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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-11-0000722
01-MAR-2016
11:57 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---oOo---
________________________________________________________________
DEBORAH J. WALTRIP, Petitioner/Claimant-Appellant,
vs.
TS ENTERPRISES, INC., DBA KIMO’S RESTAURANT, and FIREMAN’S FUND
INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent/Employer/Insurance Carrier-
Appellee, and
SPECIAL COMPENSATION FUND, Respondent/Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
SCWC-11-0000722
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-11-0000722; CASE NO. AB 2007-047(M) (7-02-00262))
MARCH 1, 2016
McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.,
WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J., CONCURRING IN THE RESULT,
WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
This case arises from an accident suffered by
Petitioner/Claimant-Appellant, Deborah J. Waltrip (“Waltrip”),
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while she worked for TS Enterprises, Inc., dba Kimo’s Restaurant
(“Restaurant”), on Maui.1 The Special Compensation Fund (“Fund”)
established under Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 386-151
(1993), is also an interested party.2 We accepted certiorari to
address certain procedural issues implicated by Waltrip’s pro se
appeal.
In brief, Waltrip was not given an award by the
Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations
(“DLIR”) for certain aspects of her claimed injuries, and she
appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board
(“LIRAB”). Following a hearing, LIRAB issued its Decision and
Order (“July 2011 Decision”). Unsatisfied with LIRAB’s
decision, Waltrip, pro se, filed two separate motions, each of
which was denied. The first motion was titled, “Request to
Reconsider” (“August Request”). The second motion was titled,
“Request That the July 25th, 2011 Decision and Order Be Vacated
and That the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board Issue
1
The term “Employer” is used to collectively refer to Restaurant and its
workers’ compensation carrier, Fireman=s Fund Insurance Company.
2
See HRS § 386-151 (a) (1993) (“There is hereby created a fund to be
known as the special compensation fund which shall consist of payments
made to it as provided by law. . . .”); HRS § 386-56 (1993) (“Where an
injured employee or the employee’s dependents fail to receive prompt
and proper compensation and this default is caused through no fault of
the employee, the director shall pay the full amount of all
compensation awards and benefits from the special compensation fund to
the employee or dependent.”).
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a New Notice of Initial Conference and Restart the Proceedings
All Over Again Including New Discovery Deadlines and a Retrial
of the Issues” (“September Request”). Waltrip appealed to the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”).
Fund then filed a motion to dismiss Waltrip’s appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that her notice of appeal was
untimely filed. The ICA issued an “Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Appellee Special Compensation Fund’s May 3, 2012
Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction” (“Partial
Dismissal Order”) stating that Waltrip’s notice of appeal was
untimely as to LIRAB’s July 2011 Decision, and was also untimely
as to LIRAB’s order denying the August Request. See Waltrip v.
TS Enters., No. CAAP-11-0000722, at 3 (App. May 31, 2012)
(order). As to Waltrip’s appeal of LIRAB’s order denying her
September Request, the ICA concluded that “it appears that we
might have appellate jurisdiction over [it].” Id. Accordingly,
the ICA permitted the parties to proceed with briefing.
Ultimately, the ICA found LIRAB lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Waltrip’s September Request when it construed
that request as a second motion for reconsideration over which
the Board lacked statutory or regulatory authority to rule. See
Waltrip v. TS Enters., No. CAAP-11-0000722, at 2 (App. Aug. 28,
2014) (SDO).
The following timeline provides a sequence of major
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events relevant to the procedural posture presented by this
case:
9/18/2001 – Waltrip is injured at work
9/04/2002 – Waltrip files a workers’ compensation claim
1/04/2007 – Director of DLIR issues a decision that awards
Waltrip medical care, services, and supplies; temporary
total disability benefits; partial disability benefits for
her lumbar spine, psychological condition, and left leg;
and $250 for disfigurement
1/23/2007 – Waltrip and Employer both timely appeal to
LIRAB regarding the Director’s January 4, 2007 decision
12/28/2007 – LIRAB temporarily remands the case to the
Director for additional findings regarding the Employer’s
refusal to compensate for a referral and treatment plan
11/14/2008 – Director issues a supplemental decision
determining that the referral and treatment plan were
unnecessary
12/2/2008 – Waltrip timely appeals the Director’s November
14, 2008 supplemental decision to LIRAB
10/12/2009, 7/19–7/21/2010 – LIRAB holds hearings
7/25/2011 – LIRAB issues its Decision and Order (“July 2011
Decision”)
8/23/2011 – Waltrip files a “Request to Reconsider”
(“August Request”)
8/29/2011 - LIRAB issues an “Order Denying Claimant’s
Request to Reconsider” (“Order Denying August Request”)
9/23/2011 – Waltrip files a “Request That the July 25th,
2011 Decision and Order Be Vacated and That [LIRAB] Issue a
New Notice of Initial Conference and Restart the
Proceedings All Over Again Including New Discovery
Deadlines and a Retrial of the Issues” (“September
Request”)
9/28/2011 - LIRAB issues an “Order Denying Claimant’s
Motion to Vacate Decision of July 25, 2011” (“Order Denying
September Request”)
9/29/2011 – Waltrip files a notice of appeal from the July
2011 Decision and Order Denying August Request
10/28/2011 – Waltrip amends her notice of appeal and lists
the July 2011 Decision and Order Denying September Request
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as the subjects of her appeal
5/3/2012 – Fund files a “Motion to Dismiss the Appeal for
Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction” (“Motion to Dismiss”)
5/31/2012 - ICA issues “Order Granting in Part and Denying
in Part Appellee Special Compensation Fund’s May 3, 2012
Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction”
(“Partial Dismissal Order”)
8/28/2014 - ICA issues a Summary Disposition Order (“SDO”)
vacating the Order Denying September Request and remanding
the case to LIRAB for the entry of an order dismissing the
September Request for lack of jurisdiction
10/2/2014 - ICA issues its Judgment on Appeal
10/31/2014 – Waltrip files an Application for Writ of
Certiorari (“Application”)
Upon accepting certiorari, this court ordered
supplemental briefing to address the following issues:
1. Whether this court has jurisdiction under Hawaii Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 602-59(c) (Supp. 2013) to review the
Intermediate Court of Appeals’ May 31, 2012 “Order Granting in
Part and Denying in Part Appellee Special Compensation Fund’s May
3, 2012 Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction;”
2. Whether the ICA gravely erred in the May 31, 2012 order by
granting in part and denying in part, rather than wholly denying,
the Special Compensation Fund’s May 3, 2012 Motion to Dismiss and
addressing any partial dismissal in its eventual summary
disposition order; and
3. Whether the ICA gravely erred in the May 31, 2012 order by
granting in pertinent part the Special Compensation Fund’s May 3,
2012 Motion to Dismiss with respect to . . . Waltrip’s appeal
from . . . [LIRAB’s] August 29, 2011 “Order Denying Claimant’s
Request to Reconsider.”
