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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: M.R.B. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER : No. 180 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered December 18, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s): 2015-0125
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2016
Appellant, J.B. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the York
County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of the York
County Offices of Children, Youth & Families (“CYF”) for involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights to her minor child (born January
2009), M.R.B. (“Child”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On August 11, 2015, CYF filed an application for emergency protective
custody of Child, based on allegations of abandonment. Specifically, CYF
learned that sometime in early July 2014, Mother decided she could no
longer perform parental duties for Child and left Child in the care of Mother’s
father (“Maternal Grandfather”). Maternal Grandfather was unable to care
for Child, so he contacted Wesley Pritt, Child’s second cousin, to see if Mr.
1
The court also granted CYF’s petition for involuntary termination of Father’s
parental rights. Father has not challenged that decision.
_____________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Pritt and his wife were willing to parent Child. After several requests, Mr.
and Mrs. Pritt agreed; and Child began living with the Pritts and their three
children on July 14, 2014. The Pritts tried to enroll Child in school but were
unable to do so because they did not have legal custody of Child. When
Child came to live with the Pritts, she was one year behind in school. Child
also needed medical attention regarding a dental issue. The court granted
CYF’s application and awarded CYF temporary legal and physical custody of
Child; and CYF continued Child’s placement with the Pritts. The court held a
shelter care hearing on August 13, 2015, after which the court awarded legal
and physical custody of Child to CYF; and CYF continued Child’s placement
with the Pritts. CYF filed a petition for adjudication of dependency on August
14, 2015. Following a dependency hearing, the court adjudicated Child
dependent on October 13, 2015, with a goal of adoption.2
Since July 2014, Child has been living in the care of others. On
October 27, 2015, CYF filed a petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights. The court held a termination hearing on December 18,
2015. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties incorporated into the
record the proceedings and filings docketed in the related dependency
action. Marilyn Monkowski testified that she is an intake caseworker for CYF.
Ms. Monkowski said Mother currently resides in Delaware, and there is no
2
The Family Court in Sussex County, Delaware, previously adjudicated Child
dependent on July 11, 2011, based on Mother’s abandonment of Child. The
Delaware Family Court returned Child to Mother’s custody on January 8,
2013.
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evidence that Mother is able to maintain and obtain safe, stable, and
appropriate housing for herself and Child. Mother did not provide CYF with
any documentation of a lawful source of income. Mother made no requests
to CYF since Child’s adjudication of dependency to visit with Child or for
services. Ms. Monkowski said CYF offered Mother family group decision-
making services as well as one-way transportation for Mother to visit Child.
Mother declined CYF’s offer of transportation to visit Child. Mother
participated in the family group decision-making by speakerphone, at which
time CYF arranged for appropriate times for Mother to call Mr. Pritt to speak
with Child. Mother called Mr. Pritt for the first time on the morning of the
termination hearing. Ms. Monkowski confirmed that Child is doing well in the
Pritts’ care, attending school, and participating in play therapy. Ms.
Monkowski said Child refers to the Pritts as mom and dad. Ms. Monkowski
stated Child has no bond with Mother. Ms. Monkowski opined termination of
Mother’s parental rights would give Child the permanency she needs so the
Pritts can adopt Child.
Mr. Pritt testified Child moved in with his family in July 2014. After
Child moved in with the Pritts in July 2014, Mother did not attempt to
contact Child or send Child any cards or presents. Mother also provided no
financial support for Child. Mr. Pritt said he called Mother a few times and
told Mother she could call him anytime to speak with Child or learn about
Child’s wellbeing; Mother told Mr. Pritt she was too scared to call. While
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living with the Pritts, Child admitted looking at pornography on an IPad. Mr.
Pritt learned Child had been exposed to sexual behavior while previously
living with Mother. Child also told Mr. Pritt she had seen Mother use drugs in
the past. Mr. Pritt said Child is doing great in his care and excelling in
school. Mr. Pritt stated Child rarely asks about Mother but does ask about
Child’s brother, who resides with Mother. Mr. Pritt confirmed his willingness
to let Child visit her brother and Mother, even if the court terminates
Mother’s parental rights.
