page 58)

86. Both parents express that their concern as parents for

the Child are their first priority. Mother is willing to

separate from Father if the Child is returned to Father's care.

Father believes the Child needs both Mother and himself, but if

he is required to not have Mother present, he will abide by that.

(N.T. 9/3/2015 at pages 41-42 and pages 47-48; N.T. 12/7/2015 at

page 69)

-15-
 CONCLUSION OF LAW

The record amply supports the Court's decision, in a proper

exercise of its discretion, that the Agency shall make reasonable

efforts toward the reunification of the parents with the Child.

DISCUSSION

After hearing the extensive testimony in this case, the

Court determined in its sound discretion that the Agency should

be required to make efforts at reunification between the parents

and the Child despite the finding of aggravated circumstances.

The Agency, in its appeal, claims that the Court "erred in

its disposition." The Court's disposition included a· directive

that the Agency develop a Child's Permanency Plan establishing a

primary placement goal of reunification and a concurrent

placement goal of adoption.

The law defines the term "aggravated circumstances" to

include, in portions relevant to this case, when:

The parent of the child has been convicted of criminal

homicide under 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to criminal

homicide) [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 "Aggravated

Circumstances" (3) (i)]

The parent of the child has been convicted of

conspiracy to commit such crime. [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302

"Aggravated Circumstances"]

-16-
 The parental rights of the parent have been

involuntarily terminated with respect to a child of the

parent. [42 Pa.C.S.A. s 6302 "Aggravated

Circumstances" (5))

In the instant case, it is indisputable that the Agency

proved by clear and convincing evidence the existence of

aggravated circumstances as to both Father and Mother in respect

to each of these distinct statutory bases. The Court made the

requisite findings.

A finding of aggravated circumstances permits, but does not

require, the Court to relieve the Agency of the responsibility to

make reasonable efforts to reunify a family. The relevant

portion of the Juvenile Act provides:

If the court finds from clear and convincing
evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, the court
shall determine whether or not reasonable efforts to
prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child
from the home or to preserve and reunify the family
shall be made or continue to be made and schedule a
hearing as required in section 6351 (e) (3) (relating to
disposition of dependent child). 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341
(c .1) . (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, the existence of aggravated circumstances does

not bring to a halt the Court's necessary inquiry into whether

the Agency should be ordered to make reasonable efforts to

support family reunification. Rather, the statute confers

authority upon the Court to order that such efforts be made in

the Court's discretion. After finding the existence of

-17-
aggravated circumstances, the Court's decision whether to pur sue

reunification is made on a case-by-case basis. In re R.P., 956

A.2d 449, 455 (Pa.Super. 2008)

In approaching this case, as with every juvenile dependency

matter; the Court is guided by the first stated purpose of the

Juvenile Act, that being "[t]o preserve the unity of the family

whenever possible." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 (b) (1). In essence,

within the context of juvenile dependency, the reunification of a

child found to be dependent with that child's parents is the

fundamental objective of the law for so long as the child's

paramount interests in respect to safety, timely permanency and

well-being are served. See In the Interest of C.B. and A.L., 861

A.2d 287 (Pa.Super., 2004).

There is no question that there is a history of tragedy in

this case. An accident led to horrific injuries to a child of

just ten years of age; a combination of ignorance, medical

neglect, and misapprehended priorities on the part of the parents

extended the child's suffering and led to her death. Those sad

realities are not lost on the Court. It was evident in the

course of the hearing that those sad realities and their

consequences are not lost upon the parents either. Father, whose

prior involvement in the criminal justice system was negligible,

and Mother, who had no prior involvement in the criminal justice

system whatsoever, each served seven years in state prison.

-18-
Father and Mother lost their parental rights to two children and

Mother lost her parental rights to her son by an prior

relationship as a result. Rather than despair or sink into anti-

social behaviors, they each took extensive, even extraordinary,

steps in respect to their personal rehabilitation. Of great

significance, they each have accepted personal responsibility for

what happened and each is appropriately remorseful.

But the Court's focus must be upon where the needs of the

Child will be best met, as the Child's needs are paramount.

Here, the parents have actively engaged in a process of re-

ordering their daily lives and, importantly, the dynamics of

their own relationship so as to place the needs of the Child

ahead of their own needs. They are more mature than they were

and their relationship is more mature than it was when the tragic

death of the child occurred in 2007. They have not put mere

voice to the principle of parental responsibility, they have

acted upon it. Notably, it was Mother who invited the Agency to

look into the parents' circumstances before the Child was born.