We hold as follows:
(1) because: (a) under Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure
(“HRAP”) Rule 35(a), an order partially dismissing an appeal is
not a “dispositional order”; (b) pursuant to HRS § 602-59(c)
(Supp. 2011), “[a]n application for a writ of certiorari may be
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filed with the supreme court no later than thirty days after the
filing of the judgment or dismissal order of the intermediate
appellate court,” and (c) Waltrip timely filed her application
for certiorari from the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal, this court has
jurisdiction to review both the ICA’s Partial Dismissal Order
and SDO which underpin the Judgment on Appeal;3 (2) the ICA did
not err in issuing its Partial Dismissal Order, rather than
wholly denying Fund’s Motion to Dismiss and later addressing any
partial dismissal in its eventual SDO, as it has the power under
HRS § 602-57(3) (Supp. 2010), “[t]o make or issue any order
. . . necessary or appropriate in the aid of its jurisdiction
. . . ,” and also because it referred to its partial dismissal
in its subsequent SDO; (3) in reviewing the Partial Dismissal
Order, the ICA did not err in dismissing Waltrip’s appeal of
LIRAB’s (a) July 2011 Decision and (b) Order Denying August
Request, for untimeliness; and (4) pursuant to the fundamental
tenets that “[p]leadings prepared by pro se litigants should be
interpreted liberally,” Dupree v. Hiraga, 121 Hawaii 297, 314,
219 P.3d 1084, 1101 (2009) (citation omitted), and that
“pleadings [and letters] in administrative proceedings are to be
construed liberally rather than technically,” id. (citing Perry
v. Planning Comm’n, 62 Haw. 666, 685-86, 619 P.2d 95, 108
3
The Judgment on Appeal was entered pursuant to the SDO; the SDO refers to
the Partial Dismissal Order.
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(1980)); Doe v. Attorney General, 135 Hawaii 390, 399, 351 P.3d
1156, 1165 (2015) (discussing id.), the ICA erred in holding in
its SDO that LIRAB had no authority to rule on the merits of
Waltrip’s September Request because it was essentially an
unauthorized second motion for reconsideration under HRS § 386-
87(d) (1993),4 on the same grounds as the August Request, rather
than viewing it as a motion to reopen under HRS § 386-89(c)
(1993),5 when Waltrip’s September Request was filed more than a
4
In the absence of an appeal and within thirty days after
mailing of a certified copy of the appellate board’s
decision or order, the appellate board may, upon the
application of the director or any other party, or upon its
own motion, reopen the matter and thereupon may take
further evidence or may modify its findings, conclusions or
decisions. The time to initiate judicial review shall run
from the date of mailing of the further decision if the
matter has been reopened. If the application for reopening
is denied, the time to initiate judicial review shall run
from the date of mailing of the denial decision.
HRS § 386-87(d).
5
On the application of any party in interest, supported by
a showing of substantial evidence, on the ground of a
change in or of a mistake in a determination of fact
related to the physical condition of the injured employee,
the director may, at any time prior to eight years after
date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a
decision awarding compensation has been issued, or at any
time prior to eight years after the rejection of a claim,
review a compensation case and issue a decision which may
award, terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or
decrease compensation. No compensation case may be
reviewed oftener than once in six months and no case in
which a claim has been rejected shall be reviewed more than
once if on such review the claim is again rejected. . . .
This subsection shall not apply when the employer’s
liability for compensation has been discharged in whole by
the payment of a lump sum in accordance with section 386-
54.
HRS § 386-89(c).
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year after LIRAB’s hearing and she had attached post-hearing
letters from her treating psychiatrist discussing both her
physical and mental condition, which could be construed to
constitute “substantial evidence . . . of a change in . . . a
determination of fact related to [her] physical condition”
pursuant to HRS § 386-89. Such a motion, however, should have
been submitted to the Director of DLIR instead of LIRAB.
Accordingly, we affirm the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal.
The ICA’s Judgment as to the July 2011 Decision and August
Request is affirmed. The ICA’s Judgment as to the September
Request is affirmed on other grounds.
II. Background
A. Work Injury to LIRAB Proceedings
Waltrip sustained a work accident on September 18,
2001 while working for Restaurant. On September 4, 2002, she
filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits with DLIR.
Waltrip described her work injury as pain in the left knee,
reflex sympathetic dystrophy (“RSD”), neuropathy, atrophy, and
depression. Waltrip was represented by counsel during the
proceedings before DLIR until April 2006. Subsequently, she
proceeded pro se. The Director of DLIR issued numerous interim
decisions on Waltrip’s claim including a January 4, 2007
decision awarding Waltrip medical care, services, and supplies;
temporary total disability benefits; permanent partial
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disability benefits for her lumbar spine, psychological
condition, and left leg; and $250 for disfigurement.
Both Waltrip and Employer appealed to LIRAB. Waltrip
appealed in part because the Director did not award her benefits
for RSD. Employer appealed in part because it disagreed with
the permanent partial disability benefits awarded to Waltrip.
LIRAB scheduled a hearing to commence on October 12,
2009. In a letter dated September 28, 2008, Waltrip’s then
treating physician, Dr. Paul Kaiwi, Jr. (“Dr. Kaiwi”),
recommended that during the hearing, Waltrip should (1) have her
legs elevated, (2) avoid contact with direct wind, air
conditioning vents, or fans, and, (3) because of her sedating
medications, be limited to one and one-half hours per day.