Mother testified by speakerphone. Mother stated she currently resides
in Delaware and has been attending a methadone clinic since February 2015.
Mother admitted she is unemployed and seeking employment. Mother lives
with her boyfriend, who is also unemployed. Mother claimed she was
unaware Child was living with the Pritts until six or seven months after Child
began living with them. Mother thought Child was still living with Maternal
Grandfather during that time. Mother admitted she did not contact the
police or report Child as missing when she was uncertain of Child’s
whereabouts. Mother said she was afraid to contact the Pritts after she
learned Child was living with them because Maternal Grandfather told her
the Pritts did not want Mother to call them. Mother conceded she last saw
Child in July 2014, and has performed no parental duties since then.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted CYF’s petition for
involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child. On January 15,
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2016, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal incorrectly under the Juvenile
Court’s dependency docket number. Mother filed a second notice of appeal
on January 27, 2016, along with a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), under the correct Orphans’
Court docket number.
Mother raises two issues for our review:
DID MOTHER PRESERVE HER APPELLATE RIGHTS BY
TIMELY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL EVEN THOUGH IT
WAS FILED IN THE CLERK OF COURT’S OFFICE RATHER
THAN THE ORPHANS’ COURT?
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND
ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN TERMINATING MOTHER’S
PARENTAL RIGHTS WHEN [CYF] FAILED TO MEET ITS
BURDEN THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS
WARRANTED UNDER 23 PA.C.S. SECTION 2511(A)(1) AND
(A)(2) IN THAT OBSTACLES WERE PUT IN MOTHER’S WAY
WHICH PREVENTED HER FROM LOCATING HER CHILD AND
PERFORMING PARENTAL DUTIES?
(Mother’s Brief at 3).
In her first issue, Mother argues she timely filed her notice of appeal
on January 15, 2016 from the court’s December 18, 2015 termination order
but inadvertently filed the notice of appeal under the docket number for the
dependency action. Mother admits she should have filed her notice of
appeal in the Orphans’ Court. Mother asserts she filed a second notice of
appeal from the termination order on January 27, 2016, in the Orphans’
Court under the correct docket number. Mother maintains she filed her Rule
1925(a)(2)(i) statement along with the January 27, 2016 notice of appeal.
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Mother insists this Court should consider the current appeal timely where
she filed the initial notice of appeal within the requisite thirty-day timeframe
but filed it in the wrong office. Mother acknowledges her concise statement
was not filed contemporaneously with her initial notice of appeal. Mother
emphasizes, however, that the belated filing of her concise statement did
not prejudice CYF. Mother concludes this Court should consider her appeal
timely and excuse the late filing of her concise statement. We agree.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 905 provides, in relevant
part:
Rule 905. Filing of Notice of Appeal
(a) Filing with clerk.
(1) Two copies of the notice of appeal, the order for
transcript, if any, and the proof of service required by Rule
906 (service of notice of appeal), shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court. …
(2) If the appeal is a children’s fast track appeal, the
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal as
described in Rule 1925(a)(2) shall be filed with the notice
of appeal and served in accordance with Rule 1925(b)(1).
(3) Upon receipt of the notice of appeal the clerk shall
immediately stamp it with the date of receipt, and that
date shall constitute the date when the appeal was taken,
which date shall be shown on the docket.
(4) If a notice of appeal is mistakenly filed in an
appellate court, or is otherwise filed in an incorrect office
within the unified judicial system, the clerk shall
immediately stamp it with the date of receipt and transmit
it to the clerk of the court which entered the order
appealed from, and upon payment of an additional filing
fee the notice of appeal shall be deemed filed in the
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trial court on the date originally filed.
Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(1-4) (emphasis added). See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)
(stating in children’s fast track appeal, concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal shall be filed and served with notice of appeal as
required by Rule 905). Rule 905(a)(2) is procedural, not jurisdictional. In
re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa.Super. 2009). Thus, non-compliance
with Rule 905(a)(2) results in a defective notice of appeal, subject to a case-
by-case waiver analysis and disposition. Id. (declining to quash or dismiss
appeal or to waive issues, in light of purpose to expedite disposition of
children’s fast track appeals, where mother filed her concise statement three
days after notice of appeal and late filing did not prejudice other parties in
case).
Instantly, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal from the court’s
December 18, 2015 termination order on January 15, 2016, but she
inadvertently filed it under the Juvenile Court’s dependency docket instead
of the correct Orphans’ Court docket. Mother’s initial appeal was docketed in
this Court at 132 MDA 2016. On January 27, 2016, Mother filed an
amended notice of appeal from the court’s termination order under the
correct Orphans’ Court docket number, along with a Rule 1925(a)(2)(i)
statement, which was docketed in this Court at 180 MDA 2016. The notice
of appeal in the certified record for the present appeal at 180 MDA 2016
contains multiple timestamps indicating the notice of appeal was received by
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the York County Judicial Center on January 15, 2016, and received in the
Orphans’ Court division on January 27, 2016. Mother’s initial filing on
January 15, 2016, preserved that filing date for purposes of the timeliness of
this appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(4). Thus, we consider Mother’s appeal,
docketed in this Court at 180 MDA 2016, as timely filed.3 Additionally,
Mother’s delayed Rule 1925 statement did not prejudice any other party in
this case. Under these circumstances, and in light of the purpose to
expedite disposition of children’s fast track appeals, we decline to dismiss
the appeal or to waive Mother’s claims. See In re K.T.E.L., supra.
In her second issue, Mother argues she did not know where Child was
living for a significant period. Specifically, Mother asserts that, when she
learned Maternal Grandfather had placed Child in the Pritts’ care, Mother did
not know how to contact the Pritts; so she could not fulfill her responsibilities
to parent Child. Mother contends that she left Child in Maternal
Grandfather’s care and expected to regain custody of Child in the future.
When Mother learned Child was living with the Pritts, Mother still believed
she would regain custody of Child, once CYF became involved in this case;
but CYF denied her that chance. Mother emphasizes that CYF set the goal in
this case as adoption upon Child’s adjudication of dependency and did not
attempt to reunify Mother and Child. Mother avers CYF gave up on her
before allowing her an opportunity to show she was capable of caring for
3
In a separate judgment order, we dismiss the companion appeal at 132
MDA 2016 as duplicative.
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Child. Mother concludes CYF failed to show Mother evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Child required under 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), and this Court must reverse the order granting
involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights.4 We disagree.
The standard and scope of review applicable in termination of parental
rights cases are as follows:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent
evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law,
or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has
granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental
rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision
the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict.
We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s
decision is supported by competent evidence.
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of
fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses
and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by [the]
finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking
termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the existence of grounds for doing so.
The standard of clear and convincing evidence means
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
4
Mother also alleges CYF failed to meet its burden for involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother
failed to raise this claim in her concise statement, so it is waived. See
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005) (holding
generally that any issues not raised in Rule 1925 concise statement will be
deemed waived on appeal); In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super. 2007)
(explaining waiver rules under Rule 1925 apply in context of family law
cases). Mother does not contest the court’s termination decision under
Section 2511(b).
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as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
exists for the result reached. If the trial court’s findings
are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even though the record could support an
opposite result.
In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
The court granted CYF’s petition for involuntary termination of
Mother’s parental rights on the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for [her] physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied
by the parent.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing
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and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1-2), (b). “Satisfaction of any one subsection of
Section 2511(a), along with consideration of Section 2511(b), is sufficient
for involuntary termination of parental rights.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
758 (Pa.Super. 2008).
A court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) where
the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a
child or fails to perform parental duties for at least the six months prior to
the filing of the termination petition. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa.Super.