Together they have undertaken and completed the parenting program

which the Agency routinely requires parents to take. They have

each expressed a willingness to go to all ends to convince the

Court and the Agency that they are worthy of having the Child

returned to them. Father has acquired valuable skills which,

through his hard work and commitment, have enabled him to provide

-19-
amply for the Child. He has assembled a home which will be more

than sufficient for the Child, and has made arrangements to

assure that the Child will be cared for at all times. Both

parents are willing to sacrifice their mutual relationship if

that is necessary in order to secure for Father the opportunity

to parent the Child. The Court was struck by the sincerity and

credibility which both Father and Mother displayed during the

course of their testimony.

It is often said that past performance is the best predictor

of future performance. In this case, the Agency urged the Court

to embrace the sad events of April, 2007, as the sole measure of

these parents' past performance. However, the sad and complex

circumstances of the last week of April, 2007, were an apparent

aberration when considered in the context of the totality of the

circumstances. Credit must be given to Father and Mother for

their hard work and commitment toward building a successful

blended family which preceded the tragedy. Father worked two

full time jobs which afforded him little time for sleep, but he

still managed to be an active, involved parent. Mother took on

the responsibility of caring for and nurturing two special needs

children who were not her own in addition to parenting three

children of her own. The five children in their household were

appropriately fed, clothed, housed, and educated, and their

ordinary and special medical needs were met. It is not difficult

-20-
to imagine the enormous amount of energy and devotion which was

required of both Father and Mother during that time.

While the Court cannot ignore or endorse the medical neglect

which caused the death of a childr the Court can readily envision

that these parentsr who are now mature1 psychologically and

physically capabler andr above allr who are focusedr highly

motivated1 and committed to the Child1 present a strong

likelihood that the Child1s needs for safety and well-being will

not only be secure but will be highly valued and exceeded should

he eventually be returned to their care. The Court has

confidence that these parents will complete the objectives of the

Child1s Permanency Plan which the Court awarded them to enable

the Child to be reunited with them in a timely manner. This is a

case where the preservation of the unity of the family is not

just possibility1 but where it is the most probable outcome.

That being said1 it must be noted that the Court has found

dependency and has ordered the Agency to provide these parents

with the opportunity to achieve reunification with the Child. It

has not ordered that reunification between the parents and the

Child take place at this timer as that outcome is ultimately

dependent upon the completion by one or both parents of the

objectives set forth in the Child s 1 Permanency Plan which the

Court approved as part of the disposition. Furtherr to assure

that the Child s 1 interest in achieving timely permanency was

-21-
advanced, the Court directed that the Child's Permanency Plan

incorporate a concurrent permanency goal of placement for

adoption.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has offered highly

relevant observations about the role of the trial court compared

with the role of the appellate court in juvenile dependency cases

where a decision regarding a child's placement goals is at issue.

In his majority opinion in the case In the Interest of R.J.T., a

Minor, Justice Max Baer wrote as follows:

This case epitomizes why appellate courts must
employ an abuse of discretion standard of review, as we
are not in a position to make the close calls based on
fact-specific determinations. Not only are our trial
judges observing the parties during the hearing, but
usually, as in this case, they have presided over
several other hearings with the same parties and have a
longitudinal understanding of the case and the best
interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we
must defer to the trial judges who see and hear the
parties and can determine the credibility to be placed
on each witness and, premised thereon, gauge the
likelihood of the success of the current permanency
plan. Even if an appellate court would have made a
different conclusion based on the cold record, we are
not in a position to reweigh the evidence and the
credibility determinations of the trial court. The
Superior Court in this case did just that in
highlighting negative information regarding Parents.
Moreover, the Superior Court did not conclude that the
trial court's findings of fact were not supported by
the record. Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior
Court erred in reevaluating the evidence. 608 Pa. 9,
27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010).

The Agency charges the Court with abusing its discretion by

ordering the Agency to support reunification efforts. An abuse

of discretion must be demonstrated by manifest unreasonableness,

-22-
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Christianson v. Ely,
575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (2003).

There simply is no basis to suggest that this Court has

abused its discretion in the instant case. Rather, the Court's

decision to establish reunification with the parents as the

primary placement goal for the Child is well grounded in the

facts of record in this case.

CONCLUSION

The Agency's appeal is without merit. The Order of

Adjudication and Disposition-Child Dependent dated December 7,

2015, and entered upon the docket on December 11, 2015, should be

Lch , ~
=
cY'
~
lr.:"'i
01:i
0
ATTEST: C,;."1
...,,
::x

Copies to:
~
·~
N -
-0
j:,..
David J. Natan, Esquire, Counsel for Children and Youth Agency
Jeremy s. Montgomery, Esquire, Counsel for Father
Daniel H. Shertzer, Jr., Esquire, Counsel for Mother
JoAnne Murphy, Esquire, Guardian ad litem

-23-