Shortly after the hearing commenced on October 12, 2009, LIRAB
became concerned that Waltrip would not be able to defend
herself, speak on her own behalf, or cross-examine Employer’s
expert witness, based on the way she was speaking. LIRAB
therefore continued the hearing.
On July 19, 2010, LIRAB resumed proceedings on Oahu.
After noting that Waltrip appeared to be falling asleep, LIRAB
continued the hearing to the following afternoon.
At the start of the proceedings on July 20, 2010,
LIRAB informed the parties that (1) after the close of the prior
day’s proceedings, Waltrip was taken to the hospital and (2)
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LIRAB had spoken with Dr. Kaiwi by conference call that morning,
in Waltrip’s presence and with her consent. According to LIRAB,
after it informed Dr. Kaiwi that “Waltrip had fallen asleep at
estimated intervals [of] once every minute or so,” Dr. Kaiwi
reported that except for one visit when Waltrip was a little
drowsy, she had “acted appropriately” each time he had seen her.
Thus, he believed her falling asleep at the hearing might be
evidence of “ulterior motives” or “malingering” behavior. He
advised LIRAB that he would no longer be her physician. There
was no indication, however, that Dr. Kaiwi had examined Waltrip
on July 19, 2010, or inquired as to Waltrip’s symptoms other
than that observed by LIRAB.
Dr. Kaiwi also informed LIRAB during that phone
conversation that Waltrip’s medication included methadone at
six-hour intervals and morphine at eight-hour intervals as
needed for pain, and that he thought the methodone and morphine
Waltrip had reported taking at 6:00 and 12:00 the day before had
been appropriate. Dr. Kaiwi also informed LIRAB that Waltrip
was to take Soma and Neurontin every twelve hours, twice daily.
In response to follow up questions posed on the record
by LIRAB to confirm the accuracy of LIRAB’s representations
regarding the phone call with Dr. Kaiwi, Waltrip reported she
had not gotten sleep the night before, that she did not know how
she could fake falling asleep, that she had not taken morphine
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that day because she felt she did not need it, and that she took
less pain medication than prescribed because she only took it
three times daily as compared to the four times daily
prescription. LIRAB proceeded with the hearing with Waltrip
present, and concluded the hearing on July 21, 2010.
LIRAB issued its July 2011 Decision about one year
after the hearings were held. LIRAB specifically found, among
other things, “[b]ased upon the Board’s observation of [Waltrip]
and the evidence in the record, the Board doubts the accuracy of
and motivation for [Waltrip]’s testimony. The Board does not
find [Waltrip] to be a credible witness.” LIRAB concluded that
(1) Waltrip did not suffer from Complex Regional Pain Syndrome
(“CRPS”) or RSD; (2) Employer was liable for workers’
compensation benefits relative to Waltrip’s knee injury and
psychological condition; (3) Waltrip did not provide credible
evidence that she remained temporarily and totally disabled
during the disputed period; (4) Waltrip did not suffer permanent
partial disability to her leg or psyche as a result of the work
injury, thus rendering apportionment moot; (5) Employer was not
liable to reimburse Waltrip for disputed expenses; (6) Waltrip’s
medical care was not terminated by LIRAB’s decision; and (7)
Employer was not liable for a referral and a treatment plan.
Thus, the July 2011 Decision affirmed the Director’s decision
denying Waltrip benefits for RSD and further reduced the
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benefits that the Director had granted Waltrip by terminating
all temporary total disability benefits and all permanent
partial disability benefits.
Waltrip stated in her August Request:
[T]his letter is a request to reconsider by the board the
July 25th 2011 decision and order by the Appeals Board in
the above case. The reason for the request is that I was
unable to adequately represent myself at the proceedings
due to my physical and psychological disability, nor was I
able to adequately file necessary medical records in a
timely fashion, arrange for expert witnesses or question
opposing counsels [sic] witness effectively. I need legal
representation and I am not competant [sic] to represent
myself.
LIRAB denied the August Request without explanatory
remarks.
On September 23, 2011, Waltrip then filed a document
entitled “Request That the July 25th, 2011 Decision and Order Be
Vacated and That [LIRAB] Issue a New Notice of Initial
Conference and Restart the Proceedings All Over Again Including
New Discovery Deadlines and a Retrial of the Issues” (“September
Request”). In it, Waltrip stated:
This request is a [sic] based on the fact that I was medically
not capable of representing myself at trial as evidenced by the
following[:]
- pre-trial proceedings were postponed in 2008 as I was inpatient
in the psychiatric unit at Maui Memorial Medical Centre [sic][;]
- during the pre-trial conference I told the Appeals Board that I
didn’t understand the process[;]
- At the initial Trial in 2009 the Appeals Board postponed the
Trial ruling that I was unable to participate and sent me home[;]
- The Appeals Board ordered me to take medications as prescribed
by Dr. Paul Kaiwi. The medical records show that Dr. Kaiwi had
tripled the narcotic/sedating medications in the months before
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Trial in [an] attempt to control the chronic pain. Hence I was
unable to maintain consciousness at Trial[;]
- Again on the first day of the next Trial (July 19th, 2010) the
Board ruled that I could not participate and called an
ambulance[;]
- After spending hours under observation at Queens Medical Centre
[sic] on July 19th, 2010, the Board commenced the Trial on July
20th, 2010 regardless of my ability to participate effectively[;]
- The additional proof that Mr[.] McKee requested in his August
25, 2011 letter is provided by Dr[.] Grace Marian, included with
this letter.
Waltrip’s September Request included two recent
letters from her psychiatrist, Dr. Grace Marian, which indicated
that Waltrip had been her patient since December 2, 2010. An
August 23, 2011 letter stated that because of her depression,
“Complex Pain Syndrome,” numerous medications, and “unstable”
psychiatric status, “it is definitely not possible” for Waltrip
to work thirty hours per week and that Waltrip “should remain on
full disability for at least a year . . . .” Dr. Marian’s
September 20, 2011 letter stated that Waltrip’s depressive
disorder, insomnia, lethargy, “Complex Pain Syndrome,” and the
medications she was taking for treatment rendered her “not . . .
capable of representing herself in court.”