2000) (en banc). “Although it is the six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition that is most critical to the analysis, the trial court must
consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the
six-month statutory provision.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855
(Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005). The
court must examine the individual circumstances of each case to determine
if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, warrants
termination. Id.
“Under [S]ection 2511, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated
process.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa.Super. 2009).
The initial focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
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seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies at least one of
the nine statutory grounds delineated in section 2511(a).
If the trial court determines that the parent’s conduct
warrants termination under section 2511(a), then it must
engage in an analysis of the best interests of the
child…under section 2511(b), taking into primary
consideration the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs of the child.
* * *
[A] best interest of the child analysis under [section]
2511(b) requires consideration of intangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability. To this end, this Court has
indicated that the trial court must also discern the nature
and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention
to the effect on the child of permanently severing the
bond. Moreover, in performing a “best interests”
analysis[, t]he court should also consider the importance
of continuity of relationships to the child, because severing
close parental ties is usually extremely painful. The court
must consider whether a natural parental bond exists
between child and parent, and whether termination would
destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.
Most importantly, adequate consideration must be given to
the needs and welfare of the child.
Id. at 10-12 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 2511 outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of
care that parents must provide for their children and a parent who cannot or
will not meet the requirements may properly be considered unfit and have
her parental rights terminated. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007 (Pa.Super.
2001).
There is no simple or easy definition of parental
duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation
to the needs of a child. A child needs love,
protection, guidance, and support. These needs,
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physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child.
Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires
affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a
financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in
the child and a genuine effort to maintain
communication and association with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor,
parental duty requires that a parent exert [herself]
to take and maintain a place of importance in the
child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of …her ability, even in difficult circumstances.
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve
the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship.
In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “a
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of…her child is
converted, upon the failure to fulfill…her parental duties, to the child’s right
to have proper parenting and fulfillment of…her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856.
“When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond
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between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., supra at 762-63.
“Above all else[,] adequate consideration must be given to the needs and
welfare of the child. A parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child,
alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights.” In re Z.P., supra at
1121.
Additionally, neither Section 2511(a) nor Section 2511(b) requires a
court to consider at the termination stage, whether an agency provided a
parent with reasonable efforts aimed at reunifying the parent with her child
prior to the agency petitioning for termination of parental rights. In re
D.C.D., 629 Pa. 325, 342, 105 A.3d 662, 672 (2014). Although the
agency’s reasonable efforts should be considered, and even ordered in the
appropriate case, nothing in the statute prohibits the court from granting a
petition to terminate parental rights under Section 2511 simply because the
agency failed to provide reasonable efforts to reunite a parent and child. Id.
at 346, 105 A.3d at 675.
Instantly, at the conclusion of the termination hearing, the court made
the following remarks on the record:
This is the time set for the matter of the hearing on the
petition for involuntary termination of parental rights as it
relates to [Child]. We note that [Child] was placed in the
care of [CYF] in October of 2015. Prior to that, however,
she was placed in the care of the current foster care
providers Mr. and Mrs. Pritt.
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[C]hild is 6 years old having been born January…2009. We
note that she is almost 7 years of age and has had no
contact with either parent since at least July of 2014. …
A petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights was
filed by [CYF] requesting the court to consider that the
parents, by conduct continuing for at least six months
preceding the filing of the petition, either evidenced a
settled purpose to relinquish their parental claims or failure
[or] refus[al] to perform parental duties.
We note that although [CYF] is not required to prove both
allegations[,] that they are in the alternative, we do find
that [CYF] has provided clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to prove that both Mother and Father evidenced
a settled purpose to relinquish their parental claim.
Neither one, for a period of more [than] one year prior to
the petition, made any efforts to have any contact with
their child, to locate their child, or use reasonable efforts
to overcome any barriers that were placed in their path.
Mother claims that she did not know for at least seven
months after placing [C]hild in the care of [Maternal
Grandfather] that [C]hild was not in his care. Clearly, she
made no effort to see her child during that period of time
nor at any time after that point.