On September 28, 2011, LIRAB issued an order that
construed Waltrip’s September Request as a motion to vacate, and
denied it.
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B. ICA Proceedings
Waltrip filed a notice of appeal with the ICA on
September 29, 2011, stating she was appealing from (1) the July
2011 Decision and (2) the Order Denying August Request. On
October 28, 2011, she then submitted another notice of appeal
(which was docketed as an amended notice of appeal), this time
stating that she was appealing from the (1) July 2011 Decision
and (2) the Order Denying September Request.
Employer and Fund filed jurisdictional statements
contesting the ICA’s jurisdiction on December 12, 2011. The
next day, Fund amended its statement, but nevertheless contested
the ICA’s jurisdiction. After the ICA had granted Waltrip two
extensions, Waltrip timely filed a jurisdictional statement on
February 21, 2012. In it, Waltrip clarified that her appeal was
of the July 2011 Decision, Order Denying August Request, and
Order Denying September Request. She further explained that Dr.
Marian’s September 20, 2011 letter, which was included with her
September Request, served as “credible proof” that she was not
capable of representing herself. Waltrip also pointed out that
LIRAB’s July 2011 Decision “should have[, but did not]
contain[],” language notifying her of the time frame in which an
appeal may be filed. Further, she asserted that when she called
LIRAB on September 28, 2011, she was twice verbally advised that
her appeal to the ICA was due on September 29, 2011.
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On May 3, 2012, Fund filed a Motion to Dismiss
Waltrip’s appeals from all three orders (July 2011 Decision,
Order Denying Claimant’s August Request, and Order Denying
September Request) for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Fund
argued that the ICA lacked jurisdiction over Waltrip’s appeal of
the July 2011 Decision and the Order Denying August Request
because Waltrip’s appeal was one day late under HRS § 386-87(d)
(1993) and HRS § 386-88 (Supp. 2010), as she filed her notice of
appeal on September 29, 2011, when the filing deadline was
September 28, 2011. With respect to the Order Denying September
Request, Fund argued that the ICA lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Waltrip’s appeal because: (1) there is “no
legal authority for a second motion for reconsideration” before
LIRAB; and (2) even if LIRAB had authority over a second motion
for reconsideration, Waltrip’s motion was untimely under HRS §
386-87 and Hawaii Administrative Rules (“HAR”) § 12-47-536
6
Reconsideration or reopening of decision or order.
(a) In the absence of an appeal and within thirty days
after mailing of a copy of the board’s decision or order,
the board may, upon the request of any party, or upon its
own motion, reconsider or reopen the matter. If reopening
is allowed, the board may take further evidence or may
modify its decision or order. The time to initiate judicial
review shall run from the date of mailing of the further
decision if the matter has been reconsidered or reopened.
If the request for reconsideration or reopening is denied,
the time to initiate judicial review shall run from the
date of mailing the denial decision. (b) The request for
reconsideration or reopening shall be in writing and shall
be served upon all parties. The request shall specify the
reasons why reconsideration or reopening is warranted. (c)
(continued . . .)
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because it was filed sixty days after the July 2011 Decision was
entered.
On May 31, 2012, the ICA granted Fund’s motion to
dismiss with respect to the July 2011 Decision and the Order
Denying August Request, but denied the motion with respect to
the Order Denying September Request. The ICA, noting that it
“might have appellate jurisdiction” over the Order Denying
September Request, directed the parties to proceed with briefing
as to this order.
After considering the parties’ briefs, the ICA held in
its SDO that LIRAB had no authority to rule on the merits of
Waltrip’s September Request because it “essentially was a second
motion for reconsideration on the same grounds as the first . .
. .” Waltrip, No. CAAP-11-0000722, SDO at 2. Accordingly, the
ICA vacated LIRAB’s second post-judgment order and remanded the
case to the LIRAB “for entry of an order dismissing the motion
[to vacate] for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at 2.
C. Waltrip’s Application for a Writ of Certiorari
Waltrip timely filed an application for a writ of
certiorari. Waltrip’s application stated that she was appealing
the ICA’s SDO and Judgment on Appeal. Her application did not
(. . . continued)
A hearing on the request for reconsideration or reopening
may be held at the board's discretion.
HAR § 12-47-53.
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state that she was appealing the Partial Dismissal Order.
Notably, other than Waltrip asserting that she was appealing the
ICA’s SDO, the application lacks any argument regarding the
ICA’s disposition.
This court accepted certiorari pursuant to its
discretionary authority under HRS § 602-59(a) (Supp. 2011), to
consider various procedural issues implicated by these pro se
proceedings before LIRAB and the ICA. See State v. Fields, 115
Hawaii 503, 536, 168 P.3d 955, 988 (2007) (stating that HRS §
602-59(b) “is not descriptive of the scope of review
determinative of the supreme court’s decision to grant or deny
certiorari” (quoting Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 73, in 1979 Senate
Journal, at 992 (internal quotation marks, emphases, and
brackets omitted))).
III. Standards of Review
A. LIRAB’s Decision
Ordinarily, deference will be given to decisions of
administrative agencies acting within the realm of their
expertise. The rule of judicial deference, however, does
not apply when the agency’s reading of the statute
contravenes the legislature’s manifest purpose.
Consequently, we have not hesitated to reject an incorrect
or unreasonable statutory construction advanced by the
agency entrusted with the statute’s implementation.
Coon v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 98 Hawaii 233, 245, 47 P.3d
348, 360 (2002) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
brackets omitted).
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The standard of review for decisions of the LIRAB is
well-established:
Appellate review of a LIRAB decision is governed by HRS §
91-14(g) (1993), which states that:
Upon review of the record the court may affirm the
decision of the agency or remand the case with
instructions for further proceedings; or it may
reverse or modify the decision and order if the
substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings,
conclusions, decisions, or orders are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or
jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized
by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
We have previously stated:
[Findings of Fact] are reviewable under the
clearly erroneous standard to determine if the agency
decision was clearly erroneous in view of reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record.
[Conclusions of Law] are freely reviewable to
determine if the agency’s decision was in violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions, in excess
of statutory authority or jurisdiction of agency, or
affected by other error of law.
A [Conclusion of Law] that presents mixed
questions of fact and law is reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard because the conclusion is
dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. When mixed questions of law and
fact are presented, an appellate court must give
deference to the agency’s expertise and experience in
the particular field. The court should not
substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.
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Igawa v. Koa House Rest., 97 Hawaii 402, 405-06, 38 P.3d 570,
573-74 (2001) (quoting In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94
Hawaii 97, 119, 9 P.3d 409, 431 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks, citations, and brackets in original omitted).
An FOF or a mixed determination of law and fact is clearly
erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to
support the finding or determination, or (2) despite
substantial evidence to support the finding or
determination, the appellate court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
We have defined “substantial evidence” as credible evidence
which is of sufficient quality and probative value to
enable a person of reasonable caution to support a
conclusion.
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawaii at 119, 9 P.3d at
431 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
B. Jurisdiction
“[T]he existence of jurisdiction is a question of law
that [is] review[ed] de novo under the right/wrong standard.”
Captain Andy’s Sailing, Inc. v. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res.,
113 Hawaii 184, 192, 150 P.3d 833, 841 (2006) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
We first clarify that this court has the authority to
consider the entirety of the ICA’s disposition of Waltrip’s
appeal. That is, although certain portions of Waltrip’s appeal
had been dismissed pursuant to the ICA’s Partial Dismissal
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Order, that order became eligible for further appellate review
upon the ICA’s disposition of Waltrip’s entire appeal.7
Certainly, the ICA may choose to address issues raised
in a notice of appeal in a piecemeal fashion, as it did here, to
assist in the efficient disposition of cases. See HRS § 602-
57(3) (“[T]he [ICA] shall have jurisdiction . . . [t]o make or
issue any order . . . necessary or appropriate in the aid of its
jurisdiction . . . .”). For example, that the ICA issued the
Partial Dismissal Order prior to the deadline for Employer and
Fund to file answering briefs, likely prompted the parties to
more fully discuss remaining issues instead of addressing
matters on which the court had already ruled.
The ICA’s management of its cases, however, does not
alter HRAP’s contemplation that a writ of certiorari only be
from an order that is actually case dispositive8 or otherwise
7
This occurred on October 2, 2014, the issue date of the ICA’s Judgment on
Appeal.
Orders of dismissal do not generally require an entry of judgment. See
HRAP Rule 36(b)(1) (“After a final decision, other than an order of
dismissal, has been filed in an appeal, the court rendering the decision
shall prepare and submit to the appellate clerk for filing the judgment on
appeal, signed by a judge or justice for the court.”). However, here, in
addition to dismissing Waltrip’s appeal by way of its SDO, the ICA had also
vacated LIRAB’s Order Denying September Request and remanded the case to
LIRAB for entry of an order dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, a judgment on appeal was warranted, and therefore Waltrip’s
appeal was not disposed of until the judgment issued.
8
This is so, even if the underlying notice of appeal also encompasses
multiple post-judgment motions that may be separately ruled upon by the ICA.
See HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) (“The notice of appeal shall be deemed to appeal the
disposition of all post-judgment motions that are timely filed after the
entry of the judgment or order.”).
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immediately appealable. See Greer v. Baker, ___Hawaii___,
___P.3d___, No. SCWC-15-0000034, slip op. passim (Feb. 22, 2016)
(stating examples of immediately appealable orders). This is
evident by the use of singular nouns and the lack of specific
reference in the HRS and HRAP that a non-case-dispositive
partial dismissal order can serve as the basis for an
application for a writ of certiorari. See HRS § 602-59(a)
(Supp. 2011) (“After issuance of the intermediate appellate
court’s judgment or dismissal order, a party may seek review of
the intermediate appellate court’s decision and judgment or
dismissal order only by application to the supreme court for a
writ of certiorari, the acceptance or rejection of which shall
be discretionary upon the supreme court.”); HRAP Rule 40.1(a)(1)
(“A party may seek review of the intermediate court of appeals’
decision by filing an application for a writ of certiorari in
the supreme court. The application shall be filed within 30
days after the filing of the intermediate court of appeals’
judgment on appeal or dismissal order, unless the time for
filing the application is extended in accordance with this
Rule.”).
In addition, HRS § 602-59(d) provides that the clerk
“shall forward the complete file of the case to the supreme
court” upon the acceptance of an application for a writ of
certiorari. In most appeals, there is no longer a hard file due
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to the advent of electronic filing. This statute signifies,
however, a legislative intent that a single case file be in the
custody of a single appellate court at any given time.
Interrupting the ICA’s review in this manner would be
inconsistent with the legislature’s reasons for creating the
ICA; that is, to address “‘the evergrowing congestion of cases
at the appellate level of our judicial system and the concurrent
increase in the length of time it takes for both civil and
criminal cases to reach a conclusion.’” Conf. Comm. Rep. No.
70, in 1979 House Journal, at 1122, Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 73, in
1979 Senate Journal, at 989 (quoting Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 52,
in 1978 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii,
Vol. 1, at 617) (emphasis added); see id., in 1979 House
Journal, at 1122–1123, Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 73, in 1979 Senate
Journal, at 990 (noting that the discussion by delegates to the
Constitutional Convention was “comprehensive,” “thoughtful,” and
“helpful”). This purpose has endured, even after our appellate
system transitioned to its current three-tiered form, as
evidenced by the legislature’s concerns as to whether the new
system “will affect rates of appeal, timeliness of decision-
making, and caseload management.” 2004 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 202,
§ 83 at 948.
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In this light, it is clear that when the phrase “or
dismissal order” was added in 2006 to HRS § 602-59(a),9 it was
intended to address the ICA’s assumption of new caseload
management functions following implementation of Act 202, which
included ruling on potentially case dispositive motions. See
Judge Gail C. Nakatani, Judicial Council of Hawaii, Final Report
of the Appellate Review Task Force (“Task Force”) 4, 41 (App. C)
(2005). In other words, the addition of the phrase “or
dismissal order,” clarified that an application for writ of
certiorari may also be filed after the ICA issues a
dispositional order that may not be a “judgment.” It can be
further inferred from the legislature’s minimal discussion
regarding the addition of the phrase “or dismissal order” that
9
Act 149 of the 2006 legislative session amended HRS § 602-59 to read
as follows:
“(a) After issuance of the intermediate appellate
court’s judgment[,] or dismissal order, a party may seek
review of the intermediate appellate court’s decision and
judgment or dismissal order only by application to the
supreme court for a writ of certiorari, the acceptance or
rejection of which shall be discretionary upon the supreme
court.