Since [CYF] has become involved, Mother has been offered
visitation. She has not taken advantage of that. She has
not made any effort until this morning to have any contact
with her child, despite having access to resources in which
to secure that contact and also access to the information in
order to contact her daughter directly.
In addition, [CYF] alleges that the parents’ repeated and
continuing incapacity or refusal to parent, the parent has
caused [Child] to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence necessary for her wellbeing. We
note that the requirement is also that the parent cannot or
will not remedy the refusal.
* * *
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As it relates to Mother, again, it is clear that she has
lacked any willingness to overcome any barriers. She
either will not or cannot remedy the conditions which led
to removal. She also cannot or will not remedy her refusal
to parent.
One phone call on the morning of the hearing on the
petition to terminate her parental rights is not sufficient to
overcome her incapacity or unwillingness to parent as
evidenced prior to the petition being filed. She has made
no indication that she has any willingness to remedy her
lack of parenting of [Child]; and, therefore, [Child] has
been without proper care and subsistence as required.
We note, particularly in light of the fact [that] [C]hild was
without proper medical care and was unable to be enrolled
in school due to the parents’ unwillingness to cooperate,
not once did Mother contact the police or make any effort
to locate her daughter other than contacting [Maternal
Grandfather]. She seemed satisfied with his response in
about February of 2015 that [C]hild was in the care of
relatives. She appeared satisfied that [C]hild was well
cared for and had no intention of making any effort to
parent [C]hild.
The evidence is clear and convincing that both parents
have failed or refused to perform parental duties, have
evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish their claim, and
continue to have incapacity or refusal to parent, which
would support a termination of their parental rights on
either of those grounds.
Therefore, after having a hearing on the petition, this
[c]ourt is satisfied to the truth of the facts set forth in the
petition, and finds that [Mother] and [Father] have
forfeited their parental rights with respect to [Child].
The [c]ourt further finds that it is in the best interest of
[Child] that the petition be granted. We note particularly
that she has developed a bond with the foster family.
They are relatives, and they have provided for all of her
care. We do find that it is in her best interest, as we are
required to find, that she remain in the care of the foster
family. There would be no adverse effect to terminating
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parental rights as neither parent has had any interaction
with [C]hild for more than a year.
(N.T. Termination Hearing, 12/18/15, at 63-67). In its Rule 1925(a)
opinion, the trial court elaborated on its findings as follows:
After a review of the record, it is clear that there was
evidence substantially beyond that which would constitute
clear and convincing evidence to support the termination
of [Mother’s] parental rights.
[CYF] first filed for Emergency Protective Custody on
August 11, 2015. At that time, [C]hild had been in the
care of a kinship family since approximately July, 2014.
[Mother] agreed that at the time the petition was filed,
[CYF] had sufficient evidence to prove that the return of
[C]hild to [Mother] was not in [C]hild’s best interest.
[Mother] also stipulated that sufficient evidence was
presented at a Shelter Care hearing, also held in August,
to show that return of [C]hild to [Mother] still was not in
[C]hild’s best interest. [C]hild was adjudicated dependent
in October with a goal of adoption, and [CYF] then filed a
Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights on
October 27, 2015. At no time did [Mother] file an appeal
of the adjudication of dependency or the goal of adoption,
nor did she seek to change the goal. …
After a full hearing on the Petition, this [c]ourt found that
clear and convincing evidence existed to show that
[Mother’s] rights should be terminated under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1) and (2)[ and (b)]. The [c]ourt determined
that for nearly eighteen months prior to the filing of the
petition, [Mother] had failed or refused to perform parental
duties and that she has evidenced a settled purpose to
relinquish her claim to [C]hild. The [c]ourt further found
that [Mother] continues to have an inability to parent
[C]hild and that it cannot and will not be remedied by
[Mother]. This [c]ourt determined that termination of
[Mother’s] parental rights was in the best interest of
[C]hild, as she appears far more bonded with her foster
family than with [Mother].