(b) The application for writ of certiorari shall
tersely state its grounds[.], which shall include:
(1) Grave errors of law or of fact; or
(2) Obvious inconsistencies in the decision of the
intermediate appellate court with that of the supreme
court, federal decision, or its own decision,
and the magnitude of those errors or inconsistencies
dictating the need for further appeal.
. . . .”
2006 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 149, § 1 at 409.
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the amendment was not intended to alter the legislature’s clear
purpose that parties’ appeals be resolved as efficiently as
possible. See Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2254, in 2006 Senate
Journal, at 1136 (stating that the proposed bill was “based upon
a recommendation by the Hawaii Appellate Review Task Force to
the Judiciary”); Task Force, at 12–13 (discussing criteria for
writ of certiorari, but lacking any specific discussion of the
phrase, “or dismissal order”).
Moreover, we observe that Act 149’s insertion of the
phrase “or dismissal order” into part (a) of HRS § 602-59,
should be construed together with the entirety of Act 149’s
amendments to the statute, specifically, the reinstatement of
criteria for applications for writ of certiorari into part (b).
See text supra n.9. An applicant would be hard-pressed to
explain why the “magnitude of [the ICA’s] error or
inconsistencies” with respect to a partial dismissal order
“dictat[es] the need for further appeal,” when the magnitude of
such error might be readily mitigated by the ICA’s resolution of
the remaining issues on appeal. 2006 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 149, §
1 at 409.
Accordingly, in cases in which the ICA separately
addresses raised issues, a party’s thirty-day window to file an
application for a writ of certiorari regarding the ICA’s
decision on any of the raised issues, begins when an appeal is
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disposed of in its entirety and judgment on appeal entered, if
required under HRAP Rule 36. For example, when a petitioner
timely files her application within thirty days of the date of
issue of the ICA’s judgment on appeal, as did Waltrip here, this
court has the authority to consider the entirety of the ICA’s
disposition. This means that in this case, we may examine both
the Partial Dismissal Order and the SDO.
Next, although this court has the authority to
consider the entirety of the ICA’s disposition of Waltrip’s
appeal,10 we observe that it is undisputed that the Application
states that Waltrip seeks a “writ of certiorari of the October
2nd 2014 Judgment on Appeal,” which was entered solely
“[p]ursuant to the Summary Disposition Order . . . entered on
August 28, 2014,” but fails to state the grounds upon which she
contests that Judgment. Waltrip herself recognized the
scantiness of her Application when she moved for, and was
denied, an “Extension to File Paperwork on Writ of Certiorari.”
Nevertheless, it was apparent to this court that the
ICA’s SDO focused on the single issue of LIRAB’s subject matter
jurisdiction over Waltrip’s pro se September Request, and that
therefore the only self-evident challenge to the ICA’s Judgment
10
The ICA did not err in issuing its Partial Dismissal Order. It had the
authority to issue the order pursuant to HRS § 602-57(3), and correctly
determined that the notice of appeal was untimely filed as to the July 2011
Decision and August Request.
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and SDO would be based on error associated with the ICA’s sua
sponte jurisdictional determination due to its
recharacterization of Waltrip’s September Request.11
With these specific circumstances forming the
backdrop, we granted Waltrip’s pro se Application.
A. Waltrip’s September Request Could Have Reasonably Been
Construed as a Motion to Reopen
In its Order Denying September Request, LIRAB
construed Waltrip’s September 23, 2011 “Request That the July
25th, 2011 Decision and Order Be Vacated and That the Labor and
Industrial Relations Appeals Board Issue a New Notice of Initial
Conference and Restart the Proceedings All Over Again Including
New Discovery Deadlines and a Retrial of the Issues” as a “non-
hearing Motion to Vacate the Board’s Decision of July 25, 2011”
and denied it without further explanation. The ICA’s August 28,
2014 Summary Disposition Order concluded that LIRAB’s Order
Denying September Request was error because LIRAB should have
instead “dismissed the motion for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction” as Waltrip’s September Request was “essentially .
. . a second motion for reconsideration on the same grounds as
11
Moreover, we note that in Waltrip’s Supplemental Brief, under the
header, “obvious inconsistencies in the decisions of the Intermediate
Appellate Court with that of Supreme Court, federal decions [sic] or its own
decision, and the magnitude of those errors or inconsistencies dictating the
need for further appeal,” Waltrip stated: “The Intermediate Court of Appeals
had no valid reason for their [sic] denial of October 2, 2014 where they did
have jurisdiction.”
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the first.” Waltrip, No. CAAP-11-0000722, SDO at 2 (citation
omitted). The entirety of the ICA’s discussion reads as
follows:
Waltrip does not suggest a statutory or regulatory basis
supporting her September 23, 2011 motion to vacate, which
essentially was a second motion for reconsideration on the
same grounds as the first, and we can find none. We hold
that there was no authority for the Board to rule on the
merits of the motion and, as such, rather than issuing a
denial, the Board should have dismissed the motion for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Hawaii Mgmt. Alliance
Ass’n v. Ins. Comm’r, 106 Hawaii 21, 27, 100 P.3d 952, 958
(2004) (holding that the insurance commissioner’s authority
to hear external review appeals, as authorized by statute,
was a question of subject matter jurisdiction); see also
Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawaii 474, 480, 918 P.2d 1130, 1136
(1996) (stating that dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits).
Accordingly, we vacate the . . . Order [Denying September
Request] because the Board lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-87(d) (1993).
Waltrip, No. CAAP-11-0000722, SDO at 2 (footnoted omitted).
Notably, when the September Request was before LIRAB,
neither Fund nor Employer objected to the September Request on
grounds that LIRAB lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, the ICA’s
decision was premised on its subsequent recharacterization of
Waltrip’s Request as a second motion for reconsideration, and
consequent examination of jurisdictional defects based on that
recharacterization.
Contrary to the ICA’s characterizations, on their
faces, the August Request and September Request were not
submitted on “essentially . . . the same grounds.” Waltrip, No.
CAAP-11-0000722, SDO at 2. Although the ICA accurately noted
that Waltrip relied in both requests on the same assertion —
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that she was “unable to adequately represent [her]self at the
proceedings” — the nature of each request differed. The August
Request asked the Board to reconsider its ruling given Waltrip’s
assertion that she is “not competant [sic] to represent
[her]self.”
In contrast, the September Request asked for the July
2011 ruling to be vacated and that proceedings be re-initiated
so that Waltrip could conduct discovery anew and have a new
trial. Additionally, Waltrip provided with her September
Request copies of two letters from her treating psychiatrist,
Dr. Grace Marian, concerning Waltrip’s psychiatric treatment and
mental and physical conditions. Dr. Marian began treating
Waltrip in December 2010 after the Board conducted its hearing
on Waltrip’s claims, and both letters were dated after the
Board’s July 25, 2011 ruling issued. Reading Waltrip’s Request
in the light of (1) the submission of Dr. Marian’s letters that
include references to Waltrip’s pain, insomnia, and lethargy,
and (2) that it had been over a year since the Board’s hearing,
leads to a reasonable, liberal construction of the Request as a
motion to reopen the case under the Director’s continuing
jurisdiction pursuant to HRS § 386-89.12
12
See text supra n.5.
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Thus, although the ICA’s instruction to LIRAB to
dismiss Waltrip’s September Request for lack of jurisdiction is
not incorrect, we disagree with the ICA’s reasoning. The
September Request should not have been construed as a second
“request to reconsider,” but rather as a motion to reopen under
HRS § 386-89(c) that was inappropriately filed with LIRAB
instead of the Director.
B. Hawaii’s Commitment to Access to Justice for All Litigants
Requires That Waltrip’s September 23, 2011 Request Not Be
“Construed Away”
A fundamental tenet of Hawaii law is that “[p]leadings
prepared by pro se litigants should be interpreted liberally.”
Dupree, 121 Hawaii at 314, 219 P.3d at 1101 (citation omitted).
The underpinnings of this tenet rest on the promotion of equal
access to justice — a pro se litigant should not be prevented
from proceeding on a pleading or letter to an agency if a
reasonable, liberal construction of the document would permit
him or her to do so. See Doe, 135 Hawaii 390, 351 P.3d 1156
(holding the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court’s
dismissal of pro se litigant’s agency appeal based on lack of
jurisdiction, as circuit court should have liberally construed
litigant’s letter as initiating administrative proceedings); see
also, e.g., Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir.
1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to
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liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.”
(citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam)).
Federal courts have extended this “liberality
doctrine” to include pro se motions in certain scenarios.
Christensen v. Comm’r, 786 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986);
see, e.g., Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925
(9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to construe pro se
pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as well as
complaints.” (citations omitted)) (reviewing district court’s
denial of pro se plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction
barring defendant county from settling plaintiff’s civil rights
action in a way that interferes with her counsel’s ability to
apply for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Such
scenarios may “extend[] . . . beyond the prisoner/civil rights
context.” Christensen, 786 F.2d at 1385 (“Tax disputes that
involve relatively minor sums may be of great significance to
less wealthy taxpayers. Such taxpayers’ access to Tax Court
review should not be barred by legal technicalities. . . . In
light of the policy favoring liberal reading of pro se
litigants’ papers, we find that the ‘Motion to Place the
Following Statements in the Record’ should have been treated as
a motion to amend. We remand so that the Tax Court can consider
whether to grant that motion.”).
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Waltrip’s circumstances, which center on a workers’
compensation claim, warrant similar application of the
“liberality doctrine.” As the only recovery available for an
employee who is injured at work is typically a statutory award
under Hawaii’s workers’ compensation law,13 and as the law
embodies a “broad humanitarian purpose,” Lawhead v. United Air
Lines, 59 Haw. 551, 560, 584 P.2d 119, 125 (1978) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), to “(1) restore the
injured employee, and (2) to compensate the employee
adequately,” Alvarez v. Liberty House, Inc., 85 Hawaii 275, 278,
942 P.2d 539, 542 (1997) (citation omitted), an employee
proceeding pro se should not be prevented from fully litigating
his or her claim simply because his or her filings are
“inartful” and fails to reference a statute by number, or
correctly address a request to the Director or LIRAB. Thus,
just as Hawaii’s workers’ compensation law should be “‘construed
liberally in order to accomplish the purpose for which it was
13
Exclusiveness of right to compensation; exception. The
rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or the
employee’s dependents on account of a work injury suffered
by the employee shall exclude all other liability of the
employer to the employee, the employee’s legal
representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, or anyone
else entitled to recover damages from the employer, at
common law or otherwise, on account of the injury, except
for sexual harassment or sexual assault and infliction of
emotional distress or invasion of privacy related thereto,
in which case a civil action may also be brought.
HRS § 386-5 (1993).
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enacted,’” Alvarez, 85 Hawaii at 278, 942 P.2d at 542 (quoting
Flores v. United Air Lines, Inc., 70 Haw. 1, 12, 757 P.2d 641,
647 (1988)), so, too, should pro se pleadings, including
motions, in workers’ compensation cases.
Had LIRAB properly dismissed Waltrip’s September
Request for lack of jurisdiction based on the filing of a motion
to reopen with LIRAB instead of the Director, Waltrip would have
been alerted with whom to appropriately file her Request so that
she may seek benefits that she perceived to have been improperly
denied. In contrast, the ICA’s incorrect construction of the
September Request as a second motion for reconsideration
provided Waltrip, a pro se litigant, little guidance.14
C. Courts and Agencies Should Construe Pro Se Filings in a
Reasonable Manner That Enables Them to Promote Access to Justice
Instructive on the issue of the scope of a court’s
discretion to recharacterize a motion is Mata v. Lynch, 135 S.