In support of the [c]ourt’s findings, we note that [Mother]
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currently resides in Delaware and claims to have
transportation issues. She was permitted to appear for the
hearing by speakerphone. However, [CYF] offered to
assist with transportation, and that offer was declined.
[Mother] states that she has had drug dependency issues,
and that she has been attending a methadone clinic since
February, 2015, with no established time frame for when
she will no longer attend the clinic. She testified that one
of the reasons she has been unable to have contact with
[C]hild is due to the substantial amount of time she spends
at the methadone clinic. She additionally testified that she
has mental health issues including depression and post-
traumatic stress disorder. Mother further stated that she
is unemployed and that she has not held a job since
approximately June or July of 2014.
At the hearing, credible evidence was presented that since
[C]hild was adjudicated dependent, [Mother] has not
contacted [CYF] or visited [C]hild. Evidence was presented
that since [Mother] left [C]hild with Maternal Grandfather
in July, 2014, she has not seen [C]hild. Further, [Mother]
has not provided…cards to [C]hild, or attempted to have
any involvement with [C]hild’s education or medical care.
The caseworker further testified that there has been no
indication that [Mother] has been able to maintain safe
housing for [C]hild, nor has she verified any lawful source
of any income.
Evidence was presented even that prior to July, 2014,
[Mother] has a history of failing to provide parental care to
[C]hild. When [C]hild resided in Delaware with [Mother],
the Delaware Division of Family Services was involved due
to abandonment of [C]]hild by [Mother], and [C]hild was
removed from the home for approximately a year and a
half. [C]hild returned to [Mother] in January, 2013.
[Mother] then left [C]hild with Maternal Grandfather
approximately 18 months later. Further, there are criminal
charges pending in Delaware against [Mother] due to
allegations of drug use in front of [C]hild and sexual abuse
of [C]hild. [C]hild is now seven years old, and she has
spent only approximately 18 months out of the last nearly
five years in [Mother’s] care. Further, she now has a much
stronger bond with her foster parents than her mother, as
evidenced by the fact that she refers to them as mom and
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dad, and does not ask about the whereabouts of [Mother].
Perhaps most [convincing] to this [c]ourt’s determination
was [Mother’s] entirely incredible testimony that she had
no idea where [C]hild was, [or] the name of the kinship
care family. [Mother] stated that every time she called
Maternal Grandfather to inquire as to the whereabouts of
[C]hild, he would not answer or say that [C]hild could not
talk to her because she was not home. [Mother], despite
alleging that she did not know where her child was for
approximately six months, never called the police or [CYF].
[Mother] never reported [C]hild as missing. Despite
[Mother’s] statements, [Mother] herself testified that she
learned the whereabouts of [Child] in December, 2014,
and yet she still failed to attempt any contact with [C]hild.
Even since the adjudication of dependency in [October] of
2015, [Mother] has failed to contact [CYF] at any time
despite [CYF]’s offer to assist with transportation.
[Mother] was informed at a hearing that [CYF] wanted to
facilitate contact, and Mr. Pritt, [C]hild’s foster father[,]
made several attempts to contact [Mother] to arrange that
contact. Mr. Pritt testified that he told [Mother] she could
call him anytime to speak to [C]hild, and that he would be
willing to arrange visits, yet [Mother] still failed to contact
him.
[Mother] had an affirmative duty to parent her child and
chose not to do so. She was content with others…caring
for her daughter and made no effort to locate or contact
[C]hild. [Mother’s] indication that others failed to act is
misguided. It was [Mother’s] obligation to be the parent of
[C]hild, and she consistently failed to act as such.
This [c]ourt found that clear and convincing evidence on
the record supported the determination that [Mother] has
consistently failed to parent [C]hild and that [Mother]
refuses to remedy the situation. Therefore, this [c]ourt
requests that the Order entered on December 18, 2015 be
affirmed.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed February 9, 2016, at 3-9). The record supports
the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child. See In
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re Adoption of K.J., supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2016
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