Ct. 2150 (2015). Mata was an illegal alien who was ordered by
an immigration judge to leave the country. Mata’s attorney
14
Indeed, access to justice also means making court and agency communications
readily informative, particularly with respect to workers’ compensation
cases, so that the law’s “broad humanitarian purpose” is furthered. For
example, had LIRAB included a notice in its Order Denying August Request that
the deadline to file a notice of appeal was within thirty (30) days of the
date the order was mailed, Waltrip would have been officially informed of
relevant due dates. This may have avoided what Waltrip asserts to have
occurred: that she relied on incorrect information she orally received from a
LIRAB employee, leading her to file a notice of appeal one day too late. See
Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 136 Hawaii 376, 389, 363
P.3d 224, 237 (2015) (“[T]he manner in which the justice system operates must
be fair and must also appear to be fair.” (citing Sifagaloa v. Bd. of Trs. of
Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 74 Haw. 181, 190, 840 P.2d 367, 371 (1992))).
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filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Immigration
Board”) a notice of appeal of the immigration judge’s decision,
and indicated that a written brief in support of the appeal was
forthcoming. Ultimately, however, no brief was filed and the
Immigration Board dismissed Mata’s appeal. Over one hundred
days after the Immigration Board’s dismissal, new counsel for
Mata filed a motion with the Immigration Board to reopen his
case pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2012). Although
such motions must typically be filed within ninety days of the
final removal order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2012),
Mata argued that he timely filed his motion because “[Mata’s]
first lawyer’s ‘ineffective assistance’ counted as an
‘exceptional circumstance[]’ excusing his lateness.” Mata, 135
S. Ct. at 2153 (second brackets in original). The Immigration
Board disagreed and dismissed the motion as untimely. The
Immigration Board also declined to exercise its separate
authority to reopen the case sua sponte.
Mata petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that the Immigration Board improperly denied his motion
to reopen as he was entitled to equitable tolling given his
initial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Instead of addressing
Mata’s appeal on its merits, the Fifth Circuit “construed
[Mata’s motion] as an invitation for the [Immigration Board] to
exercise its discretion to reopen the removal proceeding sua
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sponte” and dismissed Mata’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Mata v. Holder, 558 F. App’x 366, 367 (2014) (“As the
[Immigration Board] has complete discretion in determining
whether to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and we
have no meaningful standard against which to judge that exercise
of discretion, we lack jurisdiction to review such decisions.”
(citation omitted)).
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Contrary to
the Fifth Circuit’s assessment that only the Immigration Board’s
denial to sua sponte reopen the case was at issue, the Court
first observed that the Immigration Board’s decision separately
addressed two matters: (1) Mata’s motion to reopen, and (2)
whether the Immigration Board should sua sponte reopen the case.
“That courts lack jurisdiction over one matter (the sua sponte
decision) does not affect their jurisdiction over another (the
decision on [Mata]’s request).” Mata, 135 S. Ct. at 2155. In
other words, “[t]he Court of Appeals did not lose jurisdiction
over the [Immigration] Board’s denial of Mata’s motion just
because the [Immigration] Board also declined to reopen [Mata’s]
case sua sponte.” Id.
Even if, based on a presumption that the Immigration
and Nationality Act does not permit equitable tolling,
the right course on appeal is to take jurisdiction over the
case, explain why that is so, and affirm the [Immigration
Board]’s decision not to reopen. The jurisdictional
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question (whether the court has power to decide if tolling
is proper) is of course distinct from the merits question
(whether tolling is proper). The Fifth Circuit thus
retains jurisdiction even if Mata’s appeal lacks merit. . .
. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have asserted
jurisdiction over Mata’s appeal and addressed the equitable
tolling question.
Mata, 135 S. Ct. at 2156 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court
then noted that “the Fifth Circuit’s practice of
recharacterizing appeals like Mata’s as challenges to the
Board’s sua sponte decisions and then declining to exercise
jurisdiction over them” prevents potential splits among the
circuits from “coming to light” and addressed by the Court. Id.
(“[T]he Fifth Circuit may not . . . wrap . . . a merits decision
in jurisdictional garb so that we cannot address a possible
division between that court and every other.”).
If a litigant misbrands a motion, but could get relief
under a different label, a court will often make the
requisite change. But that established practice does not
entail sidestepping the judicial obligation to exercise
jurisdiction. And it results in identifying a route to
relief, not in rendering relief impossible. That makes all
the difference between a court’s generously reading
pleadings and a court’s construing away adjudicative
authority.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Just as federal appellate courts should not “construe
away” jurisdiction and prevent substantive decisions from
“coming to light,” so, too, should Hawaii’s courts and agencies
not construe pro se filings in a manner that leads to a decision
that does not promote access to justice, or, as pertinent here,
does not further the “humanitarian purpose of the workers’
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compensation statute.” Panoke v. Reef Dev. of Haw., Inc., 136
Hawaii 448, 462, 363 P.3d 296, 310 (2015) (“[T]he broad
humanitarian purpose of the workers’ compensation statute read
as a whole requires that all reasonable doubts be resolved in
favor of the claimant[.]” (quoting Van Ness v. State, Dep’t of
Educ., 131 Hawaii 545, 558, 319 P.3d 464, 477 (2014)) (citation,
internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)). Instead, pro
se filings, even when “misbranded,” should be reasonably
construed in a manner that “results in identifying a route to
relief, not in rendering relief impossible.” Mata, 135 S. Ct.
at 2156. In this case, in identifying a “route to relief,”
LIRAB should have informed Waltrip that she filed her September
Request before the wrong governmental entity.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ICA’s
Judgment on Appeal. The ICA’s Judgment as to the July 2011
Decision and August Request is affirmed. The ICA’s Judgment as
to the September Request is affirmed on other grounds. This
case is remanded to LIRAB for entry of an order dismissing the
September Request for lack of jurisdiction. Such dismissal
shall indicate that it is without prejudice to any subsequent
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attempt by Waltrip to request that the Director reopen her case
pursuant to HRS § 386-89.
Deborah J. Waltrip, /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
petitioner pro se
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
Robyn M. Kuwabe,
for respondent, Special /s/ Michael D. Wilson
Compensation Fund
Robert E. McKee, Jr.,
for respondents, TS Enterprises,
Inc., dba Kimo’s Restaurant, and
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company
37